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ABSTRACT
Despite a growing body of research on African American schoolteachers and their role in
the civil rights movement, as well as increased interest in South Carolina’s civil rights
movement, few historians have uncovered the contributions black schoolteachers made to
the South Carolina movement. Additionally, while many histories have highlighted how
integral the NAACP was to the civil rights movement, few have revealed the deliberate
relationship they built with black teachers associations.

This dissertation uses the

NAACP papers, political manuscript collections, oral histories, newspaper and magazine
articles, and court documents to address this gap in the historiography.

Chapter 1

discusses the Charleston black teacher hiring campaign of 1917-1920 in which the newly
created NAACP chapter fought to get black teachers placed in the city’s black schools.
Chapter 2 examines the 1940s teacher salary equalization campaign in which the NAACP
filed lawsuits on behalf of local teachers to acquire salary equalization between white and
black teachers. Chapter 3 focuses on the Clarendon County movement, which started in
the 1940s as a fight to acquire bus transportation for black students, grew into a fight for
equal school facilities, and became the first of five the desegregation cases that
culminated into the historic Brown decision. Chapter 4 examines a 1956 case in which
twenty-one teachers in Elloree, South Carolina lost their jobs for their alleged connection
to the NAACP. Chapter 5 looks at the case of Orangeburg schoolteacher Gloria Rackley
who was dismissed from her job because of her civil rights activism. Collectively, these
chapters not only prove that black teachers played an integral role in South Carolina’s
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civil rights movement, but that they were vital in pushing the movement from one of
racial uplift and equalization to a mass protest and desegregation.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 9, 1908, the Colored Ministerial Union presented a petition to the Charleston
City Board of Public School Commissioners in which they conveyed a “great and crying
need” for more and better school facilities for black children. Without these facilities, the
ministered argued, black children were “roaming the streets and growing . . . in
ignorance, idleness and crime.”1 The African American ministers stressed that more
schools for African American children would cure these social ills. Convinced that
industrial training was the “greatest and most immediate needs,” they also believed that
black teachers should instruct black children. The ministers asked the board to allow
African American teachers to complete the teachers’ examination. After all, there were
“many [black teachers] in the city—of acknowledged ability—and competence.”2 These
competent black teachers should be “put in full charge” of the “colored schools.”3
During the Reconstruction era and in the decades thereafter, black Charlestonians
struggled believed emphatically that a quality education was central to advancing social
and political rights.

With the conscious push by African Americans to hire black

teachers, these educators often joined and played critical leadership roles in the
burgeoning civil rights movement. This dissertation focuses on that role.

1

Minutes, Records of the City Board of Public School Commissioners, Charleston
County Public Library, Box 8.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
1

This research relies heavily on sources created by the organization at the center of
the South Carolina civil rights movement—the NAACP. The NAACP papers contain
newspaper clippings, correspondence between members of local chapters and the New
York office, as well as between the NAACP and other organizations such as the Palmetto
State Teachers Association (PSTA) and the American Friends Service Committee.
Correspondence between the NAACP and the PSTA is especially important because it
provides evidence that the PSTA often worked in conjunction with the NAACP.
A very critical part of my research examines the massive white resistance to the
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. In order to probe the resistance of white
residents and the adverse impacts this resistance had on African American educators, I
explored the papers of the South Carolina White Citizens Councils (WCC), which
document ordinary citizens’ efforts to prevent desegregation. I mined the papers of the
Gressette Committee, appointed by Governor Jim Byrnes, to demonstrate state-mandated
efforts to avoid desegregation and to show that South Carolina’s politicians differentiated
themselves from other southern politicians by anticipating rather than reacting to Brown.
All of these materials enabled me to employ segregationists’ own words to show the
motives behind their opposing movement.
I will also incorporate oral histories with teachers and others directly connected to
my research. Oral histories will permit me to give a fuller understanding of what teacheractivists were risking, connect their activism to the communities they worked in, and add
emotion to these histories.
This dissertation builds on previous histories of the black teacher’s role in their
community. These histories can be vastly different in chronological and geographical
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scope, but tend to address four central issues. One major area of focus is African
Americans’ efforts to gain and retain education autonomy. One of Heather Williams’
most persuasive arguments in Self Taught: African American Education in Slavery and
Freedom is that the newly emancipated freed people initiated their education. They both
funded their schools and worked as the teachers. Likewise, Christopher Span argues in
From Cotton Field to Schoolhouse: African American Education in Mississippi that
African Americans were black education’s most ardent supporters during and after the
Civil War. They envisioned that these schools, built by and for them, would help ensure
full citizenship.
Secondly, this historiography has largely positioned teaching as women’s work.
Sonya Ramsey does this with her focus on women teachers in Nashville. Her goal is to
explain how these women defined their middle-class status and navigated the path
between the various social movements that helped define their lifetimes—racial uplift,
the women’s movement, and the black civil rights movement. Likewise in Freedom’s
Teacher: The Life of Septima Clark, Katherine Charron’s analysis of the career of a
woman teacher in Charleston and Columbia uncovers how education was understood to
be women’s work. And it would be this mostly female teaching force that turned these
segregated spaces into places where citizenship could be taught alongside an emerging
civil rights movement. Moreover, women’s roles as teachers lead to their participation in
black teachers associations, providing them with an opportunity to be politically active.4

4

Sonya Ramsey, Reading, Writing, and Segregation: A Century of Black Women
Teachers in Nashville, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008);
Katherine Mellen Charron, Freedom’s Teacher: The Life of Septima Clark, (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
3

A third central theme in the historiography has been that teaching black children
was inherently political work. This theme is at the forefront of Adam Fairclough’s m
book, A Class of Their Own: Black Teachers in the Segregated South, in which he argues
that black teachers were at the center of the long struggle for education equality in the
South, and that education and educators remained heavily politicized elements of
southern culture. Fairclough further argues that black segregated schools were one part
of the larger system of Jim Crow—that segregated schools were as instrumental to
maintaining white supremacy as sharecropping, disfranchisement, etc. Ronald Butchart
devoted his book, Schooling the Freed People, to contesting the notion that the freed
people’s teachers were predominantly northern, white, middle-class, and unmarried
women.

Instead he proves that: these teachers were predominantly black; the

overwhelming majority (white or black) were southern; they were just as likely to be
male as female; and that a substantial number had poor/working-class backgrounds.
More importantly for the purposes of this study is Butchart’s argument that even when
the teachers themselves did not embrace abolitionist politics, or the Radical Republicans’
goals to expand black political rights, education itself is “always, everywhere, and
inevitably, political.”5
A fourth central issue in this history has been that teachers served a constituency
that consisted of both their students and the broader black community. Such an emphasis
is present in African American Women Educators: A Critical Examination of Their
Pedagogies, Educational Ideas, and Activities from the Nineteenth to the Mid-Twentieth
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Ronald Butchart, Schooling the Freed People: Teaching, Learning, and the Struggle for
Black Freedom, 1861-1876. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010),
xix.
4

Century. The women featured in this collection often demonstrate a deep commitment to
the communities they served, and their work easily overflowed from the schoolhouse to
the neighborhood. In fact, the editors and contributors seem to argue that community
involvement was a pedagogical practice that enabled these women to be more effective
teachers.

Vanessa Siddle Walker’s scholarship also positions teachers in their

communities. In “African American Teaching in the South: 1940-1960” Walker argues
that although African American teachers dealt with difficult circumstances beyond their
control, it is more important to understand that those obstacles did not constrain them.
Instead, these men and women developed professional practices around their
understanding of what their communities needed most.
My dissertation builds on all of these themes. Even before the NAACP’s arrival
during World War I, black Carolinians demonstrated that they wanted to have a greater
say in their children’s education, and that they believed the black teachers were central to
this goal.

This assertion takes center stage in my first chapter.

My research also

positions teaching as women’s work, proving that women teachers played a critical role
in the South Carolina civil rights movement. In my research they serve as some of the
most important organizers and litigants. Education’s politicization is apparent throughout
the whole study as African American teachers found themselves at the center of intraracial and interracial political discussion.

Additionally teachers, especially in rural

communities, knew their work extended outside the classroom. These men and women
took the lead demanding and advancing education equality.
My first chapter examines the Charleston teacher hiring campaign of 1917 to
1920. The NAACP had just arrived in South Carolina, forming its first chapters in
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Charleston and Columbia in 1917. Their movement into South Carolina was part of
larger goal to increase its southern black membership and form a mass movement. At the
same time, WWI created a higher expectation for socioeconomic advancement. This
campaign was part of a larger labor struggle. Charleston had a policy of not hiring black
teachers in the city schools. Black teachers could work in the county, but not in the city
limits. However, there were black public schools, which meant that white teachers taught
black children in segregated schools.
Black Charlestonians were adamantly opposed to this policy because they
believed it would reinforce ideas of racial inferiority. They believed that black teachers’
presence would give them more control of their children’s education and better prepare
them for the future. So, although the black teacher hiring campaign benefitted black
teachers, the main impetus was providing better education opportunities for black
children.
The teacher hiring campaign was successful and proved to be a clear catalyst for
greater civil rights participation. In 1920, the city agreed to hire only black teachers in its
black schools. NAACP membership increased.

At the same time, more black

Charlestonians joined the city’s growing NAACP chapter. As a highly visible and well
organized mobilization effort, the campaign to African American teachers in the city’s
black schools proved to the newly arrived NAACP that education could be the
centerpiece of a mass protest movement.
The second chapter examines the teacher salary equalization campaign of 19401947. States throughout the South routinely paid black teachers substantially lower
salaries than white teachers, and these equalization suits became a central part of the
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NAACP’s judicial method in the 1940s. South Carolina’s first three equalization cases—
Malissa Theresa Smith, Eugene C. Hunt, and Viola Louis Duvall—originated in
Charleston, but Duvall’s case was the only one to make it to federal district court. The
NAACP won Duvall’s case in 1944 before Judge Waites Waring. When Albert N.
Thompson, a teacher at Columbia’s Booker T. Washington Heights Elementary School,
submitted his salary equalization petition to the Richland County School Board on June
7, 1944, the NAACP took up his case as well.
On May 26, 1945, Judge Waring ruled in Thompson’s favor, concluding that
Columbia’s black teachers were entitled to an equal salary plan. The board had to begin a
new classification system, effective spring 1946. Ben D. Wood, the National Teacher
Examination (NTE) creator, predicted that black teachers would score lower than white
teachers. The South Carolina State Board of Education did a two-year study that
supported Wood’s prediction, and beginning in 1945 all the state’s teachers were required
to take the exam.
South Carolina’s use of the NTE not only facilitated unequal salaries between
black and white teachers but also emphasized the black community’s preexisting
economic disparities. The gap between the highest and lowest paid black teachers
widened.

Those who did well on the exam and earned higher wages were better

financially situated to pursue advanced degrees and further increase their earning
potential. These additional economic and educational achievements helped legitimize the
state’s use of standardized testing since white officials could now present this as proof of
the exam’s alleged objectivity.

7

Nonetheless, the teacher salary equalization campaign also revealed the shifting
tides of civil rights activism. These suits helped to increase the NAACP’s southern
membership. They were sometimes the first experience African Americans had in formal
protests and provided the foundation for a broader protest movement. Indeed, those who
participated in the campaign found it transformative and defining.
Chapter 3 examines the historic Briggs v. Elliott case that challenged educational
inequity in Clarendon County, South Carolina. While the Briggs case attracted attention
from many historians and legal scholars, this study will specifically underline the critical
roles teachers played in crafting and supporting this pivotal legal effort. Although I have
endeavored to discuss the leadership and activism of several teachers, Rev. J. A. De
Laine takes center stage because he was the major driving force behind the case. De
Laine’s role as a preacher has been closely examined in the past, (Lochbaum) but one of
the ways this study will differentiate itself from previous histories is by examining De
Laine’s career as an educator. Additionally, I focus on the juxtaposition of teaching and
preaching, and how the combination of these careers uniquely positioned Rev. De Laine
to lead the equalization turned desegregation suit.
This chapter begins with the Pearson suit, initiated by an African American
farmer and property owner named Levi Pearson, that would provide school bus
transportation to black children. It then moves on to the Briggs school equalization suit,
that later evolved into the Briggs school desegregation suit.

The Briggs case is

historically important because it was the first of the five cases that formed the historic
Brown decision. But this chapter also underscores that civil rights activism was met with
a white massive resistance efforts that often included sever economic reprisals. The
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Briggs case demonstrates that those economic reprisals could be just as effective as racial
violence. Simultaneously, the Briggs case reveals that reprisals could spark activism and
bolster membership in and support of the NAACP. Local level activism in Clarendon
County further reveals that the 1950s was a conduit to the youth-led 1960s movement.
This is best demonstrated by the events at Scott’s Branch High School where high school
seniors led the ouster of S. Isaiah Benson, the school’s principal who they regarded as
unqualified and currupt.
Chapter 4 is a case study on twenty-one teachers in the small town of Elloree in
Orangeburg County who were all effectively dismissed from their jobs on the same day
for refusing to satisfactorily answer questions regarding membership in the NAACP. As
African American activism in South Carolina expanded in the aftermath of the Brown
decision, black Carolinians began submitting desegregation petitions in 1955, including
in Elloree. The White Citizens Councils (WCC), originally founded in Mississippi,
emerged in South Carolina at the same time. Its first two chapters were founded in
Elloree and Orangeburg. S. Emory Rogers, the state’s lead attorney in the Briggs case,
was the principal founder and organizer and organizer in the state. The Council levied
economic reprisals against the desegregation petitioners and the NAACP launched a
counter attack. They boycotted all WCC owned businesses.
In 1956, the state legislature passed a slew of anti-NAACP legislation—a
reflection of the WCC’s inability to stymie local activism. This study closely examines
the anti-NAACP oath—a law that required civic employees to reveal if they were
NAACP members. South Carolina’s black leaders believed the law was geared towards
teachers. As a result teachers all across the state lost their teaching positions. But the
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events in Elloree stood out from the rest. When it came time to renew their yearly
contracts, the school district superintendent gave out a new lengthy questionnaire that
directly questioned if teachers were NAACP members and if they supported
desegregation. Not all these teachers were NAACP members, yet they all believed that
the questions on their contract were an infringement on their constitutional rights. As a
result twenty-one teachers (the majority of the Elloree Training School’s faculty) were
not re-hired. This created an opportunity for the NAACP to bring a legal suit, Ola Bryan
v. M. G. Austin, in 1956. In the suit the NAACP argued that the anti-NAACP oath was
unconstitutional. When the district court refused to address the oath’s unconstitutionality,
the NAACP appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The state repealed the law
only to replace it with two new anti- NAACP laws: 1) the barratry law which was
intended to prevent desegregation petitions, and 2) a law requiring teachers to list all of
their organizational affiliations—proving that teachers had been the target all along.
The fifth and final chapter focuses primarily on an Orangeburg teacher named
Gloria Rackley, a young wife and mother who became one of the city’s most prominent
activists. Orangeburg blacks already had a history of civil rights activism. But in the
1960s the city—home to two black colleges—became a hotbed of student activism.
Local teachers, including Rackley, openly supported student activism.
The legal case that brought Rackley to the forefront was a desegregation suit
against Orangeburg Regional Hospital. On October 12, 1962, She took her daughter,
Jamelle, to the hospital after she was hurt at school. Rackley was told to sit in a
segregated waiting area that only had crates for patrons. Refusing to abide by the
hospital’s segregation policy, Rackley sat in the whites-only waiting area and faced
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threats of arrest as her daughter was being treated. Before Rackley could be arrested, her
daughter reappeared, and they were able to leave the hospital. When they returned for a
follow-up visit and Rackley sat in the white waiting area again, she was arrested. The
NAACP brought a desegregation suit against the hospital—Rackley v. Board of Trustees.
When the federal district court did not rule in their favor, civil rights attorney Matthew
Perry appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Rackley’s arrest led to a mid-school year dismissal in 1963. Matthew Perry filed
a suit against the school district—Rackley v. School District that challenged the grounds
on which his client was fired.

Rackley and the NAACP won both the hospital

desegregation case in 1965 and the case against the school board in 1966. It was clear
that the hospital practiced racial segregation, which was a violation of the Constitution.
The judge in the school case concluded that the sole reason Rackley was dismissed from
her teaching position because of her activism, and that was an insufficient reason to
dismiss her. But they were both moot points because by the time the decisions were
made, Rackley and her daughters were living in Virginia.

Rackley’s activism

demonstrated the ways in which reprisals could be gendered and wreak havoc on one’s
personal life. Rackley’s activism contributed to her divorce. (Her husband lost is
professorship at SC State.) A juvenile court judge threatened to remove her younger
daughter, Lurma, from the home because her activism resulted in numerous arrests. And
the Rackley’s never return to South Carolina to live, even though it was their home.
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CHAPTER 1: “I HAD TO FIND A JOB TEACHING:” THE CHARLESTON
BLACK TEACHER HIRING CAMPAIGN, 1917-1920
After Mamie Garvin Fields graduated from Claflin University (a small African
American Methodist college in Orangeburg, South Carolina) in 1908, she received her
first teaching job in Pine Wood, South Carolina—an area she described to as “the poorest
part of the state.”1 She taught there with her sister Hattie in a one-room school building
provided by the black community. Fields was initially hired to teach one month but local
African American residents raised enough funds for her teach a full school year.
Afterwards Fields needed consistent employment and returned home to Charleston to
find a teaching job. With a teaching diploma and special “Licentiate of Instruction” she
quickly realized that her credentials were not sufficient to secure a position in the city.2
Instead, she was sent to teach in a rural county area. Fields remembered:
In 1909 I landed a school on John’s Island, a coveted
venture, because very few of the black graduates were
getting jobs. All the schools were taught by white women,
mainly the wives of trustees. . . But since white people
taught in the city schools, you had to try to go in the
county.3
Fields’ experiences reflected those of other contemporary African American
teachers’ in Charleston during a time when a black teacher in a city school “was still the
1

Mamie Garvin Fields, Lemon Swamp and Other Places: A Carolina Memoir (Free
Press, 1985), 104–106.
2
Lemon Swamp and Other Places, 107-110. A “Licentiate of Instruction” was given to
those who did special courses in pedagogy.
3
Ibid., 110.
12

substance of things hoped for.”4 Despite the fact that there were public schools for black
children in the city, Charleston school officials only hired them in rural county schools.
Only white teachers worked in the city schools. As a result, white teachers instructed
black students in racially segregated schools. White teachers’ placement in black schools
was not peculiar to Charleston. It was practiced in several southern urban areas. For
instance, Nashville, Tennessee’s African American residents began petitioning the
Nashville City Board of Education for black teachers in 1868; and the board began hiring
black teachers in 1887. When New Orleans began hiring black teachers in 1916,
Charleston became the only remaining southern city to continue this practice.5
This chapter will discuss black Charlestonians’ efforts to ensure black teachers’
placement in black schools through the teacher hiring campaign of 1917 to 1920. The
case would ultimately demonstrate to the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) that education could serve as the ideal centerpiece to a mass
social movement. This chapter will also emphasize the ways in which gender issues
intersected with education and segregation. The teacher hiring campaign provides a
chance for scholars to rethink the intersections of race, class, and gender in historical
research—to move beyond explaining multiple oppressions or privileges in order to
analyze how the two intersect.6 This case also presents scholars with an opportunity to
4

Edmund L. Drago, Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations: Charleston’s Avery
Normal Institute (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 169. Jeannette Cox's
words, African American schoolteacher and wife to Avery Normal School principal
Benjamin F. Cox.
5
Sonya Yvette Ramsey, Reading, Writing, and Segregation: A Century of Black Women
Teachers in Nashville (University of Illinois Press, 2008), 1; Katherine Mellen Charron,
Freedom’s Teacher: The Life of Septima Clark (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2009), 89.
6
See Jennifer C Nash, “Re-thinking Intersectionality,” Feminist Review 89, no. 1 (June
2008).
13

rethink and reimagine African Americans’ goals on the local level, and reconsider how
much their aims reflected the national NAACP headquarters.
The policy of hiring white teachers in Charleston began in the years following
Reconstruction when the school superintendent complained that there were not enough
qualified black teachers.

The state superintendent was largely responsible because

although there was an effort to expand the number of teachers’ summer schools, over
eighty percent of those funds were for white teachers’ programs. Moreover, teachers
complained that the examinations they were given went far beyond what was necessary
for an elementary school teacher to know. Nonetheless neither the city or the state
proposed a way to improve black teachers alleged lack of qualifications, but instead
remedied the issues by first recommending lower standards for black teachers, and then
hiring white teachers in black schools.7
African Americans were opposed to the use of white teachers in black schools for
multitude reasons. On one level, it subjected black children to notions of racial
inferiority. The fact that white teachers regarded black children as inferior and favored a
limited education for black children overshadowed any possible benefits these children
received from going to school. Many African Americans correctly believed that white
teachers, who used their time in black schools to gain the necessary experience for a
promotion to a white school, cared more about their salaries than about their charges. On
another level, African American leaders believed that white teachers did not have the

7

George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes: 1877-1900 (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1952), 219-220.
14

same social contract with the children that black teachers did.8 An editorial in the
NAACP journal The Crisis observed:
Of all the cities in the South, Charleston is guilty of the
meanest act toward colored folks. It keeps in their school
white teachers, teachers who do not want to be there;
teachers who despise their work and who work mainly for
the money which it brings them. These teachers are
Southern whites and they are teaching little colored
children, doing the work mechanically and with a cruelty
of discipline that is shameful. Openly and persistently the
white city gives two and only two reasons for this farce:
first, that they want to teach black folk their place; and
secondly, that they want to supply certain people with
employment.9
Conversely, black teachers’ work was influenced by a “contractarian rationale” that to act
in their students’ best interest was to act in their own best interest.10 African Americans
feared that white teachers’ mediocre expectations, coupled with attending schools in
inferior facilities, would teach black children that they were, in fact, second-class citizens
and should regard whites as their innate superiors.11 Indeed, that was exactly what white
supremacists intended.

In 1925 Andrew Butler (A.B.) Rhett, Charleston’s school

superintendent, recalled:
I have always been of the opinion that the reason why there
has been so little race friction in Charleston was that the
colored children from a very early age were under the
control and influence of white principals and teachers and
were taught to look up to and respect white people.12
8

I. A Newby, Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina from 1895 to
1968, 1st ed., South Carolina Tricentennial Commission no. 6 (Columbia: Published for
the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press,
1973), 158; Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 175.
9
Editorial, The Crisis, XIII(April, 1917), 270 .
10
See David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford University Press, 1986), 8–9.
11
Black Carolinians, 158.
12
Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 175.
15

Although African American teachers’ presence was largely about improved education
opportunities, their hiring went hand-in-hand with decreasing segregation’s adverse
psychological effects. For Charleston’s African Americans, increasing control of black
schools through the employment of black teachers was the best way to combat
segregation’s damage.

In the privacy of their own community, African American

families sought to prepare their children for the hard reality of living in a society shaped
by the forces of white supremacy. Through positive reinforcement they would ensure
their sons and daughters’ self-confidence, grooming them for the possibility of
professional jobs and leadership.13 In this sense, the black school and teacher served as
an integral part of this preparation.
Positive perceptions of black teachers stood in stark contrast to those of the white
teacher. This was partly because the teaching profession could attract the best and the
brightest African Americans. For example, Mamie Garvin Fields always thought she
would make a good teacher because she often had the highest grades.14 Established in
1869 through Methodist Episcopal missionaries, Claflin was the first college for blacks in
South Carolina. 15 Its students “in training to be teachers had to take pedagogy, the art of
teaching, as well as all the regular school subjects—English, history, math, music,
science, and of course the Bible.”16 Given Claflin’s strong curriculum, Fields felt that she
received plenty of experience as a student teacher since they “were in great demand all
13

Stephanie J Shaw, What a Woman Ought to Be and to Do: Black Professional Women
Workers During the Jim Crow Era, Women in Culture and Society (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1996), 29.
14
Lemon Swamp and Other Places, 83.
15
South Carolina Negroes, 226.
16
Lemon Swamp and Other Places, 90.
16

around, because almost every [black] schoolteacher had more to do than one person could
handle well.”17 And despite the fact that legislation explicitly intended that black land
grant schools, like South Carolina State College, have an agricultural and industrial based
curriculum, these higher education institutions quickly became important teacher training
schools with a curriculum that was more classical oriented and focused on liberal arts.18
In fact, a comprehensive study of black land grant schools from 1911-1917 revealed that
almost every school was neglecting rural-life training, and had “poorly run farming and
mechanical programs.”19 State legislatures may have preferred agricultural/industrial
education, but it was rare for any black land-grant school to receive more than half the
monies allotted to them. Therefore, by 1917 most of these schools were essentially
running as autonomous institutions. Such autonomy allowed black land grant schools to
focus on a classical education strategy and operate as teacher training centers. 20
Many of South Carolina’s African American teachers worked hard to reduce the
boundaries to success that many students faced. For instance, teachers asked local
churches for clothing and shoes for their students since this was sometimes a reason
parents did not send children to school. When Fields and Rosalee Brown began teaching
on John’s Island, the former teacher, a white woman who was a trustee’s wife, told them
that the children did not come to school very often.21 That may have been true, but Fields
contended that “white folks didn’t care much if our children came to school or didn’t, but
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we tried to get them to come.”22 This unremitting commitment to their students was part
of black teachers’ training. Fields, and the other student teachers, were taught “to keep
close to the parents, even if that meant going home with a child after school.”23 Mary
McCleod Bethune, the well-known African American educator and civil rights activist,
noted that her ability to inspire other teachers came from understanding that their work
seeped outside the classroom. She recalled:
She didn’t wait for the parents to send the children. She
went out and got them. And if something was holding the
children back, she took that as her business too.24
Indeed, African American colleges trained their teachers “toward service.”25 They were
encouraged to get to know the communities in which they taught. Fields demonstrated
such service to her students and the larger community when she read a news article at a
PTA meeting announcing a minimum wage increase, therefore ensuring the parents knew
that they had legal recourse to demand higher wages from their employers.26
African American teachers were deeply committed to removing white teachers
from black schools. From their perspective, this was sure to provide a better education
for black children, as well as increased professional and personal opportunities for
themselves.27 These professional opportunities helped them “adopt to—and sometimes
overcome—the economic and social obstacles of a racially inequitable system.”28
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Through their experiences, as teachers and students, black educators corroborated
their community’s concerns regarding the negative educational and psychological effects
white teachers imparted onto black students. Septima Clark—the well-known teacher,
NAACP member, and leader with the Highlander Folk School and Citizenship Schools—
went to Shaw Memorial School in Charleston where she had white teachers “who
expressed their gratitude for their jobs by reinforcing white ideas of black inferiority.”29
Clark’s experiences translated into a negative perception of school until her mother,
Victoria Poinsette, withdrew her from public school and sent her to a black-womenoperated private school on Logan Street in Charleston. Those experiences with black
teachers changed her negative feelings.30
Fields’ experiences as a Claflin University student also support this perception.
She felt ill-prepared for courses compared to her classmates who had been taught by
black teachers.31

One of her best friends, who had African American teachers in

Barnwell, South Carolina, helped Fields “catch up” on material “those Rebel do-nothing
women” had not taught her.32 In fact, Fields’ experiences with white teachers were so
damaging that even after Charleston agreed to hire black teachers she refused to send her
children to the public schools because “those same white teachers were still there” and
were yet “pure Rebels.”33
By the same token, some African American educators had the opportunity to
obtain teaching positions formerly held by whites and often felt they inherited a group of
students who were not well prepared or properly trained by their white instructors. Fields
29
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found that she had to teach her students some of the most elementary basics. For
example, the previous white teacher told her that the students “dance[d] the Sam just
nice.”34 Fields argued that:
[w]hether or not the children know how to sing and dance
wasn’t the point. They did. But to me, if they are
Americans, they ought to be able to sing ‘America, the
Beautiful’ and say the Pledge of Allegiance. My school
was in the United States, after all, and not the
Confederacy.35
She also recalled an incident when one of her students ran up to her say, “He cuss me
black.”36 After Fields explained that and all the students were black, and forbade them
from arguing over what was a fact, she developed a curriculum that taught the students
that black was beautiful.37 She trained them not to lower their eyes or shuffle when
speaking to her, saying that sometimes the “good manners” black children were taught
were used to condition them to the ways of the Old South.38 These daily instances pushed
black teachers to develop their own pedagogy and curriculum that intentionally went
beyond what textbooks and prescribed lesson plans. As Fields’ words and actions
demonstrate, not only were African American teachers equipped to teach their students
the rudiments of reading, writing, and arithmetic, they were deeply concerned with
ensuring that their students understood concepts of citizenship and merged those concepts
with notions of racial pride.

Likewise, positive experiences with black teachers

reinforced the belief that they had a vital role to play in black children’s education. For
example, one teacher who went to school on Johns Island recalled learning about
34
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important African American figures like Harriet Tubman and Frederick Douglass
instilled in her a sense of racial pride.39
Many white southerners strongly opposed the employment of African American
teachers in city schools. For instance, the presence of educated blacks presented a
challenge to the South’s racialized hierarchy. It could flaunt the fact that some African
Americans acquired a higher education level than many poor and working-class whites.40
Moreover, as Florida gubernatorial candidate—and later governor—Sidney J. Catts
proclaimed, there was “no room in the South for the well educated Negro, no one wants a
Negro for a lawyer or a doctor or a banker.”41 According to him, all any African
American needed was to be literate enough to read his or her Bible.42
Fields recalled that “whites didn’t like to think you had leisure to do anything but
pick cotton and work in the field.”43 Even children were not supposed to have access to
time and/or money. And those who did have it “ought not show it.”44 When Florida
passed a law stating that white teachers could not teach black children and black teachers
could not teach white children, one white newspaper declared that it was customary, even
in the days of slavery, for white women to teach black children. Therefore, “the situation
during slavery was . . . in a certain respect, better” and “to cut off the colored people from
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any instruction from the whites is simply terrible.”45 The statements overlooked the fact
that teaching slaves how to read was illegal and that these women generally were
interested in teaching slaves enough skills to make them useful plantation laborers.
Ironically, this type of teaching seems to be exactly what African Americans were
striving to combat. They wanted teachers with a pedagogy oriented towards racial uplift.
In 1914 South Carolina passed a similar measure as Florida. Champions of the
Fortner Bill wanted to “prohibit white persons from teaching in negro schools and to
prohibit negroes from teaching in white schools.”46 Some white Carolinians, however,
were defensive of their motives and warned that the removal of white teachers would
result in bedlam:
We deny that the white man needs any law to prevent the
Negro from measuring up to a place of equality with him.
If that proposition is once admitted and entered on our
statute books it will stand as an ineffaceable libel on our
South Carolina manhood.
In addition, the measure to prevent race equality, if
enacted into law, will open the doors for the very evils
which we most fear, and have reason to fear. If white
teachers are removed from our public schools and the
youthful Negro mind is turned over to the mercy of vicious
Northern Negro teachers to implant therein the seeds of
race hatred, we will soon be face to face with incendiary
conditions that may burst forth at any moment of the night
or day with terrible consequences.47
Such language reflected the insecurities and perceived threats educated blacks allegedly
posed. Others believed that hiring black teachers was acceptable, but only if they were

45

“Opinion,” The Crisis, February 1914, 176. Excerpt from the Boston Advertiser.
South Carolina General Assembly House of Representatives, Journal, 1914, 209.
47
“The Fortner Bill,” The Crisis, April 1914, 280. Excerpt from the Columbia Record.
46

22

under whites’ constant supervision.48 Either way, South Carolina legislators saw a clear
link between controlling black education and maintaining white supremacy. In short,
educating black Carolinians would pose a direct challenge to southern notions of white
manhood.
White Carolinians made no secret of their intentions to maintain the status quo:
In the northern part of this country are a few, a very few,
scholarly and earnest men, some of them rich, who believe
in the equality of the races and who wish to see it
established in politics and in social life. They are mistaken
men, they are doing what they can to promote this
equality.49
The white press expressed serious fears of African American ascendency.50 To them it
was clear that African Americans sought “forward movement” through “avidity for
education” and “reach[ing] for agricultural independence.”51

Therefore, blacks’ and

whites rhetoric placed teachers at the center of African American’s attempts for
socioeconomic advancement.
The motivations undergirding white opposition to hiring black teachers become
clearer when other legislative issues are considered. For example, the Fortner Bill also
forbade white nurses from treating black patients and the “intimacy of the races in houses
of ill-repute.”52 The proposed bill obviously played on “the titillating and violence-
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provoking” fears regarding miscegenation and rape by black men on white women that
were employed “after emancipation, when it served the purposes of racial
segregationists.”53 Members of the white press lambasted the 1914 bill as “shortsighted”
and accused its presenter, Rep. Fortner, of holding office through “ignorance and
prejudice.”54 It would “bring about the collapse of Bleaseism ‘and all that it portends.’”55
The bill played on post-emancipation fears of miscegenation and the myth of the black
beast rapist in order to “serve the purposes of racial segregationists.”56 Indeed, part of the
difficulty in getting black teachers hired in the city schools was that it bore the
appearance of “black men agitating against white women.”57 Moreover, as much as
African Americans wanted their own teachers, they surely would have been opposed to
the language Fortner used to describe the bill. He promised that hiring black teachers
would “prevent the possibility of equality between the races.”58

Therefore fears of

miscegenation were linked, through proposed legislation, to public schooling long before
the desegregation/integration struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, which places the massive
white resistance movement’s roots in the early twentieth century.
African Americans also faced white Charlestonians’ opposition to passing a
compulsory education law. They made their reasons for opposition quite clear. If
African Americans were required by the law to go to school, it would grant them “the
same provisions as the whites, with the result of exceedingly high education, but an
53
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aggravation of the labor problem and an end of agricultural pursuits.”59

African

American children, therefore, should not receive the same education as whites because it
would result in two races being “equally educated” and create a “servant problem,”
disrupting the “God intended” order of “master and servant.”60 Still some warned that the
legislature’s maintenance of white supremacy by not passing a compulsory education law
would “in the end operate to overthrow it.”61 Members of South Carolina’s white press
made a compelling case connecting compulsory education to the disfranchisement of
white men:
With one accord our political leaders insist that no white
man shall be prevented from voting in the primary and, so
long as the primary is the election that elects, there is
nothing to induce the illiterate or propertyless [sic] white
man to fit himself to be a legal elector. These same leaders,
most of them, refuse to press for a compulsory school
attendance law and so they consent to the growing up of
thousands of white men in illiteracy.62
As

above

quote

indicated,

African

Americans’

continued

oppression

and

disfranchisement complicated poor and working-class men’s status. These efforts may
have been intended to limit blacks’ socioeconomic advancement, but they concurrently
affected some whites. South Carolina did pass a compulsory education law in 1915.63
Unfortunately there were still “a number of loopholes” that made it “only partially
applicable to colored children.”64
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The Palmetto State’s black population had logical reasons to be wary of engaging
in political activism, but none was more significant or terrifying than becoming a
lynching victim. Violence, as during slavery and Reconstruction’s end, was a very
important part of gaining and maintaining white supremacy in the South.65 Some South
Carolina whites argued that lynching was a necessary evil. It was not the fault of those
who participated in the violent acts, but the Republican party’s, “which put the South
under the yoke of the carpetbagger, the Negro and the scalawag” making it “necessary for
the white man to use lawlessness to secure the restoration of law and order.”66 The
statement singularly dismantled notions that lynching was about protecting white
womanhood.67
In 1916, one year before the NAACP came to South Carolina, Anthony Crawford
was lynched on October 21. The Crawford case took place in Abbeville and gained
national attention from the black media.68 A “self-respecting, wealthy Negro citizen,” he
was once quoted as saying, “the day a white man hits me is the day I die.”69 One witness
reported that the clerks and merchants from nearby stores closed their shops and emerged
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with “sticks, ax handles, and pick handles to beat him with.”70 There was only one
African American around—not nearly enough to stop the violence.71
African Americans also feared economic reprisals. Whites employed most blacks
who knew that participation in civil rights activities could mean job loss. Likewise, the
self-employed—i.e. carpenters, seamstresses, stonemasons, and tailors—risked a sudden
and sure boycott of their services. Very few were as lucky as Teddy Harleston, a Harvard
educated artist whose family owned a successful funeral home business, whose
membership in the black elite shielded him from economic reprisals. He was able to take
on a leadership role in the NAACP and the early Charleston civil rights movement
because he and his family were all businessmen and women with a mostly black
clientele.72
Nonetheless, black Carolinians found multiple ways to combat white supremacy.
One particularly tempting method was northern migration. Being “in constant danger of
mob violence” provided “one of the most effective arguments” to leave the South.73 Lack
of agricultural opportunities due to floods and the boll weevil, coupled with increased
opportunities in the North because of fewer European immigrants provided powerful
economic push and pull factors. As of 1917 approximately 250,000 African Americans
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had gone North; 27,000 of them were from South Carolina.74 As one black Carolinian
said:
The immediate occasion of the migration is, of course, the
opportunity in the North, now at last open to us, for
industrial betterment. The real causes are the conditions
which we have had to bear because there was no escape.75
African Americans were not only looking for economic advancements, but a way to
evade the Palmetto State’s blatant racism and frequent racial violence.
Another method of combating white supremacy in South Carolina was through
the emerging form of collective activism. Racial violence was a major contributing
factor to the NAACP’s move into the South. Indeed, the violence meant to drive people
away from activism, could draw them towards it.76 For even as violence and the threat of
violence could decrease activism, it made the “need of a militant, aggressive and
uncompromising organization” increasingly clear.77

To be sure, despite the use of

legislation and violence to tamp black progress, there remained a sense of ultimate
advancement. Referring to the racist rhetoric and policies of southern governors like
South Carolina’ Coleman Livington Blease and Mississippi’s James K. Vardaman, the
NAACP’s The Crisis said:
The Bleases and Vardamans may retard the Negro race,
they may increase the number of indolent and vicious
blacks by denying them knowledge and a fair chance . . .
but the Negro race in America is advancing rapidly in spite
74
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of all opposition; increasing thousands of them are
virtuous, wise and useful Americans.78
After all, whites’ perceptions that blacks were sending more children to school, acquiring
more land, and more of their men were qualifying for the vote perpetuated much of the
racial tension.79 The teacher hiring campaign would have agitated whites’ paranoia
regarding the repercussions of black advancement.
This racial environment facilitated the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People’s (NAACP) arrival and enabled it to become the single most important
civil rights organization in the state. As a national organization explicitly dedicated to
expanding social and political opportunities for African Americans, its arrival was as
symbolic as it was helpful.80 The NAACP envisioned this movement into the Palmetto
State as part of a larger objective to redefine itself as “a real first line defense” in the
South.81 As part of a “dozen, lusty, young branches” it would mark “a new era in the
history” of the primarily northern organization.82 The NAACP’s movement into the
South not only made it a truly national organization, but entrenched it in local
communities. It would be one of the NAACP’s greatest accomplishments during the
World War I years. The first two South Carolina chapters appeared in Charleston and
Columbia in 1917, a direct reflection of the increasing militancy among black Carolinians
during World War I. The Charleston chapter, one of the liveliest among these new
78
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southern chapters, was founded largely due to Edwin “Teddy” Harleston’s efforts, a
former student of one of the NAACP’s founders and directors, W. E. B. Du Bois. In fact,
this relationship helped lead to Du Bois’ Charleston visits in 1917 and 1921.83 I.S. Leevy
led the Columbia branch’s founding. He and other local black leaders began by forming
the Capital City Civic League, whose “sole purpose” was “contesting and contending for
our every Constitutional right, privileges and immunity, in a quiet, legal and peaceful
manner.”84 Indeed, when Leevy and the other Capital City Civic League members drafted
their 1917 Address to the People, their main goal was to “cite the Constitutional
requirements of the State of South Carolina” for voting and prepare black men to vote
“on the various important matters to be decided by the qualified electorate.”85 Among
those “important matters” was compulsory education which if passed would result in
“longer terms, better pay, better teachers.”86

Such rhetoric not only makes a direct

connection between education and voting rights, but also makes better education and a
desire for qualified black teachers founding principles for the state NAACP’s formation.
Moreover, along with Columbia attorney Butler W. Nance, who served as the Columbia
branch’s president, Leevy and the other members played an indirect yet important role in
the Charleston teacher hiring campaign. In the absence of a formal Conference of
Branches, they were often the ones who communicated directly with the NAACP’s
national office in New York.87
83
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World War I presented black Carolinians with high expectations for
socioeconomic advancement. Charleston, like many urban areas, was transitioning as
rural blacks and whites flooded the city in search of war industry jobs.88 Additionally, the
existence of black soldiers made possible a “more militant race pride.”89

Black

servicemen returned home with the confidence to assume the rights that Jim Crow South
had been denying them.90 Black leaders like Harleston, one of only a few African
Americans in the area able to vote, “imagined the possibility” of a black primary.91 Black
Carolinians joined the war effort and “earned the commendation of them which is being
freely voiced by white citizens everywhere.”92

During these early years the South

Carolina NAACP employed effective direct action methods which solidified its role as a
mode of “individual and collective empowerment.”93
The teacher hiring campaign was a significant part of a small handful of issues the
Charleston chapter chose to address in 1917. At the time there were three black public
schools in the city.94

As branch president Teddy Harleston explained, black

Charlestonians found the public school system’s policy of not hiring black teachers “very
irksome.”95 He was familiar with the problems these teachers faced because his wife,
Elise, had been a teacher and was forced to take a position far away from the comfort of
88
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her Charleston home.96 He acknowledged that the community had, “tried to have it
changed three times; they tried it thirty-five years ago and they tried twenty years ago but
failed.”97 In fact, just one year earlier, a group of black ministers unsuccessfully implored
the city to hire black teachers.98 As Fields said:
You may not believe it now, but we had to fight to get
black teachers to teach in our segregated schools. When it
came to teachers, our black schools were “integrated”! For
the longest time, they didn’t want black teachers to teach
black children in Charleston public schools.99
These comments demonstrate a commitment to equality through autonomy. Even as
many African Americans were keen on regaining the right to vote and fighting against
segregation’s many humiliations, countless others were equally eager to “separate
themselves as fully as possible” from whites.100 So, when the first state NAACP chapter
was founded in Charleston local blacks almost immediately began developing a plan to
replace the city’s white teachers. Septima Clark joined the effort in 1918 and recruited
other teachers to help. She also recruited some of her sixth grade students, effectively
initiating them into political activism. The NAACP began petitioning the Charleston
Board of Commissioners calling for the hiring of black teachers in black schools. The
Commission used a delay tactic; they promised to hire black teachers when more black
schools were constructed. Harleston had expected their petition to be denied.101 He said,
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“We had that talk before . . . I told them I could not go back to our people and give them
any such promise, that we had to have something definite and tangible.”102
Taking segregationists’ demagoguery to its ultimate conclusion, Harleston and the
Charleston NAACP enlisted a committee to petition the legislature to make a white
person teaching in black public schools illegal. On January 18, 1919, Teddy Harleston
led several hundred people in a march through Columbia’s streets and delivered the
petition to the state legislature.103 The petition—addressed to the governor, state
superintendent of education, lieutenant governor, speaker of the house, and member of
the state legislature—asked to end the “unnecessary, unusual abnormal conditions that
surround the management, instruction and teaching” of Charleston’s black children.104
The petition’s writers noted that there was no need to have white teachers in black
schools since there were “thousands of educated [black] men and women who are
prepared and worthy to teach.”105 As evidence, they pointed to the fact that “Negro
teachers do teach Negro children” not only in every other southern state, but in every
other South Carolina city.”106 In response, the Charleston school board sent their vicechairperson and superintendent to the state capitol to oppose the bill. In a desperate
argument against the bill, one politician said that it did not represent the general black
community’s wishes.107 White Charlestonians claimed that “it was not their cooks and
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laundresses who wanted the change but the ‘mulattoes.’”108 In order to disprove this
accusation, Thomas E. Miller, a former state legislature and one of the petition’s
signatories, asked Benjamin F. Cox, the Avery Normal School principal, to encourage his
teachers to “canvass the neighborhoods with petitions.”109 With the help of his friend, a
physician named John McFall, Harleston worked for a year collecting signatures on
individual cards.110
The petition committee successfully acquired the signatures of five thousand
heads of households—about three-fourths of Charleston’s black community. Therefore,
the teacher hiring campaign mobilized the majority of the black community behind the
NAACP. The argument that the general African American community did not support
hiring black teachers was not only proven false, but a new precedent was set for
collective action.111 They were able to avoid legislative action altogether when, on
February 3, 1920, the board of public school commissioners voted that as of September 1
“no white teachers shall be employed in the public schools in the city of Charleston to
teach Negro pupils.”112

It was a considerable victory for the new branch and the

community they endeavored to represent. By the fall, all of the teachers in the black
public schools were black.113 As NAACP chairman Joel Spingarn noted in a letter to
Nance, this was “a wonderful thing not only for the teacher but for the colored children”
who up to that point were taught “by women out of sympathy with their best
108
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development.”114 This brought about large-scale participation in the new branch because
in order to obtain enough signatures large public meetings were held, bringing together
Charleston’s hierarchical black community—a caste system largely based on colorism
and one’s ability to trace their lineage to well-known whites.115 Of growing up in the city
during the 1920s, Gussie Harleston—part of the same prominent African American
Charleston family as Teddy Harleston—remembered:
The Harlestons were light, and we didn’t associate with
people who were much darker than we were. Of course,
we didn’t associate with white people either. We were kind
of in-between people. But we were Negroes all the same,
and everyone in our circle was colored to one degree or
another. In fact, I didn’t know any white people, except for
my friend Mildred Weiters.116
Thus despite their skin tone, segregation meant light-skinned blacks could not associate
with whites. As Gussie acknowledges, they were simultaneously part and apart from the
black community. Segregation and slavery’s legacy not only positioned black and whites
against each other, but also ripped apart the black community. Hence, the teacher hiring
campaign was groundbreaking in its ability to disrupt both the white-black status quo, to
challenge colorism. Charleston did not have the clearly defined three-tiered racial caste
system prevalent in other southern port cities like New Orleans, but there was certainly a
tradition of differential treatment for light and dark skinned blacks dating back to the
city’s antebellum era. Charleston’s fair complexioned free blacks had been positioned in
a space between their darker brethren and white counterparts. They lacked the full
citizenship rights granted to whites, but were also protected from some of the worst forms
114
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of racial control/oppression.117 Through collective action, African Americans were given
a common goal and more singular purpose.
But, equally important to this case study is the fact that hiring black teachers was
only one part of a much larger goal. After all, World War I and its accompanying labor
struggle presented African Americans with the opportunity to demand more rights. This
becomes increasingly obvious when the teacher hiring campaign is considered alongside
other contemporary labor struggles. The first case the Charleston NAACP took on was
the Navy Ship Yard Campaign.

Prior to the teacher campaign, the Navy shipyard

emerged as site of racial repression and violence.

In April 1919, African American

veterans and their families were prevented from visiting the Mercury, a ship that brought
U.S. soldiers back home. In May 1919 a fight between white soldiers and an African
American resulted in a riot between white and black soldiers. As a result, Fridie's, a
black-owned barbershop catering to whites, was destroyed; two African Americans killed
and seventeen injured; and seven sailors and one policeman injured. When the U.S.
Navy decided to hire 600 Charleston women to sew Navy uniforms for America’s entry
into the war, they refused to employ black women. As with the teacher hiring campaign,
Harleston took the lead in challenging the decision. In May 1917 he began passing
around, to prominent whites, a petition objecting to the refusal to hire black women. The
petition reasoned that if jobs were not made available to African Americans, the result
would be their mass exodus. When local authorities mostly disregarded the petition
Harleston contacted R. Augustine Skinner (New York NAACP branch president) and
Archibald Grimke (the Charleston born former slave turned writer, intellectual, activist,
117
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and politician). The appeal to the comparatively progressive Republican legislatures
proved effective after five representatives and both senators sent letters of critique to the
Navy Department. The secretary of the Navy responded with a statement indicating black
seamstresses were incompetent and that hiring practices were the local authorities’
prerogative. The legislatures found the secretary’s response unacceptable, and continued
to push for a more satisfactory answer. They got it when, by the end of the year, the
Navy Shipyard had hired 250 black women.118
Combined, the teacher hiring and navy shipyard campaigns focused on ensuring
access to employment opportunities. This is underscored by the fact that when the
Colored Ministers’ Union petitioned the school board in 1916, they also asked that the
fifth and sixth grades be added, and for a more advanced program at the industrial
school.119 Their reason for this request was that, “an eighth grade education, with a large
percent of that industrial, is not sufficient qualification for race leadership nor the
profession of teacher.”120 Therefore the Charleston teacher hiring campaign was not
merely a stepping-stone to the Brown v. Board of Education decision. Instead it reflected
deep-seeded belief among African Americans that their teachers were the key to
providing black students in an unfair school system and labor market with much needed
assistance.121 Black teachers’ work simultaneously provided better education to black
children, jobs for black teachers, and the hope that the next generation would have greater
118
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access to professional jobs. Additionally, considering the fact that the navy jobs were all
for women, and that the majority of teachers were women, it becomes apparent that
African Americans wanted to make certain black women had access to gainful
employment, most likely to protect them from the sexual harassment and exploitation that
were often par for the course when working in whites’ homes.
Leaders like Harleston faced the daily oppressions associated with being an
African American in the South. Racism permeated every life factor—from where one
lived and the spaces people occupied to their professional opportunities. Yet because of
his status and gender Harleston had access to a limited amount of privilege. For instance,
although Harleston was certainly the driving force behind the Charleston NAACP
chapter’s founding and its initial campaigns, he was not necessarily the most invested
Harleston family member when one considers the fact that the city’s policy had a more
direct effect on his wife than himself. Likewise, African American teachers faced daily
racism. Since most teachers were women, this meant that black women teachers faced
the double oppression of race and gender.

They faced a particular discrimination

reserved explicitly for black women, i.e., they were either the Jezebel or the Mammy. Yet
it is also true that teaching and middle-class status granted these women some semblance
of respectability.122

It made them an essential part of the NAACP’s constituency,

granting women like Clark access to assistance and nominal leadership.
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The black teacher hiring campaign was the chapter’s most victorious
undertaking.123 Its success held real, concrete benefits since it helped connect black South
Carolinians in innovative ways and informed them of the opportunities collective action
could bring. Not only were they connected to each other, but to a national organization—
making them part of the national black freedom struggle. The mass meetings associated
with the campaign also helped blur the long-held socioeconomic lines in the city’s black
community as local and national racial conditions underscored the need to attach
collective activism to concepts of racial uplift.124
The teacher hiring campaign garnered more vocal support from local blacks than
other important causes. For instance, the second major set of issues Harleston and the
rest of the branch addressed were two cases of violence: a murder case wherein a white
streetcar conductor killed an African American man, and an attempted rape case of a ten
year old black girl by a white man. Harleston lobbied the solicitor to investigate both
crimes.125 While the murder case “marked the first time in twenty years” that a white
Charlestonian was tried for an African American’s murder, the all white male jury
composition prevented even the hope of a conviction.126 In the rape case a grand jury
refused to indict.127 Yet neither case garnered widespread community support. Perhaps
this could be partly attributed to a belief that these cases would not be successful, but the
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imminent threat of violence and economic repercussions was more likely what affected
black Charlestonians’ limited involvement.
Instead, the teacher hiring campaign caused NAACP membership to rise
drastically. In only two years’ time the Charleston branch’s membership rose from an
original group of twenty-nine to, by the close of the campaign, 646. Such growth
garnered South Carolina’s activists special attention. In 1919, when Harleston attended
the annual NAACP conference in Cleveland, DuBois asked him to share the campaign’s
success with the rest of the attendees and to write about it in the Crisis.128 Hence the
campaign was not just impressive on the local level. It was significant on the national
stage. The community’s support implied that education was the cause the NAACP could
use to build a mass social movement. It insinuated that African Americans black success
of black schools and students to be bound to black teachers’ fate.
The positive effects of the campaign moved beyond the Charleston area. The
NAACP soon grew to rural areas. Between 1918 and 1919 additional branches were
founded in Aiken, Anderson, Darlington, Florence, Orangeburg, and Beaufort. This
growth connected blacks in different communities and linked poor, rural blacks with civil
rights activities throughout the nation. By 1919 the NAACP had positioned itself at the
center of South Carolina’s black freedom struggle; and by the end of the Great War the
NAACP completely transformed itself from a northern organization with white
management to one with a growing southern constituency that provided both its funding
and leadership.129 The NAACP changed with the times, moving away from being an
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organization primarily concerned with a small, professional, urban community to a “mass
organization representing the needs and interest of a broad cross-section of black South
Carolinians across lines of geography, gender, and economic status.”130 This ability to
change course and pursue a broader constituency’s interest propelled the SC NAACP’s
power and influence.131
Just as African Americans understood hiring black teachers to be inextricably
linked to improving black children’s education, white official’s efforts to lessen teachers’
effectiveness proves they understood and feared this outcome.

Even after the teachers

were hired, the school board continued to oppose high education standards in black
schools.132 In 1925 the board agreed to add the eleventh grade at Burke Industrial
School, but refused the inclusion of French and Latin courses. A.B. Rhett defended the
policy, saying that what African Americans needed most was an industrial education—to
prepare themselves for “Negro jobs.”133 As Asa H. Gordon, a South Carolina State
College professor wrote in 1925, “[t]he Burke Industrial School . . . is supposed to be the
high school, but the real high school for the city is a private school, Avery Institute.”134
In 1939, a committee including the PTA, civil, and ministerial organizations petitioned
the board for an accredited high school. They argued that Burke’s alumni were unable to
go into institutions of higher education unless they completed two additional years of
schooling that Charleston’s public schools did not provide. Nonetheless, despite these
130
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encumbrances, black schools improved significantly after the entrance of black
teachers.135
Yet the victory of the teacher hiring campaign did not mean the eradication of
discriminatory hiring practices in public schools. Prior to World War I and the teacher
hiring campaign, African American women were kept from teaching positions because of
their race. Afterwards their marital status often barred them. Only unmarried women
could teach in the city schools. Married women were permitted to teach in the county,
but that could mean less income and separation from their family.136 Fields noted that
deciding to get married essentially meant giving up her teaching career:
. . . I was going to turn twenty-five that summer; it was
time for me to think about getting married. If I stayed over
there [on John’s Island], maybe I never would. Quite a few
teachers stayed single all their lives—[Cousin] Lala was
one. I didn’t want to become a spinster teacher, yet still I
hated to leave my profession. That’s the fix I was in: I
hated to leave but couldn’t stay.137
Women like Fields and her cousin found themselves in a precarious situation. They
could sacrifice their career, and probably a much-needed income, or they could sacrifice
their personal lives. Pushing married women out of teaching jobs was almost certainly
based on the assumption that their husbands could now provide them with financial
support.138

For African American families, this was likely a grossly inaccurate

assumption since black men in the South continued to face huge barriers to gainful
employment.
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African Americans may have witnessed the hiring of black teachers, but in the
long run they lost school autonomy as white officials began closely monitoring the
principals, teachers, and after-school activities. Additionally, hiring black teachers did
not necessarily mean hiring black principals. In fact, white Charleston education officials
endeavored to maintain control of the schools through a concession stating whites would
still be the principals. Rhett was eventually forced to hire black principals when all the
whites he approached for the positions turned him down.139 But Rhett later reasoned “the
white people still have an interest in the schools and an authority over the schools, which
they are prepared to exercise.”140 He created a new position, “supervisor of Negro
schools,” and hired Shaw’s former white principal, Edward Carroll, to fill it.141 Rhett
claimed that Carroll was the ideal candidate because he “was widely respected by the
Negroes, knew how to talk to them, and how to influence them. He exerted over them at
all times a wise and salutary influence.”142 After his death in 1925, Carroll was replaced
by F. W. Wamsley who complained in 1932 that B.B. Jones, Burke’s principal, did not
acknowledge his authority on school issues. It was not until Wamsley’s retirement in
1944 that the board finally appointed an African American, William H. Grayson, Jr.
Grayson used wartime labor shortages to his advantage, hiring college educated teachers
and pushing Burke’s curriculum form primarily industrial to classical education.143
Loss of autonomy is emphasized by the fact that the local white authorities
decided to investigate Simonton school principal James Andrew Simmons’ political
139
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activities when word spread that he encouraged his teachers to register to vote, and after
he offended white audience members during a speech he gave in February 1932 on Race
Relations Sunday in which he allegedly suggested that whites and blacks were social
equals.144 During an interview with the school board, Simmons denied advocating social
equality but admitted to promoting hiring black policemen and, after hours, encouraged
teachers to register to vote. He was instructed that if he continued to make “harmful
statements” he would be censured as a public school official.145

Rather than face

censorship, Simmons chose to leave Charleston and assumed a principal’s position at the
Booker T. Washington High School in Columbia, the state’s largest black high school.
Yet even this reflects the intersections of oppression and privilege. On the one hand,
whites limited Simmons’ political activities. On the other hand, the fact that Simmons
had the opportunity to leave for another job reflected gender and class privilege. For as a
male, he was much more likely to be considered for a principalship.

Born to middle-

class Charlestonians, he was able to go to private school at the School of Immaculate
Conception from the first to eight grades, and then attend the Avery Institute for high
school. He then attended the prestigious Fisk University where he received his Bachelors
degree.146 In short, Simmons’ socioeconomic background gave him greater educational
opportunities, setting him up for a lifetime of improved professional opportunities.
Throughout the upcoming decades of the twentieth century, education remained
an incredibly politicized topic. Teachers like Fields and Clark continued to follow some
of the methods they learned in the teacher hiring campaign.
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Both women worked

through black women’s clubs. Clark continued to work with the NAACP and, later on,
the Highlander Folk School. The NAACP, and the African American community as a
whole, also learned some important lessons from the teacher hiring campaign. These
methods (petitions, marches, mass meetings, mass protest, etc.) were used continually in
local blacks’ efforts to establish a more just society. This case study also cautions that
while black education is often viewed through the lens of the historic Brown v. Board of
Education decision, it is important to consider these cases contemporarily. For African
Americans in Charleston (and other southern urban centers) desegregation/integration did
not even factor into the conversation.
With the hiring of black teachers in the city schools, superintendent A. B. Rhett
told the school board in May 1919:
It is customary in cities where negro teachers are employed
to teach negro children to have an entirely different salary
schedule. I would recommend that a salary schedule for
colored teachers in Charleston be adopted, which shall
amount to 2/3 of the white schedule.147
That same month the Board of School Commissioners approved the adoption of different
salary schedules for white and black teachers. Therefore, even as black teachers and the
larger black community were winning one battle on the education front, they were being
forced to wage another one. The next major public schools struggle in the state focused
on teacher salary equalization. Clark and Simmons would both play key roles in the
salary equalization cases. Obviously Simmons did not take away from the encounter the
need to avoid whites’ anger. In the early 1940s, he was accused of initiating a salary
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equalization lawsuit.148 Simmons, and other educated African Americans, “represented
the emergence of a cultured and college-educated black leadership that advocated a more
activist-oriented interpretation of the social uplift philosophy.”149 For his M.A. thesis at
Columbia University in 1935, Simmons conducted a study of South Carolina teachers in
black public and private high schools. The study surveyed 141 teachers and found that
the average male’s salary was $640/year and the average woman’s was $475/year. These
were well below the average whites’ salary of $1,249/year for men and $832/year for
women.150 So the teacher hiring campaign presents an opportunity to reconsider and
reanalyze the goals of African Americans on the local level. It pushes us to not confuse
the goals of the NAACP national headquarters with those of the broader community.
If—as the fight to equalize teachers’ salaries suggest—the ultimate goal was equal
education, then the African American teacher, and not desegregation, was possibly
perceived as the key to that objective.
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CHAPTER 2: “MY SALARY INCREASE WAS AMAZING:” THE TEACHER
SALARY EQUALIZATION CAMPAIGN
John McCray, editor of the prominent African American newspaper, Lighthouse and
Informer, once reflected that:
…the colored citizens in Sumter ought to change the
city’s slogan from “Gamecock” city to something like “The
start here city.” As we look over the past seven years and
note the great strides our people have made in the state,
especially in educational matters and in our fight for the
right to vote, we cannot help but note that both of these
either originated or were carried out by Sumterites.1
South Carolina’s teacher salary equalization campaign began in 1940 in Sumter County
where local African Americans embarked on a thirty-month crusade to accomplish this
goal. Osceola McKain’s return home marked the campaign’s beginning. He had just
spent sixteen years in Europe, where he owned a club in Ghent, Belgium, when World
War II’s outbreak resulted in Belgium’s German occupation. McKaine decided to trust
the club’s management to friends and return to the United States. The following year, a
young group of teachers, including one of his cousins, spoke to him about the possibility
of a salary equalization suit. The national NAACP was still basking in their recent
teacher salary equalization victory in Virginia, Alston v. School Board of the City of

1
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Norfolk, and some black Carolinians were eager to bring a similar suit in their home
state.2
Supporters of a salary equalization lawsuit faced a number of challenges in getting
things off the ground. First, the NAACP’s lead attorney, Thurgood Marshall, informed
the state’s black teachers that they needed to gather hard evidence of salary differentials.
He also told them to start a defense fund to pay legal fees and assist plaintiffs who lost
their teaching positions. McKaine initially believed teacher salary equalization held even
greater urgency than voting rights, so he was willing to take all necessary steps to ensure
victory. He travelled the state to collect salary data. Then he, along with several other
Sumter businessmen, started a legal defense fund.3
The second challenge to getting the teacher salary equalization campaign off the
ground was connected to the black teachers association, the Palmetto State Teacher’s
Association (PSTA), whose executive committee did not support McKaine in his
endeavors. The executive committee was comprised mostly of senior level teachers and
administrators who were concerned that involvement in a lawsuit would result in loss of
prestige and position. In response to their hesitations and ambivalence, McKaine and
McCray, editor of the prominent African American newspaper, the Lighthouse and
Informer, worked together to oust the PSTA’s leadership.

Through McCray’s

newspaper, the two men publically criticized the organization’s president John P.
Burgess, who made a speech in which he ridiculed black teachers for thinking they could
get equal pay. The speech propelled the Sumterites’ efforts. Its aftermath actually gave
2
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the salary issue some much-needed attention. McCray and McKaine’s efforts were
largely successful.

Over time the PSTA became more activist oriented as the

organization’s financial and logistical support for the NAACP became increasingly
unabashed. This increased militancy, combined with World War II, drastically decreased
the organization’s membership.4
A third challenge came in convincing the state NAACP to finance the salary
equalization case. State president, John Hinton, certainly thought it was a legitimate
issue, but believed black teachers—who, despite salary inequities were better paid than
many black Carolinians—should finance the legal suit themselves. He wanted the state
NAACP to focus its resources on school facility equalization. Nonetheless, Hinton
eventually agreed to work towards both issues.

Since a local salary equalization

campaign was already underway, and with the recent Alston victory, the salary
equalization case took precedence over facility equalization.5
On April 26, 1942 the Sumter NAACP met at Mt. Pisgah AME Church where Dr. B.
T. Williams made a move to endorse teacher salary equalization.

Dr. E. C. Jones

seconded the move, and the group unanimously passed it. With the support of the local
branch and state conference, McCray and McKaine were able to crusade, full force, for
salary equalization. From 1942 to 1947, the Sumter branch revisited the issue during
almost every meeting. They kept their movement relevant and energetic by bringing in
several guest speakers with firsthand knowledge of the case and its importance, such as:
NAACP Secretary and former teacher Modjeska Simkins; attorney Harold Boulware;
North Carolina Mutual Insurance Company representative Tommie Gilliard; S. J.
4
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McDonald, Sr.; Donald Sampson; and John McCray. Moreover, these mass meetings
enabled the Sumter branch to build up its membership, collect much needed membership
dues, and take up donations which could be earmarked for the salary equalization fight.6
Sumterites provided the initial groundwork for the teacher salary equalization suits,
but Charleston was where the first case began. On a Sunday morning in Charleston,
South Carolina, Eugene C. Hunt was walking to Saint Mark’s Episcopal Church on the
corner of Thomas Street and Warren Street when a car stopped in front of him. The car
carried James Hinton, president of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) South Carolina Conference of Branches; Mr. Robinson; and
Harold Boulware, state NAACP attorney. To anyone else, the meeting would have
looked like a chance encounter between old friends. And while the gentlemen had not
accidentally bumped into each other on the street, the meeting was designed to look that
way.

Hunt had been quite eager to serve as the plaintiff in a local teacher salary

equalization lawsuit.

However, he received an A-1 designation from the military,

heightening his risk of being drafted. The plaintiff’s departure would have made the
whole case fall apart. So that morning, Hunt was giving the NAACP leaders directions to
another schoolteacher’s home, Viola Louis Duvall—a woman he described as both “very
brilliant” and “very pretty.”7

As Hunt was forced to step away from the case, Duvall

would bravely take up the mantle as plaintiff.
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The teacher equalization campaign that swept across the South was the “first
systematic challenge to the southern caste system.”8 The campaign was momentous for
the NAACP because it established an important precedent for taking public education
cases before federal courts, and highlighted a strong legal challenge to prevailing notions
of white supremacy. The NAACP’s legal strategy began largely with the work of Charles
Hamilton Houston, the man Walter White handpicked to lead the NAACP’s legal
division. In 1935 he showed a 30-minute documentary at the NAACP annual convention
titled A Study on Education Inequalities in South Carolina. The film provided visual
evidence that there were huge disparities in the funding between black and white
schoolchildren. Houston believed that litigation would mobilize local communities and
quickly cited unequal education as the chief issue in this expanding legal program. With
Charles Houston at the helm, the NAACP entered the 1940s with a focus on using the
courtroom to ensure African Americans’ constitution rights, and concentrated the great
majority of those efforts on the South, where more than eighty percent of blacks lived.
But instead of immediately beginning desegregation litigation, Houston purposely began
with an equalization strategy that he believed would eventually make the courts more
amenable to desegregation, and place a significant enough financial strain on school
systems to make continued segregation unfeasible.9
Houston’s legal strategy began with founding the Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., a separate legal offshoot of the NAACP, which gave the fund’s lawyers more
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independence and led the NAACP to place an even greater emphasis on litigation. After
Thurgood Marshall was appointed assistant special counsel in 1936, he went about
acquiring black teachers’ support to finance the salary equalization lawsuits. These
lawsuits were ideal for the NAACP’s legal strategy. Unequal salaries elucidated the fact
that “separate but equal” was not a reality. Racial discrimination was blatantly obvious
because African American teachers were always paid less, even when their education was
equal to or superior to that of white teachers. Unlike other labor markets, blacks and
whites were doing the exact same skilled labor. If anything, black teachers’ labor was
more challenging and difficult because they worked in inferior facilities and had
significantly heavier teaching loads.10
With the NAACP’s assistance, African American schoolteachers in every southern
state sued local school boards for salary equalization. The NAACP was committed to
teacher salary equalization for a number of reasons. It was only one part of a much larger
anti-discrimination campaign that also included gaining entrance into white professional
and graduate schools, and equalizing segregated public schools. In fact, with the
NAACP’s assistance, African American schoolteachers in every southern state sued local
school boards for salary equalization. Houston had his own reasons for focusing on salary
equalization.

He believed the NAACP’s middle-class constituency would find it

pleasing, that higher teachers’ income would increase the organization’s coffers, and that
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teachers embodied a large, untapped pool of potential plaintiffs. Teachers may have
found the salary equalization campaign appealing because it represented the possibility of
a better salary without acquiring the personal financial burden of acquiring legal
assistance.11
South Carolina’s segregationists were equally invested in maintaining the status
quo. Teacher salary inequalities saved the state millions of dollars. Although the state
partially funded public schools, the allocation of those funds was left to the local school
boards’ discretion. During the Duvall case, Charleston school superintendent A. B. Rhett
admitted that teacher salary equalization would require additional funds for the school
district. Although the school board of trustees allegedly had a plan to equalize salaries,
Rhett was unsure where that extra money would come from. He mentioned that it would
help if the state allocated more funds, and that the only other option was local taxation.12
As the NAACP moved its teacher salary equalization campaign into the Palmetto State,
this disconnect would prove to be a challenge to its legal strategy.
Although the salary equalization campaign emerged in Sumter, the initial three
plaintiffs were Charlestonians.

First was Malissa Theresa Smith, an ideal choice. She

taught history at Burke Industrial High School, a well-known and respected institution.
She was also well educated, having graduated from Charleston’s Avery Normal Institute
in 1934, the city’s first accredited secondary school for blacks. She continued her
education at South Carolina State College, and had two years teaching experience when
11
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James Hinton and J. Arthur Brown approached her. But, it was more likely Smith’s
family connections and background that gave her the impetus she needed to step forward
as a plaintiff. Salary inequalities had persuaded her cousin, “Pearly” Simmons, to resign
from a teaching position at Simonton. “Pearly” tried to prepare Smith for the inevitable
consequences of her involvement, telling Smith that she would lose her position at Burke.
Smith’s cousin, J. Andrew Simmons—a Charleston native, former principal of Simonton,
and current principal of Columbia’s Booker T. Washington high school—was the one
who finally convinced her to get involved with the case.13
Charleston would prove a particularly challenging city to wage the salary
equalization campaign. In demonstration of a complete lack of commitment to African
American teachers, the city still had not developed a policy for paying pensions to retired
black teachers. In March 1943 A.B. Rhett informed the Charleston City School Board of
Commissioners that Hinton planned on addressing salary equalization. The board
received Smith’s petition on behalf of herself and the other Burke teachers on June 24,
1943.14 The petition requested that the school board:
…immediately discontinue the policy,
custome (sic) and usage of making any
discrimination in the payment of salaries of
teachers and principals because of their race
and color.15
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Initially, it looked as if the NAACP would be able to rely upon the PSTA’s unqualified
support. On April 9, 1943, executive secretary C. V. Bing announced during a House of
Delegates meeting that $1,200 would be reserved for a Legal Defense Fund. A long
discussion of the issue followed because some the delegates had not been informed of the
vote.16 When Rev. H. B. Butler’s motion that “the $1,200 be used with the words Defense
Fund meaning fighting for equalization of salaries for teachers and transportation
facilities and other facilities for Negro children to start this year” was almost
unanimously passed it seemed to be an open and shut case.17 However, during a meeting
later that day, twelve “very influential” delegates voiced their discomfort with a legal
suit, and another drawn-out discussion followed.18 Instead of seeking a lawsuit, the
organization sent a letter to the State Board of Education requesting that the state “close
the gap between” black and white teachers’ salaries “with a 50 percent differential” and
give at least two school buses to each high school and one school bus to each grammar
school.19 If the Board met their requests, they would not seek court action.

Upon

receiving an ambiguous response from the Board, PSTA members favoring a legal suit
motioned that the funds be given to the NAACP to help with their efforts to equalize
salaries. Opposition to legal action was voiced again. J. E. Blanton of Voorhees Institute
in Denmark motioned that the previous motion be tabled indefinitely. Blanton’s motion
was seconded and, in a number reflecting the changing tides of the organization, passed
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in a 39 to 31 vote.20 The PSTA still was not as militant as the NAACP, but its leadership
was becoming more closely aligned with the civil rights organization.
Fortunately the NAACP’s commitment to the case remained steadfast. Their
attorneys, Thurgood Marshall and Harold Boulware, announced that if the school board
denied the petition they were prepared to take the case to court. In fact, the attorneys said
they had acquired the funds to take the case all the way to the Supreme Court if
necessary.

Initially, the board’s legal advisor, H.L. Eckerman, informed them that

racially based salary inequalities were unconstitutional.21 However, when the board met
on August 6, they were also told that they could revise their pay scale based on whatever
criteria they saw fit, as long as that criteria was not race or creed. With this in mind the
board passed a resolution stating that all teachers and principals would be classified.
Salaries were to be based on this classification as well as “character, age, experience,
preparation, teaching ability, and general fitness.”22 Essentially, the school board had
simply found another way to pay African American teachers unequal salaries.
Unfortunately for Smith, the resolution was a null factor. On September 27, 1943, Smith
called in sick. When the school board got wind of it, their legal advisor, H.L. Eckerman,
informed them that they had legal grounds to fire her for failing to obtain permission for
her absence. Additionally, she took the time off because she had just been married and
used the time to honeymoon and the board still had a policy against hiring married
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women. According to her contemporaries, the board’s true intent in firing her was that it
provided a succinct way to dismiss the legal suit.23
Yet, Smith’s case may have put Charleston’s segregationists on guard, for it
confirmed that salary equalization was only one part of a much larger plan to acquire
equal education rights for black Carolinians. Marshall and Boulware revealed that they
planned to engage the issues of equal access to graduate training, the transportation
system, and unequal school terms. Smith took a similar position in her petition when she
aptly linked salary inequalities with the board’s refusal to provide Burke with sufficient
funds, yet finding the funds to build a new gymnasium for the local white school and
spend more on white children.24
Another Burke High School teacher, Eugene C. Hunt, became the second
potential plaintiff Brown and Hinton chose partly because he was a male teacher and
therefore immune to the downfall of their previous potential plaintiff.25 Hunt remembered
that he was also chosen because of his character and academic accomplishments:
They contacted J. Arthur Brown, who was the president of
the local NAACP chapter. J. Arthur knew me and knew
the type of person that I was, that I was qualified—
academically qualified—and also that I would not be afraid
to bring suit and so he recommended me to that
committee.26
The NAACP was also considerably more secretive this time around. Hunt flew from
Charleston to Columbia to meet with Hinton and other NAACP officials at J. Andrew
Simmons’ home. During that meeting, they discovered a significant problem with Hunt’s
23
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potential as a plaintiff. The nation was in the midst of World War II. Because of Hunt’s
status as a teacher, he had already been deferred from military duty three times. This
meant that he now had an 1-A designation for being drafted and they feared that if he was
presented as plaintiff, local officials would find a way to ensure he was drafted before the
case could be decided.27
Indeed, the war was having a negative effect on African American schools and the
teaching community. The PSTA suffered a decline in membership as many teachers
enlisted in the military. Many teachers were leaving the teaching profession to pursue
more lucrative positions in the war industries, creating even greater education disparities
in areas already suffering from lower educational outcomes.28
Still the SC NAACP continued in its efforts to find a suitable plaintiff. They asked
Hunt for a recommendation—someone who would be willing to stay the course. The
first person he thought of was a “brilliant young woman” named Viola Louise Duvall.29
Duvall was a model candidate. Like Smith and Hunt, she worked at Burke High School
where she taught science. And as a Howard University graduate, she had the requisite
academic background.30 Equally important to her education and work background was
the fact that she “was young and single, and her parents were financially secure.”31 She
was, therefore, in no danger of losing her job because of her marital status. If she did
lose her position, she had a family that could support her until she got back on her feet.
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Duvall’s suit against the city school board and superintendent—Viola Louise Duvall,
et al. v. J. F. Seignous—was filed with the federal district court on November 10, 1943.
Like Smith’s petition, Duvall’s suit charged the school board with paying African
American teachers less money solely on the basis of race, therefore denying her and the
other teachers their fourteenth amendment right of equal protection under the law. The
suit included an addendum outlining the salary inequalities. White principals were being
paid $2,500 to $3,000 a year while black principals were paid $1,100 to $1,450 a year.
The salary differentials for teachers were equally stark with white teachers making $900
to $1,340 compared to black teachers income of $600 to $750. Although in her third year
at Burke Industrial, Duvall was making $645/year while white teachers with the same
qualifications were making $1100/year. Furthermore, although African Americans were
willing to acknowledge that the lack of access to professional/graduate school training
sometimes resulted in fewer qualified teachers, salary was clearly not based solely on
education and training. Not all white teachers had high school degrees. But a greater
disparagement to black teachers was that white teachers with degrees from nonaccredited colleges and without any college degree had significantly higher incomes than
black teachers with college degrees from accredited schools.32
As Smith did with her petition, members of the black press successfully linked
Duvall’s salary equalization suit to broader education equalization.

In an editorial

column, Osceola McKaine noted that although African Americans constituted forty-three
percent of South Carolina’s population, there were over 3,000 more white teachers; white
32
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school property was valued at over $41,000,000 more than black schools; and while
84,134 white children were taken to school on buses, only 551 black children were. He
then linked the lack of school transportation to the lower levels of high school
graduation.33
Due to the amount of discretion Hinton and the other NAACP officials practiced
with the Duvall case, the local authorities were caught off guard. Hunt remembers:
…when the suit hit the school board, they were entirely
flabbergasted. They were taken off their seat. They were
so sure that they had the colored teachers under that they
were just shocked and there was very little resistance to that
on the part of the board. They saw the handwriting on the
wall. They had no way of fighting it.34
The school board filed a reply to Duvall’s suit, stating that she could not bring a
salary equalization suit since she signed a contract that would begin June 1, 1944. The
board could not raise or reduce salaries until that time, making the legal suit “premature
and ill-advised.”35 The board further claimed that her school district could not raise
additional funds until the next meeting of the General Assembly, and that it would take
“some time to reclassify and grade the teachers along the lines proposed by the
Resolution.”36 They even referenced the Smith petition, noting that the board had met in
August and adopted a new method of deciding teachers’ salaries. Duvall did not respond
to the filing and the case proceeded.
Her attorneys Thurgood Marshall and Harold Boulware had legitimate reasons to be
concerned about the suit’s possibility of success. They would be arguing the case in front
33
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of Judge J. Waties Waring, whose background made the attorneys wary. He came from a
distinguished aristocratic Charleston family and had worked for U.S. Senator Ellison
“Cotton Ed” Smith, a well-known white supremacist. In fact, he largely owed his federal
bench appointment to Smith, and many assumed that Waring embraced the South’s
racially regressive social mores.37
Waring heard the case in February 1944. During Marshall’s direct examination of
Dr. William H. Frampton, a Board of Trustees member, Frampton verified that as of that
time, black teachers were being paid less than white teachers with the same
qualifications. When Marshall asked if, as a result of the Melissa Smith petition, there
was supposed to be a new classification system for deciding teachers’ salaries, Dr.
Frampton responded that it was “in the process of being put into effect.”38

When

Marshall asked if he, as a board member, had any objection to black teachers being paid
equal salaries, Frampton responded:
The Supreme Court, as I understand, has made that quite
clear that, regardless of what the individual’s own feelings
in the matter might be, it is right, just and fair that there
shall be no differentiation in payment of salaries for any
race with the same qualifications; and it is my purpose to
fulfill, as far as I can, that decision.39
Such a response was hardly an endorsement, but it was a promise to at least follow the
letter of the law. Indeed, the Charleston school board passed a resolution to equalize
37

Peter F Lau, Democracy Rising: South Carolina and the Fight for Black Equality Since
1865, Civil Rights and the Struggle for Black Equality in the Twentieth Century
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 129. Boulware graduated from Howard
University Law School and was the SC NAACP's Committee on Legal Redress
chairman; Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 242; Freedom’s Teacher, 163–165;
Democracy Rising, 129.
38
Viola Louise Duvall, et al. v. J. F. Seignous, Deposition of Dr. William H. Frampton
(Feb. 7, 1944) (District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South
Carolina 1944).
39
Deposition of Dr. William H. Frampton.
61

teacher salaries essentially because they saw the writing on the wall. Their lawyer
advised them that recent court decisions declared unequal pay on the basis of race
unconstitutional.40
Waring ruled in Duvall’s favor. Extensively citing the Alston case, as well as noting
similar teacher salary cases, Waring ruled that the law clearly entitled the plaintiffs to an
equal salary. The Charleston school board agreed to equalize teachers’ salaries by
September 1946.41
Duvall was a significant victory for the South Carolina NAACP and African
American teachers. Yet, although a salary equalization suit in a U.S. District court
should have meant statewide compliance to the law, it did not. In April, just two months
after Waring handed down his decision, Hinton announced that the state NAACP was
preparing for another case in Columbia. Yet Waring’s decision may have, at least,
placated the fears of some PSTA members. In April 1944, the teachers’ group finally
contributed $1,200 to the state NAACP to assist in the teacher salary equalization fight.42
White reaction to the Duvall decision, and the broader 1940s black freedom struggle,
was fraught with fear, anger, and ambivalence. On March 15, 1944 the State Senate
passed what was known as the Jeffries Bill, for Sen. Richard Manning Jeffries, which
established a lengthy process for teachers who wanted to appeal their salary. First an
aggrieved teacher had to appear before the county board of education. Teachers could
only appear on their own behalf, meaning they could not petition on behalf of themselves
and others as Smith and Duvall had. If the teacher was unsatisfied with the board’s
40
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decision s/he had thirty days to appeal to the State Board of Education. Following this
appeal, the State Board then had the right to reexamine and recertify all teachers in the
aggrieved teacher’s school district. If the State Board also ruled against the teacher, an
additional appeal could be filed with the Court of Common Pleas. Only after these
multiple appeals could the teacher file with the District Supreme Court.43 This process
would not only put the appealer’s livelihood at risk, but the jobs of all teachers in the
district.
The Jeffries bill also determined that teacher’s salaries would be based “exclusively
upon the merit of the individual teacher.” Some of the qualifying merits were dubious
and subjective, such as: “character,” “personality,” “refinement,” health,” “cultural
background,” and “Any other things pertaining to the employment and its
performance.”44 The bill was clearly “another legal subterfuge to postpone what the
Legislatures conceived as the evil day of doing justice to the state’s Negro teachers.”45
Others asserted that salary increases for black teachers would result in salary cuts for
white teachers. One writer for the Columbia Record, the foremost white newspaper,
insisted that the state would have to come up with an additional $3 million.46
Possibly the most vitriol reaction was a resolution Union County Representative
John D. Long introduced and the House of Representative passed. The resolution—
referencing the “Yankee slave-traders,” “War between the States,” the North and South’s
43
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need for “self-government,” and “agitators of the North”—sought to reaffirm Jim Crow
segregation.47
…we indignantly and vehemently denounce the intentions,
utterances and actions of any person or persons and of all
organizations seeking amalgamation of the White and
Negro races by a co-mingling of the races upon any basis
of equality, as being destructive of the identity and
characteristics and integrity of both races, and as being UnAmerican . . .48
The resolution also expressed the legislative body’s commitment to white supremacy:
…we re-affirm our belief in our allegiance to the
established White Supremacy as now prevailing in the
South and we solemnly pledge our lives and our sacred
honor to maintaining it, whatever the cost, in War and in
Peace.49
For their part, moderate whites did not consider the resolution appropriate, noting that
there were “very few” northern agitators and that mentioning the possibility only invited
more attention from the North.50 As far as moderates were concerned, South Carolina
was fortunate in avoiding the race riots that plagued other parts of the country; the
resolution would not help keep the peace.51 The legislature would have better served its
citizens by “keeping its mouth shut.”52
Other white Carolinians may not have welcomed salary equalization with open arms,
but assumed it was inevitable. As the Columbia Record reported:
There has been no criticism of Judge Waring’s decision in
the “Teacher Pay Case” from any source. That decision
47
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was a foregone conclusion as a matter of law in view of
prior federal decision. It should have been foreseen and
anticipated as indeed some South Carolinians did foresee it
and try to persuade the General Assembly to anticipate it.53
For example, actress, feminist, and Charleston native Margaret Vale simultaneously
lauded the merits of her Confederate veteran and former Ku Klux Klan member father
while arguing that African Americans should receive equal pay for equal work.54 The
Walterboro Press and Standard shrugged off assertions that the additional money needed
to equalize salaries would be a burden to the state.

South Carolina could get the

necessary funds from the federal government. Lest its readers fear that receiving federal
aid would lead to white and black children attending school together, the newspaper
observed that the state already received federal aide to pay the salaries of agricultural and
home economics teachers, and yet that had not led to “mixed race classes.”55
Unsurprisingly, African Americans were upset by the Long resolution.

Nat

Humphries, Executive Director of the Welfare Equity Association, wrote Long a letter
which maintained that no “colored persons or Colored Organization, or white person or
White Organization advocate amalgamation of the white and colored race[s].”56 He went
on to point out how Representative Long’s amalgamation claim was hypocritical:
I have particularly in mind, a T. Jones, a wea[l]thy citizen
of your county, who was tried and acquitted of wifemurder, and thereafter he lived with his colored mistress,
borned [sic] him several children. There was, and still is,
many T. Jones’ in your state.”57
53

“In the Ditch Together.”
John Henry McCray, “The John Henry McCray Papers, 1929-1989” (South
Caroliniana Library). “Education, Justice, Removal of Fear of Negro Held Solvents of the
Race Question”
55
“Why Not Federal Aid for Our Schools?,” Press and Standard, February 24, 1944.
56
“The John Henry McCray Papers, 1929-1989,” Roll 1.
57
Ibid.
54

65

Despite the Jeffries Bill, the NAACP took the position that teachers should not be
subjected to such a “long, drawn-out procedure to secure their rights” and that the
legislature had no right to “close the doors of the federal courts to aggrieved parties.”58 In
Columbia, Albert N. Thompson, a teacher at Booker Washington Heights Elementary
School submitted his petition for equal salary to the Richland County School Board on
June 7, 1944. The petition asserted that the School Board and the City of Columbia had a
policy of paying black teachers less money than white teachers, even when they had the
same qualifications. On behalf of all black teachers in the city, Thompson requested that
the board discontinue this policy and asked that the board take action at its next meeting.
The Board of School Commissioners denied that they had a policy of paying equally
qualified black teachers less. When the petition went before the County Board of
Education, they admitted that before February, 1941, there was a salary schedule that
paid black teachers less. But they also asserted that, in the summer of 1940, they had
appointed a committee of school commissioners who advised the board to establish a
salary schedule that did not consider race.59
At this point Thurgood Marshall advised Hinton and Orangeburg attorney Shadrack
Morgan to abandon the appeals process the Jeffries Bill outlined and to instead directly
petition the federal district court.60 Like the petition submitted to the County Board Of
Education, this one charged the school board and superintendent with maintaining
58
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…the policy, custom and usage of paying Negro teachers
and principals in the public schools of School District 1 of
Richland County less salary than white teachers and
principals.”61
As with the Duvall case, the NAACP argued that unequal pay on the basis of race or
color was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, black and white
teachers had to meet the same certification requirements as all South Carolina teachers
were required to obtain the same teaching certificate from the State Board of Education.62
The complaint also noted that the teachers were being denied equal pay from public
school funds. So, not only were their fourteenth amendment rights violated with public
funds that Thompson and the black teachers she represented paid in to.
The NAACP again went to the PSTA for support. On April 7, 1945, the state
president James M. Hinton spoke to the organization’s House of Delegates, reiterating the
NAACP’s commitment to ending salary inequalities. Hinton suggested that the PSTA
form a seven-member committee to work directly with the NAACP Defense Fund in
order to coordinate future court battles. The PSTA agreed and appointed representatives
from six school districts and one college representative. Isaac Bracy, of Sumter’s Stone
Hill School, who moved that the PSTA immediately contribute $500 to the NAACP.
Several members expressed wariness of the motion and someone else moved that instead
the teachers should go back to their communities to request local teachers’ support.
Fortunately, when Rev. C. H. Brown. of Benedict College, moved that they provide the
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NAACP with $400, that motion was carried and a decision was made to present the funds
at the first joint committee meeting.63
On the same day that Hinton spoke with the PSTA committee, Thurgood Marshall
filed a request for admission of fact. In it, Marshall agreed with the school board’s
assertion that prior to 1941 there was a salary schedule that paid lower salaries to black
teachers, and that in 1941 the school district set up a new salary schedule with a
minimum salary of $675 to all elementary and junior high teachers, and $720 for all high
school teachers.

But Marshall also asserted that all black teachers were paid the

minimum salary while all white teachers were paid more than the new minimum.64
Therefore, although black teachers were, in fact, receiving a higher salary, the school
district had not abandoned its policy of paying lower salaries to qualified black teachers.
They had simply attempted to ameliorate the problem.
The defense responded by reiterating that they instituted a new minimum salary in
1941. They also directly contradicted the plaintiff’s assertion by insisting that all teachers
were earning more than the minimum salary and that the minimum salary for all teachers
was $900 a year. But according to the documents they submitted, most white teachers
were making over $1000 a year, while no black teachers received more than $882 a year.
The school board essentially argued that black teachers were to blame for their lower
salaries.

They asserted that ninety-three percent of white teachers/principal had

voluntarily participated in the new certification process while only fifty-six percent of
black teachers/principals had.65
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Unsurprisingly, Thurgood Marshall strongly objected to the defendants’ claims.
He confirmed that Thompson filed a petition with the County Board of Education, but
maintained that this should have no impact on the court’s jurisdiction in this case.
Asserting that this case was about black teachers’ fourteenth amendment rights, Marshall
argued that res judicata was not applicable because even though the General Assembly
adopted a method for teachers to contest their salaries, that method was done through the
county school board rather than a recognized court of law. Marshall further asserted that
a state statute could not limit a person’s ability to appeal to a federal court. Even if a
citizen appealed to a system established through state statute, that did no mean they had
to accept that body’s decision. So although Thompson submitted a petition to the County
Board of Education, that did not mean he relinquished his right to appeal to a federal
court. The NAACP also addressed the defense’s assertion that a new certification system
would alleviate unequal teacher salaries. He argued that a future certification plan had
nothing to do with the Thompson case. This case was about whether or not black teachers
were receiving equal pay at the present time.66
For his part, Judge Waring believed that the court clearly had jurisdiction in this case.
He referred to the Duvall case (which he had also decided) as proof of the court’s
jurisdiction.67 The General Assembly was well within its rights to set up “system of
hearing and appeals” for the state’s citizens, and said citizens had every right to pursue
such a method. But the General Assembly did not have the right to impede on the federal
court’s constitutionally guaranteed jurisdiction.68
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On May 26, 1945 Judge Waring ruled in Thompson’s favor. Waring believed that as
of 1941, the school district made an effort to alleviate unequal pay, but that there was still
a “startling disparity” between what black and white teachers made, even when they had
the same amount of experience.69 Waring asked the defendants about the pay disparities
and was told that other qualifications were the cause. The defense also asserted that
black teachers’ lower pay was a matter of supply and demand; there was a lesser need for
black teachers so they were willing to work for less. But the judge found these answers
unsatisfactory. He believed that the evidence demonstrated lower salary was due to race,
and that there actually seemed to be a greater number of experienced white teachers than
black teachers. The teacher salary equalization plan the General Assembly enacted in
1945 did, according to Waring, lessen pay disparity. But it only applied to the part of
teachers’ salaries that came from state funds, and since it was part of the annual
appropriations statute, the plan was only a temporary measure.70
Waring ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, concluding that Thompson and the teachers he
represented were entitled to a salary plan that was not influenced by their race. The Board
had to begin a new classification system, effective spring of 1946. But Waring
underscored that his order was related only to pay discrimination on the basis of race or
color.71 The defense was still allowed to use their judgment “respective to the amounts to
be paid to individual teachers based on their individual qualifications, capacities, and
abilities.”72
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Waring’s opinion in this case demonstrates that he already had a far broader
understanding of contemporary racial disparities than the teacher salary equalization
cases. In the Thompson opinion, Waring endorsed a central proposition of the NAACP
that linked educational and political opportunities to citizenship rights. Waring remarks:
The idea that emancipation of a race long enslaved and
without political rights, without political or any other kind
of education, and without training to assume citizenship,
would bring about a satisfactory situation over night could
be held by only a few partisan, biased, persons motivated
either by idealistic abstraction or by a spirit of political
revenge and self-seeking aggrandizement.73
Over the next decade, Waring’s perspective would play a key role in black South
Carolinians’ efforts to improve their schools and to expand their civil rights agenda.
Some of the NAACP’s most meaningful 1940s legal victories were the teacher
salary equalization cases. As a direct result of the NAACP’s equalization campaign,
salary inequalities across the South decreased by the late 1940s. In 1931-2 black teachers
made about fifty percent of what white teachers made. In 1935-6 they made fifty percent.
And by 1945-6 they were making sixty-five percent.74 As Septima Clark remembered:
And our efforts paid off . . . in actual cash. The courts
sided with us. When I went to Columbia, my salary was
$65 a month. When I left I was getting almost $400 a
month . . . I cannot rightfully argue that all the raise came
from the action of the court. But a greater part did. And
the decision of the court followed our institution of legal
action. As a matter of fact, my salary increase was
amazing.75
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But these legal victories were often hollow as state school boards found seemingly
objective methods for determining salaries. In 1941 the South Carolina legislature—in
response to the Alston case—appointed a committee to look at how teachers were
certified and how their compensation was determined. The committee recommended that
the state consider using the National Teacher Examination (NTE) to develop a four-tier
certification system. The highest twenty-five percent of test-takers were to receive an A
certificate, the middle fifty percent received a B certificate, the next fifteen percent
received a C certificate, and the remaining ten percent received a D certificate. Southern
officials began writing Ben D. Wood, the NTE creator, after the Alston and Mills rulings
in an effort to find another way to determine teachers’ salaries. Wood asserted that the
tests were objective because machines scored it.76 Still Wood, who initially expressed
hesitancy with getting “mixed up in the racial problem,” also predicted that black
teachers would score lower than white teachers.77 The South Carolina State Board of
Education did a two-year study, which supported Wood’s prediction. In a 1944 four
volume report conducted to comply with the committee’s recommendation, pretests
revealed that ninety percent of the white teachers received an A or B certificate, and ten
percent would receive a C or D certificate. Conversely, only twenty-seven percent of the
state’s black teachers would receive an A or B certificate while seventy-three percent
would get a C or D certificate. Still, as it faced the possibility of another salary
equalization suit, the state embraced the NTE and Wood’s salary plan. Beginning in
76
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1945, all South Carolina teachers were required to take the exam.78 Like the Charleston
Board of School Commissioners, the State School Board had found a legal means for
sustaining unequal salaries. As Sen. Hughs of Oconee admitted:
What is the real reason for the certification program[?] . . .
It is not going to improve our schools nor the qualification
of our teachers. The real reason for this program, is to set
up, by a legalized method, a standard by which it is hoped
that a vast majority of the white teachers can qualify for
higher salaries, and the Negro cannot, thus legalizing a
difference in their salaries.79
Black Carolinians would have agreed with this assertion.

William Henry Grayson,

principal of Burke Industrial High School, advised his teachers to continue their
education beyond a bachelor’s degree because not only would it better prepare them for
the classroom, but it would better position them to do well on the NTE. For Principal
Grayson, this was part of a larger objective to hire a cadre of college-educated black
teachers who could build up a more academic rather than vocational curriculum to better
prepare their students for success.80 Eugene Hunt recollected that the exam was “another
device, which was intended to discriminate against black teachers.” For, officials had
been “assured that by using this as a standard . . . they could still pay black teachers less
money.”81 Another African American teacher, Rev. Joseph A. DeLaine, who would
become the foremost leader in the Briggs v. Elliott desegregation case, called the new

78

The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950, 93;
Paradoxes of Desegregation, 57; A Class of Their Own, 351.
79
Report, November 28, 1946, Rev. Joseph A. DeLaine Papers, 1918-2000, University of
South Carolina, Thomas Cooper Library, Digital Collections Department.
80
Interview with Eugene C. Hunt; Scott Baker, “Pedagogies of Protest: African
American Teachers and the History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1940-1963,” Teachers
College Record 113 (No. 12): 2782-2783.
81
Interview with Eugene C. Hunt.
73

certification program an “effort to legally dodge an equal salary decision by the Federal
Court.”82
South Carolina’s use of the NTE not only facilitated salary inequalities between
white and black teachers, but it also aided economic disparities within the black
community. Black teachers, like Septima Clark, who were able to attend private high
schools and universities often scored higher than both black and white teachers. In fact,
some white officials, such as Columbia school superintendent A. C. Flora, were hesitant
to support using the examination out of concern that it could prove that black teachers
were actually better trained than some white teachers. However, the majority of black
teachers, who were products of an unequal education system, made lower scores and
therefore had lower salaries. Overall, the salaries of black teachers remained well below
whites. Sadly, the gap between the highest and lowest paid black teachers made also
widened. People like Duvall made $45 more than her lowest paid black colleague in
1943. But by 1948 she made $2,000 more. Furthermore, as these already advantaged
teachers began earning more, they were given even more opportunities for advancement.
They, unlike their lower paid colleagues, could now afford to pay for continued
educational opportunities in graduate school. These additional economic and educational
achievements helped legitimize the state’s use of standardized testing since white
officials could now point to them as examples of significant achievement among African
Americans.83 Therefore, while race remained the defining factor in teacher salaries, postNTE remuneration was also bound to one’s socioeconomic status.
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Even Judge Waring, who handed down each of the equalization decisions and saw
the new certification program as “a perfectly fair scheme of adjusting the whole [salary]
thing,” conceded that the new certification program was problematic:
I realized that it wasn’t going to [be] very satisfactory to
anybody, because some of the school teachers were going
to have a bad time under it, because they were so
inadequately prepared. And it happened. They had trouble
from it. They were so inadequately prepared, many of
them, that necessarily there were going to be a lot of
failures. But those are casualties that come about from bad
to good—there are always a lot of casualties. You have it
in housing. You have it in education. You have in
practically everything that comes about. Whenever you put
in another system, you’re going to have certain people that
fall by the wayside.84
The PSTA had these very concerns regarding the new certification system.

The

organization pointed out that under Jim Crow segregation, the state had given them an
unequal education. While white teachers had numerous graduate school options, black
teachers’ options were limited to South Carolina State College. For the most part, they
had to leave the state to pursue a graduate degree. Therefore, while graduate training was
an A or B certificate requirement, the state provided no in-state method for black teachers
to meet that requirement.85
Additionally, the lawsuits associated with these legal cases were most often in
urban areas, leaving black teachers in rural areas still largely subject to significant
inequalities. Indeed, according to a 1947-1948 State Superintendent report, white
elementary school teachers, on average, made $601 more than black teachers. This was
84
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partly due to higher NTE scores. But the difference was also attributed to unequal fund
distribution on the district level. The school system was comprised of a series of largely
autonomous school districts controlled by all-white school boards responsible for
determining salaries.86
African Americans pointed out various other subtle methods of preventing salary
equalization. Some school officials were insisting the black school administrators hire
teachers with less experience and qualifications—who could, therefore, legitimately be
paid less than the teachers they replaced. There was also a practice of hiring black
teachers as substitutes rather than contract teachers.

These teachers were left in

“substitute” status for years even though they had the appropriate qualifications for
contracted employment. Despite this unfair treatment, these teachers were often women
who were married and settled, and therefore unable to move to another school district
with better career opportunities.87 Consequently, not only did African American teachers
continue to face discrimination, but women teachers were more negatively affected than
male teachers. And, in light of African American men’s continued exclusion from
gainful employment, the limited or outright loss of women’s income could have a truly
detrimental effect on a family.
African American teachers’ larger teaching load magnified continuing salary
inequalities. As McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer reported, “[t]he Negro teacher, in
86
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many instances, does twice the work for half the pay of the white teacher.”88 That same
State Superintendent report noted that there were 9,272 white teachers for 249,897 white
students. On the other hand, there were only 6,222 black teachers for 207,058 students.
The average white elementary school teacher had approximately twenty-nine students,
and the average high school teacher had twenty-three students.

This stood in stark

contrast to the average black elementary school teacher’s thirty-four students, and the
high school teacher’s twenty-nine.89
These continuing differentials may have contributed to the NTE scandal. A large
group was caught cheating on the exam. Somehow an individual obtained part of the
exam and distributed an answer key. Unluckily, s/he was only able to obtain part of the
test, and made several mistakes on the answer key. Most of the cheaters were caught
because they scored high on the same portions of the exam and all made the same errors.
Judge Waring suspected the possibility of “a certain amount of entrapment among these
poor devils.” But he also concluded that “[i]n the long run it wasn’t a bad thing, because
it got rid of a lot of inadequate teachers and crooked teachers.”90
Regardless of the scandal and black teachers’ legitimate concerns that a lack of
educational opportunities would result in continued salary inequalities, there is significant
evidence that they were willing to seek further training. In 1930, 15.6% of black teachers
in the thirteen southern states had a bachelor’s degree, but by 1940 that number had
increased to 35.1%. Furthermore, in rural areas where teachers often taught in one-room
schoolhouses, the number of teachers with more than six years of training after
elementary school more than doubled between 1930 and 1935. They sought further
88
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training because they linked their qualifications not only to their salary potential but also
to their work for racial uplift which placed education at its core.91
Still, despite their evident willingness to pursue further education, many teachers
were opposed to or fearful of the NAACP’s litigation method.92 They believed the best
method was to be “patient and reasonable and try to get the whites, the School board, the
state to change [their salary] voluntarily.”93 The issue caused a rift in the PSTA. There
was a small, but more activist, faction who sided with McCray and McKaine. This
faction had grown weary of the state’s education officials. Their position was clear—the
only way to rectify the issue was through a court battle, which meant providing support to
the NAACP. The opposing group saw waging a court battle as using force. They argued
that the NAACP was trying to control the PSTA.94
Such uncertainty and apathy garnered criticism and outright anger from activists and
other teachers. Indeed, as one historian has noted, the salary equalization campaign
presented “perhaps the 1940’s greatest clash between conservative and militant black
leaders in South Carolina.”95 Eugene Hunt believed that a more cautious method never
would have worked.96 Modjeska Simkins, then NAACP secretary and a former teacher,
expressed the same sentiments in a newspaper editorial that strongly criticized the
PSTA’S leadership and their “patience” argument:
Resolve NOW that you will acquit yourselves as American
citizens and not as sniveling, crawling nonentities that the
petition of your Executive Committee would intimate that
91
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you are. . . Believe me, that BEGGING will not improve
your economic condition, or any other condition for that
matter.97
Simkins also sent out a letter expressing frustration with the PSTA and teachers’
lackadaisical and sometimes unfavorable attitude towards seeking salary equalization
through the courts:
The suit WILL BE BROUGHT. Plans which have been
under way for months were not started by the Palmetto
State Teachers Association and the PALMETTO STATE
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION cannot stop them. This letter
is being sent, therefore, with the urgent request that you
give all the money you possibly can to help finance the
case. . . Now, I shall make a suggestion which should be a
great insult to you: If for any reason you fear publicity or
intimidation because of your contribution, you may either
send a check or a cash donation directly to me or you may
leave your contribution at the Victory Savings Bank in a
sealed envelope marked “FOR TEACHERS FUND.”98
John McCray expressed similar outrage:
More and more (though it is a sinister feeling) I am
reaching the conclusion that Negro teachers, as spineless
and unworthy as those of Columbia have proven
themselves, should be left to slave and starve and receive
the wages of a serf.99
The belief that teachers were among the NAACP’s primary beneficiaries
engendered these hostile feelings. As Simkins later wrote in 1949:
Teachers, in particular, must realize that court action, if it
must come, is costly. Ethically, teachers should contribute
far more to the South Carolina Teachers Defense Fund of
the NAACP because they have been the real benefactors, so
far. The years of indication and compromise are over in
this fight. Men and women of noble character . . . must be
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willing to take the unequivocal stand in these matters, “and
having done all, to STAND.”100
These views of teachers reflect those of national leaders like Thurgood Marshall, and
later by the militant activists of the 1960s such as Stokley Carmichael.101 Yet, there are
many teachers’ actions that challenge the uncooperative-apathetic-teacher narrative.
In fact, some teachers inspired student activism.102 Under school principal, William
Grayson’s, leadership, Burke High School teachers like Duvall, Hunt, and Smith took
advantage of changing school policies in order to “strengthen the curriculum and create
new progressive educational programs.”103 As Duvall recalled, “We knew what the
requirements for college were. We wanted to make sure that our young people could
meet them.”104 These new efforts—combined with an increasing number of collegeeducated teachers who used the school as a safe space to teach black race
consciousness—taught students citizenship and dissatisfaction with white supremacy.
Within the walls of the black school, teachers found a way to ingrain citizenhip,
democracy, and racial uplift in their pedagogies.105 And when Smith decided to stand up
for herself and the other teachers, she felt that she was also taking a stand for her
students.
While I teach my pupils to be brave and fight for
democracy I do not feel teaching by concept alone is
sufficient. I must set the example so that they might keep
100
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alive and have more love for the democracy some day they
must keep alive. . . Rousseau said “He who would be free
must strike the first blow.” I believe as ardently in that
doctrine as I do in the concepts of that democracy and God
himself.106
In short, Smith believed that directly challenging discrimination would allow her to teach
her Problems of Democracy students citizenship, in both word and deed.107
Further evidence of South Carolina’s black teachers’ eagerness to ensure their
students’ awareness of current events is found in their communication with
newspaperman John McCray. Dillon, South Carolina teacher Herbert Crawford wrote
McCray requesting twenty-five copies of the Lighthouse and Informer because he wanted
his students to be “acquainted with the activities of their state and the service and duty of
the N.A.A.C.P.”108 Miss Alma Metcalfe, a teacher at Mather Academy in Camden, South
Carolina, wrote to ask for materials to help her teach about civil rights in her Social
Problems class.109
However, the high risk of repercussions and ostracism certainly made teachers’
caution understandable. Fighting for equal pay, and other civil rights activities, was a
significant risk for African American teachers. Their jobs were not guaranteed, and they
were largely at superintendents and/or white school board members’ mercy.
Furthermore, black teachers’ associations which supported these equal pay campaigns
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were risking their well-cultivated relationships with white officials.110 Hence, an African
American teacher’s willingness to challenge a white school board, and to do so in court,
“required considerable courage, exposed them to recriminations, and, because the cases
could be very lengthy, required great perseverance.”111
John McCray remembered Duvall assembling a small group in Columbia about
three weeks before her court case began. She told them she was “getting depressed and
feeling the pressure of being cut-off by her fellow teachers.”112 Duvall said that if she did
not have the support of her family, the NAACP, and the Lighthouse and Informer, she
would not have been able to endure so much stress. Malissa Smith’s first cousin, J.
Andrew Simmons chose to resign his position as Booker T. Washington High School’s
principal rather than face the possibility of dismissal for his role in the salary equalization
campaign. Simmons moved to New York where he continued a life of public service by
working for the department of welfare and founding a home for children. He also
maintained his commitment to education when he served on a U.S. task force to rebuild
educational facilities in the Pacific area following World War II, and becoming the first
African American elected to his district school board.113 Smith and Simmons’ stories
elucidate why becoming a plaintiff and/or assisting in lawsuits was considered a huge
risk.

Equally important to acknowledge is the fact that Smith and Simmons had

resources many other African Americans did not have.

Smith came from a well-

established family who could afford to give her financial assistance. She also had a four
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year degree which better positioned her to seek other career opportunities. Likewise,
Simmons was already a school principal. He likely knew that, if necessary, a move could
facilitate viable career options. Unlike the married women mentioned earlier, his position
as an educated man meant that although he faced racial discrimination, he had more ways
to circumvent that discrimination than women or uneducated men.
The teacher salary equalization campaign represents the shifting tides of civil
rights activism. These suits helped the NAACP’s southern membership grow. They
garnered greater interest than the higher education cases. They were sometimes the first
experience African Americans had in formal protests.114 They provided an avenue for
civil rights activists’ move towards a “collective and forceful protest movement.”115
Indeed, those who participated in the campaign, found it transformative and defining. As
Septima Clark remembered:
My participation in this fight to force equalization of white
and Negro teachers’ salaries, on the basis of equal
certification, of course, was what might be described by
some, no doubt, as my first “radical” job. I would call it
my first effort in a social action challenging the status quo,
the first time I had worked against people directing a
system for which I was working.116
Indeed, for Modjeska Simkins the equalization campaign served as a catalyst for her
“personal radicalization”—a move from racial uplift to protest politics.117 Furthermore,
many of the individuals who helped realize teacher salary equalization—Boulware,
Clark, McCray, McKaine, Simkins, etc.—would continue to serve as the seminal figures
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in the Palmetto State’s civil rights movement. Therefore, as this campaign transformed
activists, it also transformed the whole movement. The critiques individuals like McCray
and Simkins expressed against South Carolina’s black teachers illustrated this shift.118
The salary equalization cases also signified a transition in white segregationists’
methods. On the one hand, the cases proved that it was possible to take on white
authority and win. On the other hand, Smith’s firing and the era’s racial violence also
proved that taking on white officials could come with significant repercussions. South
Carolina’s segregationists made a concerted effort to get the NAACP’s membership
roster. More specifically, white officials wanted to know which teachers were NAACP
members. This was especially obvious in rural areas.119 In addition, in 1948, three years
after the NTE became a requirement, passing the law exam became a requirement for
practicing the law in South Carolina. It was clear that this was done to prevent African
Americans from practicing law since the legislature who introduced the bill said that it
would “bar Negroes and some undesirable whites.”120 The new law was reminiscent of
the NTE. These issues served as a precursor of what was to come. Efforts to track
NAACP membership, with a specific focus on black teachers, would become a hallmark
of the 1950s white massive resistance movement; and in South Carolina, it was rural
school districts that came to the forefront of the fight for school equalization.
Additionally, the NTE gave segregationists some valuable insight. For, they now knew
that it was possible to maintain white supremacy through seemingly objective processes.
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The salary equalization cases also indicated and helped strengthen black teachers’
long-term alliance with the NAACP and emphasized the fact that their goals could be
aligned. The salary equalization campaign helped legitimize the NAACP’s work in
South Carolina.121 Therefore, the campaign benefitted both parties.
The PSTA’s vocal support of the 1947 John H. Wrighten case to integrate the
University of South Carolina’s law school exemplified this teacher-NAACP alliance.122
And while the PSTA—especially the older, less militant faction—was hesitant to place
its full support behind the equalization lawsuits, the organization was far less cautious in
supporting improved education for black schoolchildren. In fact, by the close of 1947,
the PSTA seemed to have completely altered its public position on challenging
educational inequality. As one article noted:
As one of the oldest organizations of its kind, and having a
membership of approximately 6,000, the association
[PSTA] has thrown its full strength behind the S. C.
Conference of the NAACP in its fight for first-class
educational opportunities for all children in South Carolina.
The organization has made liberal contributions towards
financing legal fights lead by the NAACP. . . From now on,
for the PSTA in its avowed fight for all the children of
South Carolina, it is “Full Speed Ahead!” Close alongside
is the strong right arm of the NAACP. Now the two are
inseparable. They can become invincible.123
All the difficulties to garner the PSTA’s support, and the necessary ousting of certain
PSTA members and leadership enabled a PSTA-NAACP partnership by transforming the
teachers’ association into what was, by contemporary standards, a much more radical
organization. Indeed, when the efforts of McCray, McKaine, and Simkins to oust what
they considered a much too conservative PSTA leadership were combined with World
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War II, the draft, and the ability to leave the teaching profession for better paying war
industries jobs, a more militant and literally new PSTA was possible. Contemporaries
understood that the NAACP/PSTA collaboration was not an organic transformation, but
one wrought in “planning, scheming, and financial outlay.”124
This new PSTA’s goals foretold the coming civil rights fight in South Carolina
and throughout the nation. Although it had not initially confronted the teacher salary
equalization cases head-on, the organization was making definite changes in the mid1940s. On April 7, 1945, it petitioned the governor, superintendent of education, and
speaker of the House regarding specific issues geared towards improving education for
black children:
1. Equal transportation facilities for all high school pupils.
2. Full enforcement of the Compulsory School Law. 3. The
same or equal opportunity for higher education on the
undergraduate and graduate levels. 4. Qualified Negro
representation in the state Department of Education. 5. A
request made to all members of the United States Senate
and the House from South Carolina petitioning them to
support federal aid to education.125
As the 1940s came to a close, the national and local civil rights movements were
undergoing significant changes in style and objectives.

South Carolina’s African

American teachers had to face the increasingly difficult segregation versus
desegregation/integration debate. But two things were becoming increasingly clear. On
one hand, the state’s white officials would never guarantee equal education for blacks.
On the other hand, the NAACP’s national office was moving away from equalization and
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towards integration.126 Indeed, as of the 1947-1948 school year, the average value for
white school buildings, land, and equipment was still five times blacks’—$221 compared
to $45. State level NAACP officials began to see segregation and discrimination as
inextricably linked. As Modjeska Simkins noted, “We are concerned about the denial of
civil rights, and the indignities experienced because of segregation.”127 Yet, the South
Carolina NAACP was aware that attacking segregation would meet with resistance from
local whites, and necessitate what James Hinton referred to as “supersalesmanship” to
win over many black Carolinians’ support.128 The state’s black teachers would play a
vital yet conflicted role in the ensuing struggle. For, although they eagerly supported
school equalization, they were often hesitant to support desegregation due to the possible
loss of their position and their autonomy, and the belief that it would compromise the
need for black schools.
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CHAPTER 3: “A VERY BACKWARD COUNTY:” CLARENDON COUNTY AND
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL SCHOOLS
The same year Judge Waring’s decision on the Thompson case became effective
(1946) a man named Joseph A. De Laine received his second bachelor’s degree in
divinity from Allen University. His time at Allen would later prove to be essential to his
activism because it was at Allen that De Laine became inspired by the idea that black
churches had to provide more than spiritual guidance to their members. A second degree
was also quite fortuitous since the state’s new certification system created a direct link
between education and earning potential. However his wife, Mattie De Laine had not
finished her degree. She wanted to attend college but her parents could not afford to send
her. Yet her father’s friendly relationship with a Fairfield County school district trustee
enabled her to get a $42 dollars a month teaching job. Her salary was higher than most of
the county’s black teachers, but it was still a small amount.1 As a result she and many
others “flocked to colleges, taking both evening and summer courses to improve their
credentials.”2 Mrs. De Laine furthered her education in Columbia at the combined
Benedict College/Allen University Summer School. Rev. De Laine joined his wife and
took a Race and Culture course where he heard a powerful message from NAACP state
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president James Hinton. How he reacted to this message signaled an important shift in De
Laine—one from civically minded community leader to civil rights activist.3
But De Laine’s radicalization was already taking place, and it was directly
connected to his work in Clarendon County where he was the elementary school principal
in the little town of Silver, and pastor in the AME church’s Pine Grove/Society Hill
circuit. Rev. De Laine held a place of prominence in the community because of his
teaching and preaching. Indeed, these were “the only professions that a black youth
could aspire to”—the “only sources for educated leadership, or leadership of any kind.”4
So teaching and preaching became a pattern that defined his career in South Carolina. His
commitment to both informed his leadership and made him a person of authority on
matters of both religion and education. The active role he played in both the Palmetto
State Teachers Association and the NAACP placed De Laine in a juxtaposition that
seemed to foretell the vital role he would play in South Carolina’s civil rights movement.
He did not separate his work of saving souls from tangibly bettering black folks’ lives. 5
As he preached in a 1968 sermon, “race relations, poverty, and war” were not only
secular matters, but effected “the souls of men and directly refer to the Christian Faith.”6
It was likely his role in the black church that most informed his leadership because
churches were regarded as “places of leadership development and morale building.”7
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Religion was a central part of everyday life.8 And as the Clarendon County movement
would prove, the black church was “a bedrock of NAACP organizing efforts.”9
Clarendon County was one of the poorest in South Carolina. Over two-thirds of
the county’s approximately 31,500 residents were African American. Most of these men
and women were engaged in agricultural labor. It seemed that little had changed for them
since emancipation. Most worked in agriculture, growing and harvesting the same crops
as their enslaved ancestors, on land owned by slave owners’ decedents. For black
children, their families’ dependence on white landowners and agriculture’s demands
meant that farm work came first—even before school.10 Billie Fleming, who would
become one of the county’s most prominent activists, remembered economic dependence
and a life in servitude:
We had no rights whatsoever that whites were bound to
respect. We suffered and we were held in bondage. . . we
actually had tenant farmers living on farms owned by
whites that had no freedom whatsoever. These people were
held in servitude and they were held in bondage. Many of
these people were not free to move from these farms.
Many of these people were jailed because they made
attempts to question the accountability of these farmers to
them when they sold the crops. Life for blacks in
Clarendon County in that era was deplorable and I think
about as bad as they were anywhere in this country. 11
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There were a few black landowners. Their lives, though comparatively better
than farm laborers, were far from easy. Their work was backbreaking, and their incomes
were low. They were self-sufficient, not wealthy. Most black people who did not labor in
the fields did other menial work such as loading trucks, sawing wood, cooking, cleaning,
or caring for children. They were not prepared to do anything better because, for most of
them, their educational opportunities ended before seventh grade. Black children could
not even get to school because the county refused to provide them with bus
transportation. 12 As Judge Waring remembered, the county’s lack of economic
opportunities went hand-in-hand with its oppressive race relations:
It’s a poor county; it’s a very backward county. . . One of the most
backwards counties of the state. It’s ruled by a small white minority very
limited in their viewpoint and education, and a large population of
Negroes, most of whom are dreadfully ignorant and poor, with very little
opportunities.13
As many of Clarendon County’s African Americans would soon learn, insisting on their
constitutional rights as a way to move their children out of ignorance and poverty put
them at the mercy of a small but powerful white minority who controlled jobs and their
children’s education.
Yet race relations in this rural area were headed toward change. During World
War II concerned citizens became more civically engaged. Rev. De Laine became
increasingly involved in civil rights in this era—issuing food and gas ration stamps. But
it was the returning African American veterans’ growing militancy that truly helped
radicalize De Laine.

Clarendon’s returning black veterans found that local school
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officials were making it difficult for them to take advantage of the GI Bill’s education
benefits. Two local black veterans wanted the school district to offer GI agricultural
classes. School officials claimed that they could not find a teacher. So the veterans
found a qualified candidate. When officials continued to drag their feet, the veterans
approached Rev. De Laine who drafted a petition that they sent to the State Department
of Education. The petition was successful. They soon had so many students that they had
to hire more teachers.14
De Laine was pleased to help the veterans and learned valuable lessons. In
hindsight it seems unsurprising that the two veterans who lead the fight for those GI
classes were Jesse and Ferdinand Pearson—the very same family who would initiate the
school bus petition that culminated into a school desegregation movement.15 Just as
important for this study is the fact that De Laine would have walked away from this
encounter knowing the value of organizing, a petition’s effectiveness, and who to
approach if he needed a petitioner.
Rev. J. A. De Laine and Mrs. Mattie De Laine found themselves at the center of
an all-encompassing fight for equal rights. But it was a fight that Rev. De Laine’s role as
a minister—particularly in the AME church which had historically linked leadership and
social activism—and their experiences as educators in segregated schools made them
well prepared.16
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De Laines’ activism was also informed by more practical matters—namely he
was not completely economically dependent on whites. Rev. De Laine learned the value
of economic independence while attending Allen University in Columbia where he
worked his way through school with a series of jobs in and out of state. Now, Rev. De
Laine worked for the AME Church. He also bought a small farm that provided his family
with another source of income.17 Mrs. De Laine was likely an ideal spouse to support his
efforts to be economically autonomous. Her childhood gave her an appreciation for rural
life, and knowledge of how powerful economic autonomy could be.
We lived in a rural district. My father was a farmer. He
was a poor man but a rather independent farmer. He made
almost everything we used. We had cows, hogs. We raised
farm products. . . We were poor. There were many of us in
the family. But I don’t know a day that we wanted for a
piece of bread.18
So, while Rev. and Mrs. De Laine’s teaching positions made them vulnerable to powerful
whites. Farming and preaching positioned them to withstand the onslaught of economic
repercussions that undid activists with less economic autonomy.
The De Laines knew from experience how difficult it was for the children
Clarendon County’s children to get a primary and secondary education. Rev. De Laine
spent his childhood working his family’s land. When he did have the opportunity to go to
school, he had to walk five miles each way, and was taught the minimum when he got
there. Likewise, Mrs. De Laine knew what it was like to walk long distances to attend
school. Her father wanted all his children to have the best possible education so instead
of sending them to the local one-room schoolhouse he sent them to a five room, four
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teacher, Presbyterian parochial school five miles away. Her father always sent someone
to walk her home from school, but she remembered that the white children had a school
bus.19
Mrs. Mattie De Laine taught at Scott’s Branch school in Summerton. She and the
other teachers at Scott’s Branch not only had to contend with the labor demands on
Clarendon County’s children, but also the fact that it was often impossible for students to
traverse the surrounding landscape. The Santee Dam, a $65 million project, was
supposed to attract new business by making hydroelectric power and the transportation of
goods by water possible. Instead, it failed to attract business and continually flooded the
roads black children travelled on their way to school. Conditions were so bad that the
children sometimes had to row a boat to go to school. Yet when local blacks implored
the school board to help they were shrugged off by a group that saw no need to educate
black children, and had no desire to hide the fact that these decisions were based on racist
sentiments.20 Indeed as a black father named James Gibson remembered the school
board chairman told them, “We ain’t got no money to buy a bus for your nigger
children.”21
Embodying the self-help philosophy that had defined post-emancipation black racial
uplift, a group of Davis Station parents purchased an old bus. They hired a driver and
started a fund to operate the bus.

(Parents in Society Hill, which adjoined Davis

Station—did the same thing.)22 But over time the bus became less reliable. The Santee
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Dam’s continued flooding compounded the problem. No students died on the way to or
from school, but two boys died on those roads, as well as a man who was visiting his inlaws. In fact, the only reason more locals did not drown was because they were so
familiar with the area’s terrain.23
When Rev. De Laine attended that Race and Culture class, he heard Rev. Hinton
speak about the need to challenge the school bus transportation racism. Hinton told those
gathered that the state of black schools was proof that “the white man’s heel was still
pressing the black man’s head into the mud.”24 Black Americans could not advance
unless they were better educated, and white segregationists were purposely preventing
black Carolinians from getting an equal education. After all, an educated man would not
be satisfied laboring in the field for wages so low they could scarcely afford the bare
necessities. Hinton implied that although the PSTA had enough funds to pursue a legal
case, there was not a teacher or preacher with enough “damn guts” to serve as plaintiff.
De Laine resented the implication. It served as his call to action. He promised Hinton
that he would bring a client the next week.25
De Laine’s task was not an easy one. He may have had the courage to face the
reprisals coming his way but he also had to find a parent with the same courage. And that
parent had to be a taxpayer, an upstanding citizen, and have a child in the right school.
Fortunately as a teacher, preacher, NAACP organizer, and hometown man, De Laine had
deep roots in the community. If anyone could accomplish such a feat, he could. When
23

“The Word Made Flesh,” 87-88.
Simple Justice, 16.
25
J. A. De Laine, “History Leading Up to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision Outlawing
Segregation in Public Schools” (speech, May 17, 1974), Joseph A. De Laine Papers,
University of South Carolina Political Collections; “Seeds in Unlikely Soil,” 180; Simple
Justice, 16; Seeds in Unlikely Soil,” 180.
24

95

De Laine got home, he met with two brothers, Hammitt and Levi Pearson. De Laine
originally considered Hammitt to serve as the petitioner, but decided he was too hotheaded. Instead, they chose the level-headed Levi.26
The disparities between black and white schools were obvious. But for people like
Levi Pearson, their first priority was simply getting their children to school on a regular
basis.27 De Laine described how important it was to get black children to school safe and
sound:
As [a] country school teacher for seventeen years I have
seen some conditions that many people do not even think
exist. I have had children come to me wet from the rain and
from the white school bus slashing mud and water on them
when I did not have a stick of wood or other fuel to make a
fire and warm their little bodies with. I have seen children
from the windows of the white school bus spit out of the
window of the bus on the little helpless Negro Children
coming to my school.28
Pearson’s mindset and De Laine’s statement remind us that local level activism was most
often sparked by a desire for practical changes, not grandiose ideals.
The following week De Laine and Levi Pearson went to a meeting in Columbia.
The cohort—James Hinton; A. T. Butler, the PSTA executive secretary; and attorney
Harold Boulware—represented the alliance that would take black Carolinians’ fight for
equal education into its next phase.29 With the Pine Grove Church board’s approval Rev.
De Laine and a committee of two others approached a local white Presbyterian minister
26
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named L. B. McCord. McCord was the pastor at Manning Presbyterian Church and had
served as the superintendent of schools since 1940. Such education and religious
leadership made him a respected person among Clarendon County whites, but African
Americans considered him a white supremacist. They did not believe he cared about
whether or not their teachers were qualified. So perhaps De Laine and his committee
were unsurprised when their request for bus transportation was denied. White school
officials unwittingly left local blacks with few options. In late June of 1947, attorney
Harold Boulware drafted a petition bearing Levi Pearson’s name.

The petition,

requesting bus transportation for black students, was filed with the board in July. After
three weeks with no response, Boulware wrote the Superintendent again, and requested a
hearing. But Clarendon County’s black parents were met, once again, with a deafening
silence.

The Board of Trustees chairman, Vander Stukes, told Boulware that Levi

Pearson was no longer interested in the case, but Pearson was adamant.30 Anyone who
assumed he was uninterested in carrying the case out, “assume[d] too much.”31 In fact,
De Laine and Pearson seemed eager for the case to move along. De Laine believed
people would gain courage after the case went public.32
On March 16, 1948 NAACP attorneys Harold Boulware, Thurgood Marshall, and
Edward R. Dudley filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court in Charleston, South
Carolina, alleging that the practice of providing bus transportation to white students but
not black students was unconstitutional because it was done on account of their race. The
state constitution, argued the attorneys, made public education a state responsibility. It
30
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was county and state school official’ duty s to provide free bus transportation for all
students. Besides, bus transportation was paid for out of public school funds, which all
Clarendon County residents, including African Americans, paid into.33
Two defendants named in the complaint—the State Board of Education and the
State Superintendent of Education, Jesse T. Anderson—argued that providing bus
transportation was not their responsibility. They had not provided bus transportation to
any students. That was the school district’s responsibility. They also asserted that the
court had no jurisdiction in the case. The other defendants—the County Board of
Education; L.B. McCord, County Superintendent; Board of District Commissioners,
School District 26; and E.G. Stukes, Board of District Commissioners Chairman—agreed
with this assertion. They said that the District Commissioners of School District 26 held a
hearing twenty days beforehand but had not had a chance to make a decision. The
plaintiffs, according to them, had not pursued every available option. State law provided
a way to petition the County Board and the State Board of Education. Therefore the Court
should not hear the case because the aforementioned procedures were better suited to
address the plaintiffs’ issues.34
The defense also argued that discrimination was not based on race. Instead they
claimed that black students greatly outnumbered white students.35 The larger number of
black students prompted the district to situate the black schools closer to where the
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students lived, but that white schools were not as close to white students’ homes because
they were “scattered and sparsely settled.”36
The Pearson case was to be tried on June 9, 1948, at the U.S. District Court in
Florence. Unfortunately for the NAACP attorneys and the rural blacks they represented,
the case did not go to trial.37 The reason proved to be embarrassing for Boulware who
recalled that they “goofed.”38 It was dismissed, at the plaintiff’s request, because it was
decided that Pearson had no legal standing.

His farm was located between school

districts 5 and 26. He paid taxes in district 5, but his children attended school in districts
22 and 26. However, this is not an indisputable fact. On Friday, April 9, 1947, L. B.
McCord and E. G. Stukes stopped by Pearson’s home. De Laine, who had been speaking
with Pearson outside, overheard their conversation. The two men informed Pearson that
his taxes had been credited to District 5, not 26. Pearson was confident that he had paid
his taxes in District 26, but did not have his tax receipt. He went to his brother Hammitt
Pearson’s home, located only a few yards away from his. Hammitt’s receipt was for
District 26.39 Although the case may not have been a legal success, it was far from a
waste of time. As Billie Fleming recalled, the Pearson suit “was the beginning of the real
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Clarendon County movement.”40 Likewise, De Laine said it was “the legal beginning of
the movement” for equal education.41 Eugene Montgomery, one of the state NAACP
leaders agreed:
This was really, I would say, the beginning of the
Clarendon County case because they decided then that they
were not going to stop until they got some better
educational facilities for the children.42
Unfortunately, the Pearson suit reawakened the KKK. The day after the case was filed in
the U.S. District Court, the State newspaper ran a story on Levi Pearson and he faced
swift economic repercussions. White owned stores and banks refused to issue him credit.
In the past, Pearson would find a white farmer with a harvester to help him gather his
crops. But this season, no white farmer would help him, and no black farmers had access
to one. That fall, he watched helplessly as his crops decayed in the fields.43
The Clarendon movement recovered quickly. At 10:00 AM on March 12, 1949, a
small meeting was held at the Palmetto Teachers Association building in Columbia. In
attendance were Thurgood Marshall and his staff, PSTA officers, state NAACP branch
officials, De Laine, Rev. J. W. Seals, Ravenel Felder, and several Pearson family
members: Levi, Hammit, Willis, Jesse, Ferdinand, and Charlotte.44 De Laine was caught
off guard when Marshall insisted that the NAACP would no longer support a case that
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dealt only with bus transportation. Marshall told him that if Clarendon County blacks
wanted the civil rights organization’s legal support, the case would have to be for school
and education equalization. Clarendon County presented an ideal situation to challenge
whether or not black and white schools were, in fact “separate but equal.” Districts 9 and
22 had in-district high schools for both black and white students. Their case would be
clear-cut. De Laine had to find at least twenty parents to sue for equalization.45
De Laine was frustrated, but from Marshall’s perspective, there was safety in
numbers. Having one plaintiff was too risky because it was easy to find some
disqualifying factor, as they did with Mr. Pearson. If De Laine could not find twenty
plaintiffs, Marshall planned on going somewhere else. He needed a major case to test
separate but equal. The Clarendon group “withdrew for coffee” to consider Marshall’s
challenge and ultimately decided to pursue the case.46 They would find enough plaintiffs
to file an equalization suit. They decided to bring some permanency to what had been a
temporary NAACP branch. Levi Pearson was appointed President of the local branch and
Seals was appointed Secretary and Treasurer.47
The group quickly got to work in Clarendon County.

The first mass meeting

was held on March 30, 1949, at Mount Zion AME Church, located in District 26, where
Rev. Larry King was the pastor. A second meeting was held on March 31 at Union
Cypress AME Church in District 5. An informational meeting was held the next month
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on April 19 in Summerton, District 22, at St. Mark AME Church where Rev. Seals was
the pastor. Another informational meeting was held the following day in Manning
(District 9) at Ebenezer Baptist Church. That these initial meetings were held at churches
demonstrates how important faith and religion were to birthing a local protest movement.
The fact that many were held at AME churches shows that this intra-church network was
central to organizing efforts, and helps explain why someone like De Laine became so
integral to the Clarendon movement.48
De Laine recalled that this was when the “real work and sacrifice were made.”49
But the repercussions not only directly affected black adults, but the very children De
Laine and Pearson put themselves on the line to help. In the failed legal case’s aftermath,
school officials replaced the Scott’s Branch principal, Mr. Maceo Anderson, with Mr. S.
I. Benson, a man who did not have a college degree.

Anderson, who had served

effectively for eleven years, was active in the Progressive Democratic Party. In fact,
Anderson and another teacher named Mrs. White had recently attempted to register to
vote. The pretense for their denial—that they were not literate enough—was only further
evidence that Clarendon County white officials were blatantly denying blacks’ right to
vote.

Anderson was dismissed because “[s]omebody had to suffer for the eyes of the

people being opened.”50 His dismissal came at a critical time in the school’s history.
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Scott’s Branch would now have its first senior class. They needed an experienced
principal to guide them through this process.51
Teachers, students, and parents found Principal Benson’s performance
unsatisfactory.52 The list of grievances against him was so long that one wonders why he
ever became involved in education. Benson was not particularly “skillful in judging the
feelings and intelligence of others.”53 They asserted that he did not spend enough time at
the school—a problem that was amplified by the fact that the students in the algebra and
geometry classes he was supposed to teach had paid extra money for their textbooks. He
was unable and unwilling to properly supervise and discipline schoolchildren. His
handling of teacher absences further compromised the school’s discipline issues. Instead
of calling in a substitute, he adopted the method of placing one of the older schoolgirls in
charge of the classroom. Such a policy was not wholly peculiar in a small, one room
schoolhouse. But Scott’s Branch was far from being a one-room schoolhouse. Its large
classes needed a trained teacher, not inexperienced teenagers. Moreover, he was soon
assumed to be a thief. Parents who could afford to do so pulled their children from the
school and either sent them to a boarding school or to the public school in Manning. The
De Laines were among the parents who did this. They sent their son Jay to a private
school.54
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Summerton’s black adults were “slow to take up the fight.55 Students were the
first to organize. About thirty members of the Class of 1949 filed charges against the
principal with the Board of Trustees, the District Superintendent, and the County
Superintendent.56 The six complaints against Principal Benson were:
1. Misappropriation of monies for equipment and books
2. The Principal neglected his duty as a teacher
unreasonably.
3. The Principal is holding some certificates and charging
some children $27.00 plus the $7.00 paid at the begging
of the school term.
4. Failing to show results from $800.00 raised in two
rallies.
5. Pocketing moneys raised in May as door fee for eight
programs.
6. Overcharging for certificates and threatening children’s
transcripts.57
When there was no response from school officials the students, along with their parents,
organized a meeting to be held the first Sunday of the month, June 8, at St. Mark AME.
This time they notified school officials by registered mail. More than 300 African
Americans, including parents, students, teachers, and Scott’s Branch faculty were in
attendance. They filled the pews, then stood in the aisles, and some were even forced to
stand outside and observe the proceedings through the windows. Reverdy Wells, the
student body president and class valedictorian, opened the meeting and asked other
members of their class to share their complaints against Principal Benson. About thirty
students presented their complaints to the group. Later on at least two teachers—Mrs.
Rosa S. Montgomery and Mattie D. Stokes—signed affidavits before Rev. De Laine
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supporting the students accusations against Principal Benson. But no school officials
attended the meeting. 58
The parents formed the Parent Committee on Action and chose Rev. De Laine as
their formal leader and Rev. E. E. Richburg, pastor of the county’s largest A.M.E. church,
to serve as secretary. De Laine was hesitant to take on the leadership position. He was
in poor health and already had too many commitments. Foreseeing the repercussions
they would face, he was concerned that the parents would abandon him when things got
really tough. And he did not want to compromise Mrs. De Laine’s position at the
school.59 But in the long run this meeting would became one of the most integral in
cementing these rural blacks’ determination for true educational equality. As De Laine
recalled:
This was the Psychological Meeting [sic] which conditioned the minds of
the mass of parents in District 22. This was the time when the effort
shifted from Mr. Levi Pearson to Harry Briggs et al. This acceptance of
the chairmanship by Rev. J. A. De Laine was a deliberate act, understood
by Rev. J. W. Seals and Levi and Hammit Pearson, to shift the struggle
from District 26 to District 22.60
Indeed, until this point, Richburg had refrained from formally engaging in the black equal
rights movement. But he was ideal for this role. Richburg could bolster the people’s
commitment to the fight.61 He was a Clarendon County native who could prove to be a
powerful ally to De Laine. Furthermore, Richburg may have been “a country boy who
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hailed from Spring Hill,” but he possessed an urbanity that De Laine simply did not
have.62 That this moment catapulted him into activism demonstrates the importance of
education in the black community, and its power to mobilize the community and its
leaders.
The meeting also served as an important crossroads for local blacks.

It

demonstrated that they were committed to ensuring their children had an adequate
education. But equally important was that a full decade before the well-known 1960
Greensboro sit-in, and the birth of SNCC, Clarendon County’s youth were engaging in
organized direct action. Incorporating the youthful fervor of the 1960s, and the litigation
method of the 1930s-1950s, this case can be seen as a bridge between two generations’
civil rights activism.
One June 9, 1949, the J. A. De Laine and the two other Committee on Action
members—Robert Georgia and Edward Ragin (NAACP member who helped plan the
church meeting and would later serve as Briggs plaintiffs—went to see Superintendent
Betchman with a letter outlining the students’ concerns. Betchman was on vacation, so
they met with the school board clerk, J. D. Carson.63 Two days after that meeting, June
11, De Laine received a registered letter from the Board of Trustees of Clarendon School
District 30 informing him that his services as principal of Silver School were no longer
needed. Of course, De Laine knew that this was a possibility. He predicted the previous
year that he went “out so far until I doubt anything can save me as a teacher next year.”64
But it had been a risk he was willing to take. The loss of income was certainly an
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inconvenience, but the De Laines had a productive farm. And Mrs. De Laine was still
gainfully employed as a teacher at Scott’s Branch. They were in a better situation than
most local blacks to weather financial repercussions.65
The County Board of Education eventually agreed to dismiss Principal Benson
from his position during a hearing on Saturday, October 1, 1949.66 The following
Monday, Rev. De Laine met with Superintendent Betchman who handed De Laine his
son’s transcript, which had been withheld in the melee, and said that except for books,
students would no longer be charged school fees. He then dangled a carrot stick.67 If De
Laine ended the fight for better school facilities, he could have the Scott’s Branch
principalship:
Ninety percent of the people are following you, De Laine, and they
deserve better leadership than to get into a fight with the white people.
The whites provide the money and the jobs that keep them going.68
Betchman’s threat was pretty obvious. Either take the proverbial carrot stick and quell
the growing local movement, or everyone who signed the petition will face economic
repercussions. Nonetheless, De Laine refused the offer and was unmoved by the threat.
He could not ignore the interests of those who had chosen him as their leader.69 His wife,
Mrs. Mattie De Laine, who had been serving as the assistant principal, was chosen to
serve as the acting principal in “a transparent maneuver to compromise the reverend’s
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protest activities.”70 Indeed, as Rev. De Laine remembered, the thought behind giving
Mrs. De Laine the position was, “Old De Laine can’t fight his wife.”71 But by that point
the plight of the black children in this rural, agricultural area was gaining more and more
attention from the NAACP.
The Clarendon County Branch definitely had their work cut out for them. The
Pearson case made finding twenty plaintiffs incredibly difficult. After all, there was now
a glaring example of what could happen to a person who openly challenged the racial
status quo. Farmers could look at the example of Levi Pearson to see their eventual fate.
Teachers could look at the example of the Scott’s Branch principal who had been fired
for the mere suspicion of supporting the bus case. To combat this the newly formed
chapter began having meetings in local A.M.E. churches. After one of these meetings
two NAACP Executive Secretaries—Lester Banks of Virginia and Eugene Montgomery
of South Carolina—spent the night at the De Laine home and convinced them that they
should shift their focus from School Districts 25 and 5, which bused its white high school
students to different districts to Districts 22 and 9, which had white high school facilities
in decidedly better condition than their black counterparts. But one local minister warned
De Laine that his work in that area would likely result in his murder, or his house being
burned down.72 In hindsight, his warnings seemed more like a prediction.
Ultimately De Laine met and surpassed Marshall’s demands.

The Parent

Committee on Action submitted six local petitions to the trustee board. Each petition was
unsuccessful. So on November 11, 1949, NAACP attorneys Harold Boulware, Thurgood
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Marshall, and Robert Carter submitted a petition to the Board of Trustees for School
District No. 22 with over 104 names (twenty-nine adults and seventy-five
schoolchildren). However De Laine did not sign the petition because Boulware warned
him that it would make him a bigger target. The petition asserted that the black school
facilities—Scott’s Branch High School, Liberty Hill Elementary School, and Rambay
Elementary School—were significantly inferior to the white school facilities. The black
school facilities were unsanitary, unhealthy, dilapidated, overcrowded, and did not have
enough teachers.73
The Board of Trustees did not respond immediately. In fact, they did not respond
for three more months. And when they gave their decision on February 20, 1950,
Clarendon’s activists found it unsatisfactory. For, despite the overwhelming evidence to
the contrary, the Board employed deceitful, misleading language to advance the idea that
black school facilities were not only equal to white school facilities, but that they were
often superior. For example, the board said that the white school in Summerton was a
forty-three year old, two story, eight room structure that was “improperly lighted” and
old.

Its physical condition was “a source of dissatisfaction to both patrons and

trustees.” 74 On the other hand, Scott’s Branch was a forty-three year old, ten-room
structure “built according to approved plans for educational buildings, taking into
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consideration the proper lighting and protection from fire,” and that there were three
recently built additional structures.75
The board also excused the fact that white students had bus transportation while
black students did not by asserting that the white population had “shifted” since the
school was built, and that it was hazardous and inconvenient for white students to travel
without bus transportation—therefore ignoring the hazards black children faced walking
to school.76 They disregarded the unsanitary conditions black students faced with the
excuse that the restrooms in the black schools fulfilled the State Health Department’s
specifications.

And if those at the white school were admittedly better it was not

intentional. The town of Summerton had installed a new water and sewer system, and the
Parent Teacher Association provided the better facilities.77

Although there was no

municipal water system where Scotts Branch was located, the Board had “at a great
expense to itself” laid a water line to the school that was “installed and terminated under
the direction of the colored school authorities.78 They also denied unequal teacher pay,
saying that it was based on school attendance and that white schools had greater
attendance. Predictably, the board did not rule in the petitioners’ favor.79
On May 15, 1950, NAACP attorneys Boulware, Marshall, and Robert Carter
submitted a complaint to the U.S. District Court on behalf of Harry Briggs and other
black students and parents in School District 22. The plaintiffs alleged that school
officials had a policy of providing and maintaining free bus transportation for white
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children, and not providing the same to black children. The school facilities for white
children (Summerton Elementary School and Summerton High School) were superior to
those provided to black children (Scotts Branch High School, Liberty Hill Elementary,
and Rambay Elementary School). Therefore, black children were being denied an equal
education—a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

They asked the court for a

permanent injunction to prevent the plaintiffs from providing unequal school facilities
and withholding bus transportation on account of race.80
Attorneys for the defense asserted that this was a local issue, and therefore not the
court’s jurisdiction. The only issue of controversy, according to them, was whether or
not the school facilities were unequal, and whether or not free bus transportation was
provided to white children and not black children. They asserted that the school facilities
were equal, and that they were not the ones who provided bus transportation.81
When the Clarendon County legal petition was filed, it marked an important
turning point for the local movement. Local black activists could not avoid the national
spotlight that would soon shine on them—or the massive repercussions that would
continue to descend on them.

But instead of suppressing the movement, the

repercussions seemed to embolden many of Clarendon County’s blacks. According to
De Laine the economic pressure they faced opened a lot of people’s eyes to “the need for
such an organization as the NAACP.”82 He encouraged Summerton blacks to join the
NAACP as a response to the repercussions. As a result, their membership grew from
fifty, to five hundred.
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Yet as the repercussions increased, morale began to fall. Support for De Laine
waned. Someone attempted to kill Robert Georgia, Sr., a member of the Committee on
Action, by running him down. Two white men attacked and killed a black man named
James McKnight, who had signed the equalization petition. Mr. McKnight pulled over to
answer nature’s call in the woods when the two men attacked him. Despite the fact that
his family, who were still in the car, witnessed the attack, his assailants were exonerated.
Betchman threatened Rev. Seals’ teaching position if he did not stop allowing De Laine
to have meetings at St. Mark. Rev. Seals did not give in to the threat but it demonstrated
how creative segregationists had to be when confronting economically autonomous
blacks.83
And the repercussions kept coming. Bo Stukes, “perhaps the best mechanic in
town,” was fired.84 Stukes tried to continue working from home, but he did not have the
proper equipment and was tragically crushed to death trying to work under a car. Hazel
Ragin, the only housepainter in Summerton, stopped getting hired for jobs.

Mazie

Solomon, who had not actually signed the petition, was dismissed from the Windson
Motel after the supervisor told her to take her name off the list or be fired.85
Unfortunately, Mazie Solomon’s troubles did not end at work. When she returned
home, the landowner told her and her family that they would have to move if they did not
remove their name from the petition. The landowner was facing pressure from other
whites. If he did not kick them off the land, he would not be able to get his cotton
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ginned, or be able to sell his produce.

He gave them one month to move. 86 A

sharecropper named Elliott Richardson was also evicted from his land. 87 Clarendon
County’s white segregationists told local blacks to be wary of following “the radical
leadership of those Methodist preachers.”88 To do so would be met with real and
substantial repercussions.
Summerton’s white leaders labeled the Reverends Seals, Richburg, Frazier, and
De Laine as Communists. They told local blacks that Russia was paying the AME
ministers who were pocketing the money blacks gave to the NAACP.89 As hard as it was
to be a black civil rights leader, it was “infinitely worse to be black and Communist.”90
De Laine and the other leaders believed that the term “communist” was used as a way to
distract people from the education inequalities they brought to the surface. They believed
that it was used to question their patriotism.91
White officials also began telling the blacks they employed that they had to get a
resignation letter from De Laine to prove that they were no longer in the NAACP. For
instance one man, named Elvin Walker, was forced to get a written statement from De
Laine because he lived on S. E. Rogers’ property—a prominent pro-segregation attorney.
Soon there was an influx of requests, sometimes from people who had never even been in
the NAACP. The requests, most often made in person, got so annoying that De Laine
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began telling people go to attorney Rogers. He could draw up that kind of papers they
needed.92
Harry Briggs and William Stukes, both World War II veterans, were denied
admission to the GI classes local black veterans had fought so hard to gain. Officials said
the classes were full, but Briggs and Stukes found out that that other veterans were
admitted. They ended up having to travel twenty-four miles to Manning in order to
continue their coursework.93
John Edward Black, a veteran of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, could not get financing
for a tractor to farm his one hundred acres of land. Lee Richardson’s outstanding debt at
the McClary feed store, a regular part of doing business as a small farmer, was called in
to be paid immediately. Billie Fleming, owner of the Fleming-De Laine funeral home
and J. A. De Laine’s nephew, was informed that black sharecroppers were being
prohibited from doing business with him. In fact, one family who had brought their
infant son in for burial was forced to move their son’s body to another funeral home.94
Many people lost their jobs. Harry Briggs and Larry Stokes were fired from their
jobs before the case reached the federal court. Teachers suspected of sympathizing with
the students or who Principal Benson accused were fired. Two GI teachers, William
Ragin and Rev. J. W. Seals lost their teaching positions. Parents found these dismissals
incredibly disturbing. On the evening of July 25, over forty parents got together at St.
Mark and signed a petition asking the district trustees not to dismiss any more teachers.
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Similarly District 22 chose not to rehire three of the Liberty Hill elementary school
teachers—Rowena Oliver, Carrie Martin, and Edyth Oliver—who had signed the
equalization suit. Once locals heard that the teachers had effectively been dismissed,
sixty-six people signed a petition to the board of trustees citing how much the school
improved during their tenure and asked that they be rehired.95 These types of reactions to
teacher dismissals reiterate that they were seen as an integral part of improving black life
for the next generation.
Harry and Eliza Briggs faced more repercussions than any of the other Briggs
signatories because the case bore their name. Mrs. Eliza Briggs was dismissed from her
job as a motel chambermaid, after serving in that position for six years. Her employers
told her their suppliers would stop making deliveries unless they dismissed her and
anyone else who had signed the petition. Mr. Harry Briggs was fired from his job of
fourteen years, and he was unable to find subsequent employment in South Carolina.96
He remembered:
There didn’t seem to be much danger to it. But after the petition was
signed, I knew it was different. The white folks got kind of sour. They
asked me to take my name off the petition. My boss, he said did I know
what I was doin’ and I said, “I’m doin’ it for the benefit of my children.”
He didn’t say nothin’ back. But then later—it was before Christmas—he
gave me a carton of cigarettes and then he let me go. He said, “Harry, I
want me a boy—and I can pay him less than you.”97
His boss may have been specifically referring to age, but it is just as likely that he was
also referring to manhood/masculinity. When Harry Briggs insisted that his children had
95
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a right to the same education and facilities as white children, he not only stepped out of
his place as an African American, but away from the assigned role of boy. His activism
was, consciously or not, an assertion of his manhood and therefore a challenge to the
racial, gendered status quo.

Like his Reconstruction era counterparts, Mr. Briggs’

assertion of his manhood was a way for him to “assume full patriarchal responsibility”
for his family. Gaining access to the larger society’s patriarchal definition of manhood
could grant the Briggs children greater educational and economic opportunities. These
discussions demonstrate that for some families, civil rights and black manhood were
inextricably linked. Mr. and Mrs. Briggs remained Clarendon County residents in name
only. Mr. Briggs relocated to Miami for twelve years. His Florida employer, aware of
his unfortunate situation, took advantage of him and forced Briggs to work off-the-clock
or be fired. With the NAACP’s assistance the whole family relocated to New York in
1952.98
As the visual and vocal leader of this movement, De Laine faced unrelenting
persecution.

S. E. Rogers—who would represent the state in the Supreme Court

desegregation case and play an integral role in forming the White Citizens Councils—
came up with a legal way to punish De Laine. He persuaded the outgoing Principal
Benson to file a $20,000 lawsuit against De Laine. The suit was filed on January 24,
1950, and accused De Laine of fabricating the students’ complaints.99 Only days before
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the March 6 court date, papers appeared all over town threatening the outgoing Principal
Benson.
WARNING BENSON:
YOU HAD BETTER NOT APPEAR IN JUDGEMENT
AGAINST ANY PERSON IN SC OR ANYWHERE.
AND MAY WE EMPHASIZE THE FORTHCOMING
COURT. TOO, YOU BETTER BE TOLD THAT ANY
SUBSEQUENCE COURT WILL BE JUST AS
PERILOUS AS THIS ONE. THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA WILL NOT ALLOW A CHARACTER LIKE
YOU TO SERVE OF HANDLE PUBLIC AFFAIRS.
TELL YOUR “DARKY’ SUPPORTERS THAT IF THEY
WANT TO DIE WITH YOU COME AND WITNESS
FOR YOU. –KU KLUX KLAN100
To De Laine and his supporters, the badly worded “warning” was clearly the KKK’s
creation. They were trying to imitate De Laine trying to imitate them. Indeed, the FBI
did find the original stencil and mimeograph in a local white school attic. The slander
case not only put De Laine in a precarious position, but threatened to undo the whole
school equalization suit. De Laine was able to be an effective leader and withstand white
persecution because he was far more financially autonomous than most local blacks. He
did not buy on credit, and owned his own land. But if the suit was successful it would
ruin him, and by default the local movement. School officials even fired his two sisters
and niece, who were all teachers. None of these women were NAACP members. Their
dismissal was an effort to prevent them from giving financial help to De Laine during the
lawsuit.101 Their goal was evident. They wanted De Laine to be financially ruined.
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De Laine rushed to get his land transferred to other people’s names. He needed
the help of an attorney and began contacting the area’s few black attorneys. Boulware
was unable to take the case because of a conflict of interest. William James and Esau
Parker, both located in Sumter, were unavailable. A white lawyer agreed to take the case,
but his $1,000 retainer was more than De Laine could afford, and De Laine did not fully
trust him, especially when he found out the lawyer was related to one of the District 22
trustees. His friend, Dr. E. A. Adams of Columbia, had a real-estate license and began
helping with the process of transferring property ownership. Fortunately the two Sumter
attorneys realized the predicament he was in and took the case. But even though Mr.
Parker drove from Sumter to the Manning courthouse to personally deliver the
documents, not every thing was finished by the time the case started.102
All of the witnesses in the slander trial were white men with ties to District 22.
This included the local superintendent of schools, the county superintendent, members of
the high school board, and the Summerton High School agricultural teacher. All except
the teacher were defendants in the equalization suit. De Laine expected his accuser to be
dishonest, but was shocked when McCord, the Presbyterian minister, lied under oath.103
It was a short trial. It lasted three days, and the jury deliberated four hours. The
$5,000 De Laine was ordered to pay was substantially less than what Benson had asked
for, but still too high for De Laine to pay. In this case, his forethought in having his
property transferred to other people was extremely valuable. Getting that money from De
Laine would prove to be impossible. De Laine’s fee was eventually lowered to $2,700 on
appeal, but it remained unpaid. Those who instigated the suit tried to attach his property
102
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to the case, but the county sheriff confirmed that there was no property in his name.
They then tried to contest the property transfers, but a judge ruled that the transfers were
legal. The slander suit was a financial and psychological blow. De Laine, who had
worked so hard to create a sense of financial security and prosperity under Jim Crow
segregation, was “left financially at the mercy of others” for the first time in his adult
life.104
From the very beginning of the equalization fight, there had been a rumor that
local blacks wanted to send their children to school with whites. At this point, there was
no truth to this rumor. The racial integration of schools was not the goal of the Clarendon
County movement.105 De Laine went so far as to call this rumor as “a malicious lie.”106
And yet, the NAACP’s official stance on education equality was changing. In July 1950,
a group of NAACP attorneys suggested that the Association no longer accept
“equalization only” cases. 107

Instead, they would pursue cases that challenged

segregation. The recommendation was made an official rule during the October Board of
Directors meeting. So, when Judge Waring ordered a pre-trial hearing in November,
Marshall indicated that their ultimate objective was to challenge segregation. At Judge
Waring’s recommendation, attorneys Boulware, Carter, and Marshall filed a new
complaint in December, requesting that the state constitution’s rule requiring black
students attend segregated schools be ruled a violation of the U.S. Constitution, but they
quickly filed a motion to dismiss, which Waring granted without prejudice. The NAACP
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would bring the case again. And the next time, they would have ample evidence that not
only were black and white school facilities unequal, but that racial segregation was
unconstitutional and damaging to black children.
When James F. Byrnes (known as Jimmie Byrnes) became South Carolina’s 104th
governor in 1950 the southern Democrat already had extensive experience in public
office. He served in the U.S. Senate for ten years. FDR named him to the Supreme
Court, but Byrnes left after only one year of service; he preferred the wheeling and
dealing innate to elected office. He then served in FDR’s administration, helping the
much-beloved president manage the conservative and liberal branches of the Democratic
Party.108 During his inaugural address, the newly elected Governor Byrnes likely came
across as a southern moderate, perhaps even as a progressive. His speech demonstrated a
deep awareness of the burgeoning school equalization movement and the Supreme
Court’s changing attitude regarding racial equality. Abandoning a language of vitriolic
racial hatred, Byrnes positioned himself as a sort of rational segregationist—seeming to
acknowledge that some social changes were necessary, yet insisting that no serious
challenge to the southern racial status quo would be tolerated.
Byrnes indirectly acknowledged black disfranchisement. He recommended that
the legislature approve a constitutional amendment to repeal a voting poll tax that had
been approved during a recent election. He renounced the KKK’s activities, but lumped
the NAACP in with the terrorist organization. The most important parts of his speech,
for the purposes of this study, were that he upheld the white southern belief in state’s
rights, but also conceded that the state had to fulfill its responsibility to educate all the
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state’s children. All children, according to the new governor, should be provided at least
a grade school education.

Teacher salaries should be increased, and the school

transportation system should be improved.109
To address the state’s education inequalities, but remain true to the state
constitution’s mandate on segregated schools, Byrnes introduced a school building
program. The state program would: supplement local government school building funds,
span over twenty years, and provide an estimated $75 million for school construction.
And while Byrnes declared that the program was the right thing to do, he also asserted
that it was a wise choice. It was a preventative measure to thwart desegregation. He
referred to the U.S. attorney general, who had urged the courts to declare segregation
unconstitutional. Understanding the importance of the Briggs case, and foreseeing the
possibility of Supreme Court mandated desegregation, Byrnes noted that South Carolina
was not the only state with a legal case questioning racial segregation’s validity. He
warned that if these cases went to the Supreme Court, they could very well be ruled in the
plaintiffs’ favor.110
As a former Supreme Court Justice, Byrnes had a broad enough understanding of
the law and recent court decisions to conclude that school equalization would most likely
become a legal mandate in both word and deed. The courts could rule in favor of
desegregation merely as the most effective means of ensuring school equalization.111 He
hoped that if these cases made it to the court, the justices would take the school
equalization program into consideration.
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segregationist politicians, Byrnes warned that desegregation could result in the complete
destruction of the public school system.

Moreover according to him black South

Carolinians did not support desegregation. This movement was the work of “professional
agitators.” 112
Later that month, in his address to the General Assembly, Byrnes spoke directly
about the state’s education system.

Likely wanting to assuage the demands of the

original Pearson case, Byrnes acknowledged that school transportation needed to be
improved. The best way to do this was for the state to take on the responsibility of
providing and maintaining school transportation. He spoke again of his statewide school
building program, saying that it would be “one of South Carolina’s first objectives.”113
Issuing bonds could help pay for the program. The state would also need to institute a
sales tax. This would be new for the Palmetto State, but Byrnes insisted that it was not a
revolutionary concept since there was already a sales tax on specific items, and twentyeight other states already had one. To give the legislatures further incentive to approve
the new sales tax, he claimed that it would actually grant relief to low-income taxpayers.
He spoke directly to the Clarendon case when he said, “The education of every boy and
girl in the rural districts is important to every man and woman in our cities.”114 And as
he did with his inaugural address, Byrnes assured the members of the South Carolina
legislature that local blacks were committed to segregation:
The overwhelming majority of colored people in this State do not want to
force their children into white schools. Just as the Negro preachers do not
want their congregations to leave them and attend the churches of white
112
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people, the Negro teachers do not want their pupils to leave them and
attend schools for white children.115
And lest his audience start to believe that this school building program reflected a belief
in true racial equality, Byrnes compared the contemporary desegregation efforts to
Reconstruction era politics:
The politicians in Washington and the Negro agitators in South Carolina
who today seek to abolish segregation in all schools will learn that what a
carpetbag government could not do in the reconstruction period cannot be
done in this period.116
The school building plan would enable South Carolina to avoid desegregation, but the
state legislature and the citizens they represented should not confuse school facility
equalization with social equality. Black schools would be improved, but white power
would not be challenged.
For their part, African Americans seemed to see the school building program for
what it was—a ruse to avoid desegregation. South Carolina was “making desperate
attempts to put its house in order” before the desegregation case was decided.117 As the
well-known black newspaper The Chicago Defender reported, “white people of
Mississippi and South Carolina would rather support equalization programs than abolish
segregation in their schools.”118 Mary McLeod Bethune, one of the most respected and
well-known black educators to come out of South Caroline lambasted the program as
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“another poorly disguised attack on [the] democratic practice.”119

McLeod expressed

doubts that segregated schools could be truly equalized. After all, “buildings do not
spring up over night. Remodeling is not done overnight.”120 The schools that opened
that school year would be the same inferior schools they had been the previous school
year. McLeod was not alone in her doubts. Other black leaders believed that while
school equalization may have worked in the past, it was too late to use that remedy now.
Desegregation was the only way to guarantee equal educational opportunities. The
Southern Regional Council, a biracial southern group, did not explicitly denounce
segregation, but said school equality could not be accomplished unless African
Americans were permitted to serve on policy-making positions. But the Palmetto State’s
segregationists not only supported the idea in the abstract, but had already spent over half
a million dollars to get the school equalization program started.121
The South Carolina NAACP was aware that Gov. Byrnes’ school building
program could be detrimental to their challenge to racial segregation. The association’s
leaders also realized how important it was to maintain their positive relationship with
black teachers, and make sure this group supported this new education objective. Eager
to find a powerful speaker who could assist in this goal, the NAACP tried to get Ralph
Bunch, who had won the 1949 NAACP Spingarn award and would win a Nobel Peace
Price in 1950, as the main speaker for that year’s PSTA meeting. Such an endeavor
suggests the importance of this alliance. The two organizations remained “almost tied” to
119
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each other after the 1940s teacher salary equalization campaign.122 Indeed, as Eugene
Montgomery said in his letter requesting Bunche as speaker:
This is a most important event because the Teachers Association and
NAACP are so closely allied here in our fight and so many forces here
operate against the Teachers [sic]. I am certain you understand the
situation. Please do your best to get Dr. Bunche to come.
In hindsight, the focus on South Carolina’s schools was a long time coming. The state
had demonstrated its refusal to invest in the education of black children for some time.
The Margold Report of 1931 showed that South Carolina spent ten times more on white
students than on black students. This was even worse than its southern counterparts of
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas who were spending twice as much on
black schoolchildren. When esteemed civil rights attorney Charles Houston’s NAACP
appointment as special counsel was announced, it was after he toured the segregated
South. While in South Carolina, Houston filmed white and black school facilities. It
seems fitting, therefore, that challenging unequal educational facilities was one of the
first things on his agenda.123
Houston’s appointment signaled the shifting tides of the nation’s most powerful
civil rights organization. He once stated his preference for working in local and state
courts since they presented more dramatic legal battles and could more effectively
mobilize local black communities. However, he and the NAACP were tiring of the
limitations inherent in this approach. They needed a faster method to dismantle racial
segregation, so the federal courts became the legal campaign’s central focus. That this
shift was taking place at the same time that Charles Houston was emerging as the
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foremost legal mind in black civil rights would prove significant in black Carolinians’
equal education fight. It was Thurgood Marshall, Charles Houston’s most well known
student, who argued the Pearson and Briggs cases.124
De Laine was not initially happy about the switch to desegregation because he,
Richburg, and Seals had been assuring local whites that they would not challenge
desegregation. The NAACP’s change of plan made them appear dishonest. De Laine and
the Briggs petitioners had certainly faced their share of troubles already, but the move
from equalization to desegregation was when “things got hot in the state” for Rev. De
Laine.125
Yet the Clarendon case was building momentum. It seemed clear to everyone that
either way, the case would be significant.

For instance, on May 22, the NAACP

Membership Secretary, Lucille Black sent a special bulletin to everyone who worked
with the South Carolina Conference of Branches.126 She alerted them that Thurgood
Marshall, who could draw a large crowd for any occasion, would be arguing the Briggs
case on Monday, May 28. She emphasized the case’s importance, noting that it would be
the NAACP’s “first all-out attack on segregated education in the State. What happens in
Clarendon County will affect the future of every colored citizen for generations to
come.”127 Indeed, the Briggs ruling would technically be on one school district, but
astute observers understood that it would have a “far-reaching effect on the entire

124

Simple Justice, 159, 334.
“Quest for Civil Rights: Mrs. Mattie De Laine,” Moving Image Research Collections,
University of South Carolina; Dawn of Desegregation, 137-138.
126
Lucille Black to SC Branch Officers, Campaign Chairman, and Workers, 22 May
1951, Papers of the NAACP, Part 26, Box C-182.
127
Ibid.
125

126

segregated public school system” throughout the state and entire South.128 For Walter
White, who had been working with the NAACP’s national office since the 1910s, the
Briggs case was a victory regardless of the outcome:
Whatever the outcome of the Clarendon County, S.C. trial
testing and challenging segregation at the lower school
level it marks the beginning of a new and better era of race
relations in the United States. It marks the emancipation of
the Negro from fear and appeasement. It frightened the
unreconstructed South into cringing confession of its
monstrous sins of omission, forced them to admit there was
no escape from eventual defeat…”129
Indeed, the Briggs decision’s one guarantee seemed to be that the losing side would
appeal to the Supreme Court.130 Such a certainty is what made this case so incredibly
important.
Briggs created an increased interest in the NAACP. National membership
secretary Lucille Black encouraged branches to capitalize on the case as an opportunity to
garner new members. She made it very clear that this was not the time for black
Carolinians to sit on their laurels. The association needed their support now more than
ever:
At any rate, don’t sit down now! Back up Thurgood Marshall’s efforts by
getting the memberships and the money to carry on the fight.131
128

“S.C. Jimcro Schools in Vital Court Action,” New York Amsterdam News, May 26,
1951.
129
Walter White, “Charleston Trials Marks Beginning of a New Era in Race Relations,”
The Chicago Defender, June 16, 1951.
130
“School Segregation Fight Hitting South,” New York Amsterdam News, March 17,
1951; “S.C. Jimcro Schools in Vital Court Action,” New York Amsterdam News, May 26,
1951; “Three Racial Paradoxes . . . From Capital City to the Deep South,” The Chicago
Defender, June 9, 1951; S.C. to Build Jim Crow Schools as Court Weighs Their
Legality,” The Chicago Defender, June 16, 1951.
131
Lucille Black to SC Branch Officers, Campaign Chairman, and Workers, 22 May
1951, Papers of the NAACP, Part 26, Box C-182.
127

Southern blacks did not disappoint.
Counting the Pearson case and the former Briggs case, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et
al. was the third case De Laine was responsible for bringing to federal court. This was
the first one, however, that would be heard. The previous two were withdrawn. After
years of organizing and enduring severe repercussions, De Laine and the petitioners were
finally getting their day in court.132 Ever devout, De Laine “fervently prayed nothing
would go wrong.”133
Local blacks arrived at St. Mark Church during the early morning hours of the
first day of court and caravanned the seventy or so miles to Charleston. Instead of being
battle-worn the travellers were excited.

Something was finally happening.

Unfortunately, they arrived to an already full courtroom. Anticipating a big crowd, black
Charlestonians had arrived early that morning and took most of the seats. 134 The
“determined crowd” of African Americans arrived from near and far to support Marshall
and the NAACP.135 As Judge Waring remembered, there were so many people in the
corridor that the marshal had to rope off a path so that he and the other two judges could
get through the door and to their seats.136
But South Carolina’s segregationists quickly “created quite a coup” when they
abandoned their previous efforts to argue that black and white school facilities were equal
and openly admitted that they were, in fact, unequal.137 The Board of Trustees insisted
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that they “never intended to discriminate against anyone on account of race or color.”138
They defended their earlier finding that black and white schools were equal, asserting that
they believed the white school facilities were superior in some ways, but inferior in other
ways.139 Yet despite defending their original argument, the defense said they had been
satisfied as to the fact that the “educational facilities, equipment, curricula, and
opportunities” for black and white students were unequal.140 They continued to defend
their disproportionate funds allocation, opining that Clarendon was a rural school district
reliant on agricultural pursuits, and that limited funds forced the trustees to spend their
resources on “the most immediate demand rather than in light of an overall picture.”141
They also referenced Byrnes’ inaugural address and his school building program to
demonstrate that they would be taking advantage of the newly available funds. The
defense would not oppose an order acknowledging that schools were unequal, but asked
to be given a reasonable amount of time to formulate an equalization plan, have said plan
approved, and presented to the court.142
Admitting that the schools were unequal was a brilliant move. Initially, it took
the wind out of the plaintiffs’ case because the NAACP had planned to spend that first
day explicating in excruciating detail just how unequal those facilities were.143 It was a
smart move, and the segregationists knew it. As Judge Waring remembered:
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The defense said, ‘’Well, it’s no use to put all those witnesses in.” They
very smugly said, “We want to save the court’s time, and we’ll admit that
the school facilities aren’t good, but we will have them good, and any
court order should be reasonable enough to give you time if you’re going
to do that,” which sounded rather plausible, but didn’t meet the
constitutional issue.144
Waring was correct. Marshall and Boulware certainly had to regroup. The ample
evidence of the county’s long-term neglect of black schoolchildren could have garnered
their case some much-needed sympathy from Judges Parker and Timmerman. But the
defense’s admission did not deal with the constitutionality of segregation—the true crux
of Marshall’s argument.
To challenge the constitutionality of racial segregation in public schools they
relied on expert witnesses David Krech, Helen Trager, and Dr. Kenneth Clark. Krech
was a professor of social psychology, and Mrs. Trager was a schoolteacher and a lecturer
at Vasser College, Dr. Clark was a psychology professor at City College of New York
and the associate director at New York’s North Side Center. Krech testified that legal
segregation was harmful to black and white children, but was undoubtedly more harmful
to black children. Racial segregation supported the idea that African Americans were
different and inferior to whites. Black children were being taught this harmful lesson at
an age when they were forming their view of the world. According to Krech, most
children who grew up under legal segregation would never be able to recover from its
harmful effects.145
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Dr. Clark argued that segregation hurt “the discriminating and the
discriminated.”146 Segregation not only gave African American children low self-esteem,
but caused hostile feelings toward people in their own group. Among whites, segregation
created “increased hostility, guilty feelings, generalized deterioration of moral values and
a callousness of conscience which expresses itself not only in reference to the Negro but
in other things.”147
Mrs. Trager had similar findings in her research. She found that children as
young as age five were aware of racial difference.

Black children paradoxically

expressed that they wanted to be black and that they wanted to be white. Similarly black
and white children understood that to be black meant that others would not want to play
with you, and that you were not allowed to do the same things as white children. So
forced racial segregation influenced a child’s perception of their self-worth and
stigmatized them.148
Yet, despite their expert credentials and valid research findings, the defense’s
attorneys relied on the age-old argument that these were outsiders; they did not
understand the ways of the South; they may have had a lot of book learning, but they did
not have practical experience. The defense’s main witness was E.R. Crow, director of the
newly established State Education Commission that was tasked with allocating the funds
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created by the new sales tax. While Marshall cross-examined him, Crow admitted that
his opposition to school desegregation was based on his personal racial prejudices.149
The defense also held up Plessy v. Ferguson to defend segregation’s
constitutionality. Clarendon County’s school superintendent, L. B. McCord, admitted
that Clarendon County’s black children attended decidedly inferior schools. Likewise
their attorney, Robert McFigg Jr., admitted that Clarendon County schools were unequal.
But he insisted that Byrnes’ new equalization program would deal with the inequalities.
The county simply needed time.
questionable.

But Marshall found McFigg’s assertion highly

He doubled down in his argument that segregation itself was

unconstitutional. And he reminded the court that “South Carolina has had 80 years” to
equalize schools.150
Ultimately the Briggs decision came down to Judge Parker.

Waring was

staunchly against segregation, and Timmerman was an unwavering segregationist.
Parker was an able judge who followed the law. In the end, he decided that they could
not overrule Plessy. Judges Parker and Timmerman decided that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a declaration that school facilities were unequal. How school equalization was
acquired was the local school board’s prerogative, but it had to be accomplished
promptly. The court would issue an injunction that the schools be equalized and schedule
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times to follow-up on their progress.151 But they did not grant the plaintiffs’ request that
segregation be ruled unconstitutional:
We think, however, that segregation of the races in the public schools, so
long as equality of rights is preserved, is a matter of legislative policy for
the several states, with which the federal courts are powerless to
interfere.152
According to Parker and Timmerman, segregation was not unequal as long as the
facilities and opportunities were equal.

Referring to expert testimony, the judges

believed that the present case was not “hypothetical situations or mere theory.”.153 They
also found testimony that desegregated schools were better for all children unconvincing,
and said there was also testimony that it would result in “racial friction and tension.”154
They believed it was in South Carolina’s best interest to keep schools racially
segregated.155
For his part, Judge Waring seemed to think the defense’s case was all a ruse.
Citing the fact that only five months prior the defense denied the presence of any
inequalities, Waring urged the court to see through the defense’s method of avoiding the
segregation issue. He also questioned how racial segregation could be truly upheld by
challenging the very idea that race and ancestry can be clearly defined.156 Noting the
reliance on “blood and taint of blood” Waring said that there were only four kinds of
blood—A, B, AB, and O—and that these are found in people of European and of African
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ancestry.157 Furthermore, Waring questioned whether or not Parker and Timmerman’s
legal arguments had a proverbial leg to stand on, noting Plessy was about intrastate
transportation. Cases that dealt directly with education, Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin
v. Oklahoma, conclusively decided that segregation was unconstitutional. He doubted
that the defense—which openly admitted that schools were presently unequal and that
they were unsure exactly how much money it would take to equalize them—would truly
equalize schools.

Moreover, unlike the other two judges Waring found testimony

regarding segregation’s negative social and psychological effects convincing.158 Perhaps
more poignantly, he demonstrated an understanding of the huge challenges the plaintiffs
faced in getting this case to court, and how unfortunate it was that all their hard work
would be for naught:
And in addition to all of this, these sixty-six Plaintiffs have not merely
expended their time and money in order to test this important
Constitutional question, but they have shown unexampled courage in
bringing and presenting this cause at their own expense in the face of the
long established and age-old pattern of the way of life with the State of
South Carolina has adopted and practiced and lived in since and as a result
of the institution of human slavery.159
Timmerman and Parker signed a decree which had two central points: 1) South
Carolina’s state constitution did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and 2) schools
for Clarendon County’s African American children were significantly unequal to those
provided to white children.160 This was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
defense was ordered to “proceed at once” with providing “educational facilities,
equipment, curricula and opportunities equal to those furnished white pupils,” and report
157
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back in six months.161 Waring, however, did not sign the decree. Instead he wrote at the
bottom “I do not join the decree for the reasons set forth in a separate dissenting
opinion.”162
While the Briggs decision seemed to reaffirm segregation, some of the South’s
“more thoughtful” segregationists feared that “it may be only a reprieve.” 163
Desegregation was still a looming threat. The Briggs decision stymied equalization
efforts throughout the South.164 With the help of Governor Byrnes’ equalization program
white school officials throughout South Carolina began making a real effort to provide
some semblance of “separate but equal.”165 A list of approved school building projects
noted that black school facilities accounted for seventy-three percent of the total amount
spent. In Clarendon County, $516,900 was approved for black school facilities, while no
funds had been approved for white school facilities.

In fact, although funds were

approved in nine counties, only one county would be spending more on white facilities.
Additionally, a bill was submitted to the legislature that would authorize the county
treasurer and the school district board of trustees to issue and sell bonds. The proceeds
were to be used on school facilities and properties. Scott’s Branch, the school at the
center of the Briggs case, was receiving over $262,000 in updates, and would be ready as
of September 1952.166
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De Laine’s daughter, Ophelia De Laine Gona, remembered that the school
equalization program did bring about substantive changes for Clarendon County’s black
children and teachers. Two new elementary schools were approved. Scott’s Branch was
converted to an elementary school. A new district high school for black children was
constructed. Teachers’ salaries in Clarendon County were finally equalized through a
local supplement. Bus transportation was provided to all school children. The youngest
Pearson children now rode the bus to a school with indoor toilets and water fountains.
Fleming went so far as to say that some of the black school facilities built during Byrnes’
school equalization campaign were actually superior to the white school facilities.167
Some people referred to the sales tax that funded the new school buildings as the “Jimmy
tax.”168 But Clarendon County’s whites blamed it on the AME minister, calling it “De
Laine’s tax.”169 Indeed, even the town’s black schoolchildren credited De Laine with the
changes—though with a far more positive perspective.

They referred to “Rev. De

Laine’s busses,” and the “De Laine building.” 170 The governor’s school building
program may have been an effort to dodge desegregation, but for Clarendon County’s
poor black children, it was truly revolutionary. And it was De Laine’s and their own
activism that pushed the governor into action. Unfortunately, De Laine would never have
the opportunity to teach in one of the new equalization schools. And only their youngest
child attended one. Ophelia and Jay were both already in college.171
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In February 1952 the NAACP moved for an early hearing and final deposition,
and judgment in their favor. The reasons for this motion included: 1) the defense
admitted in court that facilities were unequal, 2) the “Report of Defendants” dated June
21, 1952, showed that facilities remained unequal, 3) the aforementioned report only
addressed school facilities. It did not address what the defense considered indisputable
proof that enforced segregation was detrimental to children, and 4) the plaintiffs could get
no “permanent relief” unless the state constitutional requirement for racial segregation in
schools was overturned.172 Judge Parker suggested to Timmerman and Waring that they
grant the motion.

Waring declined to serve, on the basis that they still were not

addressing the issue at hand—segregation.173 Besides Judge Waring, “the South’s most
controversial public figure,” and “the man they love to hate,” would be retiring soon.174
Judge and Mrs. Waring planned to move to New York where they would continue to
fight for human rights. But Waring tired of southern race relations, and he believed he
had done all he could from the bench:
There’s nothing more for me to do here. I would not sit
down again just to consider a report and I am not interested
in blueprints showing how separate but equal toilets should
be built.175
Moreover, the elite white community Waring was born into had turned against him. The
Warings’ home was stoned, they received incessant threatening phone calls and letters,
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and a petition calling for Judge Waring’s impeachment was circulating. 176 The
progressive couple was “avoided like lepers.177” News of his retirement was devastating
to South Carolina blacks, but white Carolinians “seemed elated.”178 Mrs. Waring put it
best when she commented that “the ostracism” in Charleston had “taken its toll. They
could remain in the city, “but what’s the point?”179 The Warings’ sentiments reveal that
no one, not even privileged white elites, were safe from the repercussions that followed
taking a public anti-segregation stance. Waring would never move back to the South
Carolina.
Armistead W. Dobie replaced Waring, and along with Timmerman and Parker,
the new judge followed the lead of their previous ruling. The judges were more than
satisfied with defense’s progress. Referring to the governor’s equalization program, they
expressed no doubts that equalization in Clarendon County would be realized by
September 1952. Therefore, they denied the request to abolish segregation.180
As the Clarendon County desegregation battle moved to the U.S. Supreme Court,
the repercussions against local blacks only heightened in severity. The teacher who led
this struggle—J.A. De Laine—noted in one of his sermons at Bethel A.M.E. Church that
there was no secret behind why these repercussions were being levied:
Negroes are being fired from their jobs and there is no
denying as to the reason. Banks are refusing to lend money
to farmers and in some instances even refusing to cash
government checks for them.
Negro and white
businessmen who are sympathetic cannot buy supplies or
176
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merchandize [sic] to carry on their day to day trade. They
are literally trying to starve us out.181
Rev. Seals faced economic repercussions so intense that his wife was forced to move to
Brooklyn to find gainful employment. Threats against the family forced his thirteenyear-old son to do the same. On October 4, 1956, Seals’ home was burned down. Billie
Fleming’s funeral home became a focus of home grown terrorists.

Allen Fleming,

Billie’s brother and business partner, came close to being burned inside the funeral parlor
in January 1950. He had burns on his back and hands, and half his hair was singed off.
His funeral home was burned down in November of 1954. He was able to resurrect his
business, but it continued to be a target. On September 17, 1955, it was peppered with
sixteen-gauge gunfire. In 1957 it was shot into twice during the middle of the night.
Then on July 30, 1957, a twenty-eight car Ku Klux Klan caravan parked in front of that
same business. One of the people in the caravan was T. K. Jackson, the Clarendon
County sheriff. Even in 1960—twelve years after Pearson case, ten years after the first
Briggs case, nine years after the second Briggs case, and six years after the Brown
decision—Manning’s whites continued to target Fleming’s place of business. On
February 27, he returned to the building that served as both his home and business to find
that someone had shot a bullet through the front door. Fleming suspected that the
shooting was in retaliation to the recent student sit-in movement.182
181
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Even at the dawn of the 1960s, when the black civil rights movement would take
on an increasingly youthful fervor, Clarendon County blacks continued to face
unrelenting reprisals. In 1958, eight Clarendon County parents filed petitions requesting
that their local school boards comply with the 1954 Brown decision. The parents argued
that, especially since Clarendon was one of the five original counties involved in the suit,
four years was more than enough time for school officials to comply with the Supreme
Court decision. The school boards (Districts 2 and 3) replied two weeks later that the
schools currently operated in everyone’s best interest and that they had no intention in
complying with the law.183
Clarendon County’s African Americans were also seeking unfettered access to the
vote. During his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights on
April 16, 1959, Billie Fleming testified that there was “a definite distinction” between
how blacks and whites that went before the voter Board of Registration were treated. Yet
it remained impossible for local blacks to change this dynamic because they were
purposely prevented from serving on the Board.184
In an unfortunate bit of irony, Fleming and his family faced further repercussions
for his audacity to testify about the economic reprisals he and other local blacks faced.
Immediately after his testimony, South Carolina Sen. Olin Johnston confronted him with
Clarendon County banker Charles Plowden’s testimony that his brother had a $4,000$4,500 outstanding loan from the bank. The threat was clear, back down or your brother
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will become the next victim of economic reprisals. When Billie Fleming was a few days
late in paying the mortgage on his business, the bank took advantage of the situation and
insisted that he pay off the mortgage in full.185 He was able to pay off the loan, but only
because local blacks had started their own self-help organization—the Clarendon County
Improvement Association.186
Despite the mass black community support for Briggs, it is important to bear in
mind that the move from equalization to desegregation represented “a deviation from the
usual pattern.”187 Acquiring equal opportunities had always been at the center of black
cultural values. Black southerners had a history of petitioning for equal facilities, equal
teacher salaries, and equal school terms. But desegregation had not been a primary
objective. Indeed, differing opinions regarding whether or not desegregation was the
right method served as a contributing factor to W. E. B. Du Bois’ departure from the
organization he helped found. While the NAACP was becoming more rigid in its support
for desegregation, Du Bois was becoming less sure that it was feasible, or always in
African Americans’ best interest. Virgil Clift warned that there could be negative,
unforeseen consequences to desegregation. 188
Despite the participation of black teachers on the local level in Clarendon County,
plenty of black teachers feared that desegregation could prove detrimental to their
careers. These fears were partly perpetuated by school desegregation cases in other parts
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of the country.

In Indiana, where racial segregation was abolished by the state

legislature, one city was dismissing black teachers before they gained tenure and
effectively became impossible to fire. Moreover, black teachers were not being hired in
the new teaching positions that were created when black students’ transferred to
previously all-white schools. The superintendent used this to push the city’s black
teachers into urging their students to continue attending segregated schools.189
Southern segregationists promised their undying support to maintaining
segregation. The state was moving forward with Governor Byrnes’ $75 million public
school building program.190 During an address to the State Education Association, the
white teachers’ professional organization, on March 16, 1951, Byrnes said that the state
would “abandon the public school system if it cannot continue to separate white and
Negro pupils.”191 No matter what happened, South Carolina was prepared to avoid
school desegregation. During a radio address on October 30, 1952, Lieutenant Governor
George Bell Timmerman, Jr., whose father served as a judge on the Briggs case, warned
the public that, in the coming election, they had an important decision to make regarding
the state’s public education system. Timmerman somewhat contradicted Byrnes’ claim
that the state would close its public schools rather than desegregate them. For, unlike
many other states, South Carolina’s state constitution required that it provide a public
school system for all children. So if the Briggs’ United States Supreme Court case was
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ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor South Carolina would have to either provide “mixed
schools” or violate its own constitution.192
The solution was to find a way around such a ruling beforehand.

And the

Palmetto State’s segregationists were thinking ahead. The state legislature approved two
bills that directly addressed the issue. One established a committee “to study and
recommend a course of action” should the Supreme Court rule racial segregation
unconstitutional.

The second put a measure on the ballot repealing the state

constitutional requirement to operate a public school system. Timmerman urged his
listeners to go to the polls and vote in favor of the amendment. 193 Without the
amendment’s passage, the state would have “no legal avenue” to continue racially
segregated schools if the court decided in the plaintiffs’’ favor.194
Despite the fact that the NAACP lost the Briggs case, it continued to serve as an
effective mobilizing tool in preparation for the Supreme Court case. Thurgood Marshall
arrived in Sumter, South Carolina in September of 1951 to attend the 13th annual meeting
of the South Carolina Conference of Branches.195 Along with South Carolina’s own
Harold Boulware, Marshall would “map the state’s legal program.”196 His presence at
the meeting demonstrated that the association continued to see the Palmetto State as a
vital part of its national movement. It is also evidence that black Carolinians remained
committed to racial advancement. Indeed, local blacks saw the battle for equal education
192
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as part of a whole cadre of important contemporary issues, including employment
discrimination, and political participation. 197
Unfortunately for the people of Clarendon County, just because the highest court
in the land ruled that schools across the country had to desegregate did not mean that the
white power structure would comply with the law, nor that they would relent on using
reprisals against those who had dared to challenge the racial status quo. As Billie
Fleming recalled:
When they gave the terminology “with all deliberate
speed,” there was no timetable set. Now this gave way to
new thinking in the white community. . . During this time,
it gave them a chance to revamp.198
Moreover, black parents may have felt ill at ease with sending their children to formerly
white schools because the first black children to attend those schools had “a very
unpleasant experience.”199
A decade after Brown, Summerton’s schools remained racially segregated. As of
1963, 300 white children and 2,700 black children in Summerton were still attending
segregated schools. Movement leaders like Billie Fleming found that they had to tread
this path carefully because they also had to contend with the likelihood of a state-aided
private school system that would be created in desegregation’s immediate aftermath. And
if they took on the private school system directly, they risked Summerton’s school
officials closing the public schools in retaliation. According to State Rep. Joseph O.
Rogers, the town’s white residents were committed to a segregated private school system.
In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order for immediate desegregation. As a
197
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result, five black students were able to attend previously all white schools. But the
following year, the desegregated school was closed down and Scott’s Branch High
School remained open. All the district’s white students were either sent to an integrated
school in Manning or their parents removed them from public school altogether, opting to
send them to a newly opened private school. When a desegregation plan was created for
the 1970-71 school year, a private school named Salem School was founded. Local
whites claimed the timing was just a coincidence, but the absence of any black students in
the school seemed to prove otherwise.200
Repercussions against Clarendon blacks continued more than fifteen years after
the Briggs cases ended. De Laine and other northern supporters worked hard to get the
word out regarding what Clarendon County’s people were going through. The AFL-CIO
loaned the Clarendon County Improvement Association more than $40K to buy a
combine. But in a move that demonstrated how petty and ill-willed local whites were, no
merchant in the state would sell them the equipment unless they could prove that the
buyer was not from Clarendon County. They eventually had to buy the combine from
another state. Reverdy Wells, the Scott’s Branch student leader and class valedictorian
who had initiated the petition against Principal Benson, was never able to receive a
college degree. He had been accepted to SC State on a conditional basis, but was drafted
into the military. When he applied to another school he was refused admission. The
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valedictorian’s grades were altered to all F’s. His transcript was not fixed until 1991. He
died in 2007.201
Reprisals against the De Laines became hyper-intensified in the years following
Briggs and Brown. After it became apparent that Rev. De Laine had no intention of
paying the slander suit, a “very suspicious” thing happened. 202 The De Laines’
Summerton home burned to the ground. The town’s firemen arrived in time to intervene,
but chose not to because the home was located twenty to sixty feet outside the city limits.
An official report confirmed it was arson. The fire provided a way for De Laine’s
enemies to finally get to him. The property was no longer in his name, but the insurance
was. The local insurance agent had refused to transfer it to Dr. Adams. As a result, the
court was able to attach the whole insurance payment to the case, despite the fact that it
was substantially higher than the fine.203
Perhaps if their persecution stopped there, things would have turned out
differently for the teacher and preacher. But after the Brown decision, whites in Lake
City started to hear that the man responsible for desegregation was their very own Rev. J.
A. De Laine. The De Laines became an even bigger target. Eggs and bricks were thrown
at the parsonage. On August 20, 1955, nightriders drove by and broke a living room
window. Six days later someone threw an orange at their window. Then on August 30
someone drove by and threw bottles at the house, breaking four windows. On September
3 several cars drove by making a lot of noise. A two-toned Buick returned a few minutes
201
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later and unloaded a barrage of rocks. The De Laines had been reporting all these
incidents to the local police, but it was pretty clear they were not taken seriously. They
asked him if he was a NAACP member, which he affirmed. Rev. De Laine actually got
in his car and followed the young men who broke the window. He wrote down their
license plate and reported it to the police who initially told him that he must be mistaken.
The police did finally follow up on the incident, but they said the plates belonged to a
dealer and it was impossible to know who was driving the car at the time. The police
chief told him that next time he should “mark” the car by shooting it. That way they
would know which car the nightriders were in.204
The next month things came to a head. On October 3, 1955, Mrs. De Laine’s
neighbor, Ms. Eaddy, woke her up to inform her that the church—which was located
across the street—was on fire. The Lake City firemen got the fire under control and
completely put out. But the fire bore a striking resemblance to the one that destroyed their
Summerton home.205 The insurance investigator said that the electrical wiring was in
good shape and there was no evidence of fire before or after the incident. He concluded
that it was clearly arson because “the fire had to start somewhere.” 206 Apparently,
gasoline and kerosene were poured down the aisle and around the pulpit and choir stand.
At the time, Rev. De Laine was in Charleston at a statewide AME conference. He
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returned to Lake City as soon as he could, but there was not much he could do.

He

returned to Charleston to wrap up his obligations at the conference.207
On Friday, October 7, Mattie De Laine arrived home to see an oddly addressed
letter to her husband and, uncharacteristically, decided to open it. What she saw inside
scared her. It was an unveiled threat on his life. The letter told the De Laines to leave
Lake City voluntarily or be killed. Mrs. De Laine’s friend told her that she needed to go
to Charleston to notify her husband. So the following day, she dressed as if she were
going in to work so that anyone who saw her would think she was on the way to the
school. But instead, she found a friend to take her to Charleston where the local police
chief provided Rev. De Laine with twenty-four hour protection and forwarded copies of
the letter to the state and federal bureaus of investigation.208
Bishop Reid, who had insisted the De Laines move to Lake City for their own
protection, now offered Rev. De Laine a position in Hamilton, Bermuda. At this point,
De Laine was being pressured on all sides to leave. Local blacks were sincerely fearful
that his life was at risk. And Bishop Reid made more than a few offers for De Laine to
be transferred somewhere else. He could go to New York, or New Jersey. But De Laine
did not want to be run out of town. He insisted on being reinstated in the Lake City
church circuit. He and Mattie were southern, country folk. They did not want the bustle
of the city. On the final day of the conference Bishop Reid announced to a shocked
congregation of ministers that Rev. De Laine would remain in the St. James Circuit in
Lake City. Referencing Emmitt Till, Bishop Reid said, “I don’t think Lake City is
207
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Mississippi.” De Laine would be fine, “I don’t think they will bother the Rev. De
Laine.”209 The St. James delegation travelled back home in a caravan, with De Laine’s
car in the center.210
On Monday morning, October 10, more than one person approached Rev. De
Laine, advising him to leave Lake City. One individual even told him that the Klan held
a rally with the goal of killing him. Mrs. De Laine repeatedly begged him to leave. They
could at least to go Sumter for the night and stay with friends. But he was resolved to
stay.211
On the evening of Wednesday, October 12, a number of cars that rode past their
home. Around 11:30p.m. Mrs. De Laine, who was up grading papers, peeked out the
window to see barrels sticking out the windows of two cars. Then she saw a flash of light
and heard what sounded like firecrackers. She rushed to wake up her husband. He was
in the middle of reassuring her that she was overreacting when he heard the sound of
gunfire. He immediately became alert, turned out the lights and grabbed his gun. He
went outside and saw a man near his garage. He initially thought it was the shooter, but it
was his neighbor, Mr. Web Eaddy. Eaddy agreed to take Mrs. De Laine to his home and
about ten minutes later a car came back and shot into the De Laines’ home again.
Following Chief Hines’ directive, De Laine returned two shots and “marked” the car.
Mrs. De Laine wanted to go check on her husband when she heard him shoot back, but
the Eaddys insisted she stay put. The car drove off, disappearing into the street. One of
the bullets De Laine shot hit the car and shattered into pieces that hit the two riders, Harry
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Gause and Donald Graham. De Laine later expressed regret that Gause and Graham were
hit, but maintained that he was aiming at the car, not its occupants.212
De Laine was initially going to wait the night out.213 He had marked the car. A
policeman was supposed to drive by his home every fifteen minutes for his protection.
But the policeman that came by was Mr. Gray, a black man who had to tow the line
between ingratiating himself to his white employers and keeping peace with his black
community members.

That night Mr. Gray told De Laine that he needed to leave

immediately. His life depended on it. De Laine had been looking for a sign that he
needed to leave and this was it. With his wife safely ensconced in the Eaddy’s home, he
grabbed his bag and his gun and got in his car to leave town.214
On his way out of town another group of riders saw him and a high-speed chase
ensued. He floored the accelerator as fast as he could. He lost his pursuers when he
finally had to stop for gas.215 An arrest warrant was issued the next day against Rev. De
Laine for “assault and battery with a deadly weapon.”216 The two nightriders, Gause and
Graham, were reportedly “painfully but not seriously injured.”217
The next morning, Mattie De Laine’s mother sent Mattie’s two brothers to Lake
City to pick her up and bring her home to Columbia. At this point both Rev. and Mrs. De
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Laine had presumably gone missing. Authorities knew Mrs. De Laine was in Columbia.
Florence County Deputy H. S. Myers said he spoke with her the day after the shooting,
but he did not know where she was staying.218 Bishop Reid, who had reappointed De
Laine to the Lake City church, told the newspaper that De Laine’s life was in danger and
“he had to run for his life.”219 By October 14, their belongings were being moved out of
their Lake City home. Law officials contacted some of De Laine’s family members, but
no one knew where he was. Her husband’s absence gave Mrs. De Laine anxiety. She
was reportedly “in a terrible condition” and in a physician’s care. But law enforcement
had an inkling that he had gone North. His relatives were ignorant of his whereabouts
but seemedunworried about his safety; and several northern congregations had invited
Rev. De Laine to join them.220
From here, their movements become even more convoluted. The De Laines
wanted to see their daughter, Ophelia, who was in school in Charlotte. So they had a
family dinner with her there. Their next stop was New York and they arrived separately.
Mrs. De Laine went by train.221 Rev. De Laine went by plane, first arriving in D.C., then
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rode to Trenton, and finally arrived in New York.222 De Laine said he felt “the hand of
God guiding me.”223
Over the next year, the De Laines made numerous public appearances through
John Sivera, a public relations specialist the Bishop assigned to work with them. The
money they raised through these appearances was supposed to help the family get back
on their feet, with a portion also going to help the movement. But the De Laines noticed
that Sivera gave them a flat fee of $50 to $75. The amount did not seem to correlate with
how much was raised. The fundraising effort seemed to foretell what their life in New
York would be like and the type of relationship they would have with the AME church
hierarchy.224
But the AME hierarchy did not place him there. Instead they gave him an open
appointment in Buffalo, with a promise that financial assistance would be forthcoming
once he established a new congregation. He did, in fact, establish a new church in
Buffalo. Always cognizant of the struggle and thankful for its few white allies, he named
the new church the De Laine-Waring AME Church, in honor of federal district judge
Waties Waring. Although he did not receive financial backing from the AME hierarchy,
De Laine was able to successfully mobilize his South Carolina connections to get the
church started. Fellow minister and activist Rev. E. E. Richburgh sent him some money
from himself and dozens of other Liberty Hill members including Mazie Solomon and
Annie Gipson.

He encouraged De Laine, “don’t become discourage[d], God will
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provide.”225 De Laine felt that the church hierarchy’s treatment of him during this time
was no different than the economic reprisals he faced in South Carolina.226
On top of all these issues was the threat of De Laine’s extradition.227 But De
Laine had some of the AME’s machinery advocating on his behalf. New York AME
Bishop D. Ward Nichols told the press that the South Carolina authorities would have get
an extradition order because De Laine was a refugee. He was giving “him asylum in the
same way we give refugees from Europe asylum.”228 He also helped De Laine retain a
lawyer. South Carolina officials inquired with the Justice Department regarding a federal
fugitive warrant, which would enable federal authorities to arrest De Laine.229 But a U.S.
District Attorney said that De Laine was living openly in New York. He was not on the
run and therefore it was unnecessary to grant a federal fugitive warrant.

Gov.

Timmerman charged the department with “discriminating in the administration of
justice.”230 According to Timmerman, De Laine was a “fugitive from justice” and the
attorney general was using his office to promote integration and the Republican agenda.
De Laine did surrender to the police in New York on November 25, 1955.

He was

booked as a fugitive from justice, but paroled in felony court. Timmerman then called on
President Eisenhower to explain the Justice Department’s refusal to grant a federal
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extradition warrant. But De Laine’s supporters were already petitioning New York
governor Averell Harriman not to sign an extradition order. They asked him to consider
not only the legal issues, but the human cost—the certainty that De Laine would be
sentence to the chain gang and likely be killed at the hands of the Klan.231
All of Timmerman’s outrage must have been bluster because his office failed to
take any action to secure De Laine’s extradition and his parole was continued.232 Instead
Timmerman changed his tune. The Palmetto State was “well rid of this professional
agitator”—a title De Laine took as “a great tribute.”233 The state did not pursue De
Laine’s extradition. Although he was unable to return to his home state, De Laine
became a free man in 1956 when a New York felony court magistrate dismissed the
fugitive charge against De Laine due to South Carolina’s failure to come through with a
warrant.234 He missed home but his escape from South Carolina was cause to “rejoice in
God’s deliverance of me, to a place where I can wage a greater battle for the cause of
JUSTICE.”235
In 1958 Rev. De Laine was finally assigned to Calvary AME Church in Brooklyn,
NY. The De Laines purchased a home in Queens where they lived until retirement. In
1971 Rev. De Laine submitted his resignation letter and asked to be transferred to the
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Western North Carolina Conference where he would connect with local church folk, but
did not want to be appointed to a pastorate. He moved to Charlotte, North Carolina, in
1971. Mrs. De Laine remained in New York until she retired from her teaching position
in 1973 and joined her husband.236
Rev. De Laine died on August 3, 1974. Mrs. De Laine lived twenty-five more
years, passing away in 1999. She had been a schoolteacher in New York for seventeen
years. With so little support from the church, Mattie De Laine’s income was essential to
their survival. It gave them a certain amount of financial security. Mrs. De Lane’s career
not only demonstrates how important women’s work was to black families, it reiterates
the fact that black women not only provided emotional support for their families; they
were often an important source of financial security.237
The De Laines were never able to return home to live in Clarendon County, or
anywhere else in South Carolina. He still had an outstanding warrant for his arrest and
authorities refused to dismiss it.238 The move to New York certainly caused economic
problems, but the biggest sacrifice was being away from their family. Despite the fact
that South Carolina had become “a land of terror and violence,” the De Laines were
“homesick and lonesome” for their family.239 They were never able to truly reunite their
family unit. As Mrs. De Laine remembered:
Our feeling was not good. And we did not feel welcome
back in the state. We knew we weren’t welcome. He
236
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wasn’t welcome and I felt if he wasn’t welcome then I
wasn’t welcome. Yet all of our people—most of our close
relatives—were in the state. And everybody wants to visit
their relatives.240
In 1968 some of his South Carolina friends began efforts to safely bring him back to
home. They reached out to noted Charleston activist J. Arthur Brown and South Carolina
governors Robert E. McNair and John West.241 De Laine was getting older and “wanted
to spend the remainder of his life in his home state.”242 John Bolt Culbertson, one of
South Carolina’s most liberal attorneys, even offered to represent De Laine pro bono in
the event he chose to return to South Carolina and face the charges.243 But De Laine was
unwilling to return if it meant being “humiliated…arrested and mistreated by race
haters.”244 In 1971 Rev. De Laine wrote the newly formed South Carolina Governor’s
Advisory Council on Human Relations and asked to be allowed to return home.245 De
Laine pointed to irony of his predicament—he had been prevented from returning home
while the “night riding criminals” who shot into his home “enjoyed the protection of the
state.”246 The Council did appoint someone to investigate the matter, but they quickly
ended their efforts on behalf of De Laine after they were unable to get the charges against
240
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him dropped.

As one reporter put it, De Laine’s Lake City accusers were still

“determined to punish” him. In 1994—twenty years after his death—when a sympathizer
requested the warrant be removed, South Carolina authorities refused with the pitiful
excuse that in the event he applied for a job, employers deserved to know his history.247
Rev. De Laine finally received some recognition for his activism posthumously.
Mrs. De Laine received several invitations to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary
of Brown v. Board of Education.

She was invited to the South Carolina NAACP

Conference of Branches’ program in Columbia, South Carolina; the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund’s commencement in Washington, D.C., and a reception at
the White House with President Carter. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund invited her
again for the thirtieth anniversary of the historic decision. On September 9, 2004, Rev.
De Laine was posthumously awarded the Congressional Gold Medal—that body’s
highest award. Congressman Clyburn, the first African American to be elected to that
position since 1897, was the one who pressed for the award. Ironically, Sen. Ernest F.
Hollings, who had been unabashedly segregationist, first introduced the idea. De Laine
was also posthumously awarded by the University of South Carolina’s Museum of
Education in 2006 when he was inducted into their Hall of Honor.248 His official papers
are how housed at the South Caroliniana Library on that same university’s campus—a
school which did not desegregate until 1963, nearly a decade after the Brown decision.
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CHAPTER 4: “HELL IS POPPING HERE IN SOUTH CAROLINA:”
ORANGEBURG COUNTY BLACK TEACHERS AND THEIR COMMUNITY IN
THE IMMEDIATE POST-BROWN ERA
On the morning of May 15, 1956, Cecil Williams, a young photographer from
Orangeburg, South Carolina, traveled to the Elloree Training School (ETS) to photograph
twenty-one faculty members. The neatly dressed group of sixteen women and five men
assembled in the front of the building, where the name of the school appeared above their
heads on the brick facade. As she moved to the front of the group so that her petite frame
would be visible Elizabeth Cleveland, a newlywed and recent South Carolina State
College graduate, wore a polka dot dress, white shoes, and carried a matching white
clutch. On the far right of the group stood the school’s principal, Charles Davis, who
arranged the photograph session. He had one arm wrapped around the shoulders of his
wife, Rosa Delores Davis.

Although many of the teachers smiled as Williams

photographed them, the moment’s seriousness weighed heavily upon them. Days earlier,
when the ETS teachers received their contracts for the upcoming school term, they
noticed new questions that asked if they were members of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and if they aspired to teach an integrated
class. When the twenty-one African American teachers refused to distance themselves
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from the leading civil rights organization and refused to endorse prevailing segregationist
practices, white school officials refused to rehire them for the upcoming school year.1
The collective defiance of those black teachers in the spring of 1956 was just one
of a growing number of civil rights protests that aimed to challenge and dismantle social
and racial inequity in the American South. Two years earlier, on May 17, 1954, the
NAACP won its most historically significant legal victory when Chief Justice Earl
Warren announced the United States Supreme Court’s decision regarding Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, Kansas. When the highest court in the land ruled that the South’s
long-held doctrine of “separate but equal” had no place in the public school system, it
dealt a powerful blow to segregation’s legal and intellectual defenses. In the immediate
post-Brown years (1955-1956), South Carolina continued to be an influential
battleground. Even as the courts deliberated, the state’s champions of white supremacy
worked in advance of the decision to circumvent desegregation and to shore up
ideological, political, and intellectual support. For black Carolinians, those immediate
post-Brown years were simultaneously full of promise and despair. The Supreme Court’s
vague instruction to implement desegregation with “all deliberate speed” gave South
Carolina’s segregationists the opportunity to avoid compliance with the ruling. In the
face of a strong civil rights organization, powered by a mass of seemingly powerless
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people, South Carolina’s segregationists would have to attack the NAACP, its members,
and its supporters in order to evade the law.2
Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, argued that many white southerners, even
“right here in South Carolina,” not only wanted to follow the new law of the land, but
that many were “ashamed of the injustices that have occurred under the separate but
equal system. They know, deep down in their hearts, that never, never will there be
equality until segregation is abolished.”3 State NAACP president, Rev. James Hinton,
seemed to agree with Marshall and Wilkins when he said, “Negroes foresee no trouble
ahead, unless it is suggested, or led by those instructed with the administration of the
law.”4

In fact, while at a Georgia State NAACP Conference Rev. Hinton seemed

confident that state officials would eventually comply with the Brown decision. He
dismissed segregationists’ claims that they would avoid desegregation. He argued that
they had made similar claims regarding maintaining an all-white primary, but that after
the court made its decision, and the judge made clear that he would uphold that decision,
African Americans did, in fact, gain access to the ballot. According to Hinton, as long as
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African Americans had “the courage to stand up,” they would find that they had “all the
necessary support” to make desegregation a reality.5
For their part, South Carolina’s black educators seemed in favor of the historic
decision. The Palmetto State Teachers Association (PSTA) voiced their open approval,
saying that it was consistent with their belief in democracy and pledged one thousand
dollars to support the implementation of “universal public education within the
framework of the recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court.”6 Local teachers also
became desegregation activists. In Charleston, Septima Clark and Henry Hutchinson,
already seasoned activists, helped lead the city’s desegregation campaign. Hutchinson
was a history teacher at Burke Industrial School (whose teachers had been at the center of
the Charleston teacher hiring campaign) and an advisor for the NAACP youth chapter.
When Charleston NAACP president J. Arthur Brown submitted a desegregation petition,
Hutchinson and Clark organized a number of workshops to help shore-up support.7
Only seven days after the initial Brown decision, SC NAACP leader James
Hinton travelled to Atlanta to serve as chairman of a quickly organized conference that
would draft a desegregation program. The conference urged all branches in the Jim Crow
South to begin submitting desegregation petitions to their local school boards. The
association projected confidence that desegregation would become a reality due to both
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the United States Supreme Court decision and a growing African American electorate.8
As NAACP executive secretary Walter White said:
Already our branches and state conferences are hard at
work in a region-wide campaign to get 3,000,000 Negro
voters registered by 1956 . . . with this vote plus that of
enlightened white citizens we can look forward to
elimination from political life of some of the present
demagogues who plague the region.9
On the surface such rhetoric projected confidence reassured local activists, like the
parents in Clarendon County who had put their lives on the line for the sake of bettering
their children’s education. But that the NAACP paired desegregation’s success with the
growth of the black vote may also demonstrate that its leaders foresaw a path that would
be, at best, difficult to traverse.
Sensing the refusal of southern white leaders to implement desegregation, the
NAACP drafted a resolution that asked Congress to make federal education aid available
only to states that complied “fully with the spirit and purpose of the Constitution.”10 The
NAACP wanted Congress to ensure that any federal aid reserved for education contained
protective measures, which would prevent such funds from being used in segregated
schools. Furthermore, they requested that preexisting legislation be amended to include
the same restrictive measures.11
Unsurprisingly, many white Southerners saw desegregation as an impending
doom. One federal judge in South Carolina, Ashton H. Williams, compared the NAACP
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to the KKK, implying that it was an extremist organization whose departure from the
Palmetto State would only better race relations. Bob Jones, founder of the religiously
conservative Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina, wrote Roy Wilkins a
lengthy letter condemning the NAACP and the Supreme Court.12 According to Jones,
both had irrevocably harmed southern race relations. He compared integration to the
Tower of Babel:
He fixed those boundaries between races. After the flood,
God told the people to go out and scatter and replenish the
earth; and they went out and built the Tower of Babel and
said they were going to have one world and one race. But
God said that was not His will, and he scattered them.13
In short, desegregation was un-Christian, and cast African Americans out of favor with
“conservative Christians” who had been “the best friends the colored people have” and
were “doing everything in the world we could to help them.”14 Desegregation would be a
failure because “the omnipotent God [was] against it.”15 But it was Jones’ assertion that
African Americans should “teach their own children” which revealed that despite the fact
that he was trying to make a biblical argument, his fears were the same as any other
segregationists.16 If schools were truly desegregated, would white teachers be forced to
teach black children? And, likely more important to someone like Jones, would black
teachers be allowed to instruct white children?
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Yet, it was not the integration of black teachers that provoked the greatest sense
of anxiety among white segregationists, but the oft-employed fear of miscegenation and
interracial marriage.

Orangeburg segregationists declared that the NAACP’s whole

objective was “intermarriage and the mongrelization of the white races.”17 Yet the
NAACP made clear that it “was not a marriage bureau.”18 Its primary concern was
education, not marriage. To allay these fears they noted that even in states that had
integrated schools, interracial marriage remained low.19 Moreover, the NAACP argued
that the “if you let the Nigra do thus and so, he’ll marry your daughter” argument was a
discredit to white women, as if they would have to be “restrained by law from choosing
Negro mates.”20 In fact, Roy Wilkins argued that the “social association between the
races” simply was not part of the NAACP’s program.21
Southern politicians used the Brown decision as a rallying cry. It became a
central issue throughout the South, but especially in Georgia and South Carolina, where it
became the issue as politicians, in an effort to prove that they were more devoted to
segregation than their running mates, “maneuvered frantically to occupy the extreme
segregationist position.”22 In the 1954 gubernatorial primary, race and desegregation
became a central factor in the South Carolina Democratic Party’s factionalism. The race
was between Lester Bates and Lt. Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr.
17
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candidates were decidedly against integration, with Timmerman proposing a three-school
system—one for whites, one for blacks, and one for those seeking integration. Bates
opposed Timmerman’s plan as well as any other that permitted any form of integration.
However, Bates lost the election, partly because Timmerman charged him with being a
NAACP member. The accusation, as ludicrous as it may have been, was enough to sink
Bates’ campaign.23 Timmerman turned out to be no less committed to segregation than
Bates. In his inaugural address he stated that even gradual desegregation would be
“cowardly because it seeks to minimize opposition by careful selection of a few victims
from time to time.”24 Yet in his farewell address to the state legislature, the soon to be
former governor, James F. Byrnes, was certain that white Carolinians had nothing to
worry about. He asserted that “the great majority” of black parents wanted their children
to attend “modern schools for Negroes and be taught by Negro teachers.”25 Such an
assertion contradicted the NAACP’s belief that what black parents truly wanted were
competent teachers, regardless of their race.26
Even before the Supreme Court gave its Brown decision, an initial reaction to
desegregation was a threat to close public schools. The NAACP tried to call
segregationists’ bluff:
If, which is not likely, the public school system were
abolished, who would educate the poor white child? He
could not pay to attend private schools. Only professional
and business classes and skilled laborers could afford an
education for their children.27
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Southern states could not close down public schools without loosing their investment—a
valid point in South Carolina where, in an effort to avoid desegregation, the state had
increased its education budget by millions of dollars.28 Yet, southern segregationists’
assumption that the Brown decision was a ruling in their favor was not without merit.
Even Roy Wilkins acknowledged that when southern political leaders heard the Supreme
Court’s language of “with all deliberate speed,” they were “hollering happy,” viewing the
ruling as a victory for the South. The decision of when (or if) to desegregate schools
would be left up to the local courts, who would be sympathetic to the segregationist’s
plight.29 When Brown was argued for the third time in 1955, NAACP lawyers stressed
to the court the need for definite methods and time limit to institute the court’s decision.
However six states (Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas)
submitted recommendations that stressed that desegregation should be implemented
gradually and with as little interference from the federal government as possible.30 So,
while the second Brown decision said that desegregation should happen “with all
deliberate speed,” the Supreme Court basically sided with the southern position. The
court acknowledged that desegregation could look very different from one school district
to another. They could not “easily venture beyond the executive department’s position in
a case involving such complex enforcement problems.”31 The court chose to recognize
the “varied school problems” and gave no specific time limit for desegregating schools.32
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South Carolina’s segregationists had a distinct advantage over their counterparts
in other southern states because they laid the groundwork for resistance years before
Brown. Argued in 1951, the Briggs v. Elliott case put the state in the spotlight and made
both black and white citizens aware that changes in the public education system were a
legal imperative. Adamant that these changes would not result in school desegregation,
Governor James Byrnes turned to the state legislature to start “preparedness measures.”33
In 1951 he appointed a fifteen-member committee comprised of five state senators, five
state representatives, and five laymen representing the state at-large. The purpose of the
committee was “to study and report on the advisable course to be pursued” in the event
federal courts mandated desegregation.34 Yet, despite the fact that the committee was
formed to study an issue that would directly impact the lives of black children, “not one
Negro (not even one of the favorite Uncle Toms…)” was asked to serve.35 L. Marion
Gressette, a state Senator from Orangeburg County, was the chairman of the newly
established committee, which became known by his name—the Gressette Committee.36
The Gressette Committee’s solutions offered “as much of a threat to the public schools in
general as it did to desegregation.”37 So when the Supreme Court announced its decision,
South Carolina was ready. It had a well-established, state-mandated agency explicitly
designed to protect racial segregation. Two months after Brown, the Committee began
33
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holding special sessions.38 During those meetings, committee members concluded that
the Supreme Court’s decision did not apply to the state of South Carolina:
Time has brought some clarification of just what the United
States Supreme Court did decide. It is becoming plain that
the Court did not intend to force integration on an unwilling
people. It is the considered opinion of your Committee that
there is nothing in the Constitution or the decision which
compels the State of South Carolina to deliberately mix the
races in the public schools.39
At the start of the 1954-55 school year, the Committee recommended that schools open
“according to the present pattern of pupil classification and assignments in keeping with
previously established policy.”40 They argued that the Supreme Court had purposely not
made “any order or decree which might have the effect of forcing an immediate change
in local school policy or procedure.”41 Governor George Bell Timmerman agreed with
this assertion. During a 1955 statewide radio-television address, he stated:
There is one current misunderstanding about the Supreme
Court opinion that we should clarify in our minds. The
Court did not say that school children must attend racially
mixed schools. It did not say that all public schools must
be racially mixed. . . What the Court has said, and all that it
has said, in this respect, is that no child can be denied
admittance to a school of his choice because of his race.42
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Timmerman and the Gressette committee’s rhetoric was clear. The Supreme Court’s
decision was merely an “opinion,” not a ruling. By the time the Elloree teachers made
their stand, the Gressette Committee had already established intimate relationships with
local school boards. Parroting the “separate but equal” doctrine, the committee also
employed a rhetoric of equality. They reported that their goal was to provide better
educational opportunities for all South Carolina children.43 The Committee downplayed
black Carolinians’ efforts to desegregate schools, saying that both blacks and whites were
“to be commended for their attitude of calmness” in the aftermath of the 1954 decision.44
They claimed that this calmness was proof that “sentiment in favor of separate schools
and against integrated schools has crystallized in recent months.”45 According to them,
African Americans were not attempting to integrate schools.46 Therefore public opinion
was clear. The people of South Carolina wanted “better schools, but separate schools.”47
Even as the 1950s came to a close, when there had been vibrant integration efforts across
the state and the whole South, the committee continued to assert that South Carolinians
were—and would continue to be—happy with segregated schools.48
An act was approved on March 27, 1956 that extended the committee’s existence
and scope.

They would not only study the public school system, but also higher
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education and “all phases of segregation affecting the state government and the citizens
of South Carolina.”49 That year the Gressette Committee had been especially busy, and
persuaded the General Assembly to pass fourteen new laws. These included permitting
local school boards to sell or lease school property, the repeal of the compulsoryeducation law, and—most importantly to this study—a series of anti-NAACP statutes
designed to stymie the organization’s progress. 50 So even as Brown provided the
groundwork for black Carolinians to challenge segregation, it also mobilized southern
leaders to protect the South’s racial mores.
Although many African Americans were vocal and unwavering in their support of
desegregation, African American teachers conveyed varied, and sometimes contrasting,
outlooks about the goals and timetables of racial integration. Many of them had
significant and well-grounded doubts about the merits of ending segregated schools. Only
months after the 1954 Brown decision was handed down, U.S. News and World Report
published an article predicting that desegregation would cause thousands of black
teachers to lose their positions. According to the article, displaced southern teachers who
hoped to find employment opportunities in the North would be disappointed. A black
teacher was statistically more likely to be employed in the South, where one out five
teachers were black, than in the northern and western states where one out of seventythree teachers were black. According to this article, one of the lessons of northern
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desegregation was that if white parents objected to black teachers in the classroom, the
result would be black teachers’ wholesale dismissals.51
Such reports undoubtedly created concerns among southern black educators.
Those concerns were skillfully explored in a 1955 study of 150 black South Carolinian
schoolteachers—104 women and 56 men—published by the Journal of Negro Education..
Howard University professors Hurley Doddy and G. Franklin Edwards conducted the
study and found that one-fourth of the respondents expressed “some apprehension”
regarding desegregation.52 The teachers voiced three pressing concerns surrounding job
security. First, they believed that they would be saddled with more requirements and
certifications to maintain their professional positions. Second, they feared that integration
would make it more difficult for married couples to continue working together in the
same school. Finally, many expressed concerns that the desegregation campaign would
exacerbate racial inequities in the salaries and benefits afforded black and white teachers.
Indeed, seventy-three percent of respondents felt that desegregation would result in largescale job displacement.53
Even African American educators who endorsed desegregation strongly feared
that increased antagonisms would emerge between themselves and white superintendents,
teachers, and students. Some principals raised concerns about the possible administrative
problems they would likely encounter if they supervised white teachers and staff. Since
51
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desegregation plans could lead to temporary or long term financial hardship, black
teachers did not take possible job dismissals lightly. Unlike their white counterparts who
could pursue other professional positions, educated blacks had few career options outside
of the school system.54 Southern, college educated African Americans regarded teaching
as a very attractive occupation. It was even more appealing for black women because
there was “no prestige ful [sic] vocational area other than teaching.”55 Educated black
men had the option of “other white collar jobs such as in insurance, as salesmen, and in
self-employment.”56 Consider Cecil Williams’ parents. His mother was a teacher, but
his father maintained his own successful tailoring business.57
Confounded by a potential loss of income and status and by the perceived
tensions of working with white colleagues and students, half of Doddy and Edwards’
respondents preferred teaching in segregated schools. Despite those reservations, the
PEA and NAACP continued to push for desegregation.58 The PEA acknowledged that
job loss among black teachers was possible, but the group’s leaders argued that
desegregation could serve as a weeding out process in which “unprepared teachers” were
removed while “teachers who are prepared” would have no problem maintaining their
positions in the public schools.59
The NAACP sought to allay teachers’ fears. During that NAACP conference
James Hinton attended only days after the May 17 Brown decision, the association gave
54
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its assurance that the full power of its educational specialist, legal, and research staff
would be used to “insure that there will be no discrimination against Negro teachers as a
result of integration.”60 The organization made a similar promise the following year
during a conference for southern branches.

They would protect current and future

African American teachers and “offset any program on the part of those school agencies
which seek to frighten Negro teachers and principals.”61 In a statement to the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund’s Board of Directors Dr. John W. Davis, the West
Virginia State College president, admitted that there was “a growing sentiment in the
South and in other parts of the country not to permit Negro teachers to teach white
children.”62 Black teachers’ fears were growing, and that fear was well grounded as more
and more of them were losing their jobs. The NAACP received several reports
confirming these dismissals. Fifteen black teachers in West Virginia’s small towns were
reportedly dismissed.
renewed.

Twenty-six teachers in Missouri did not have their contracts

And in a move reminiscent of what would happen in Elloree, Virginia

introduced new contracts which included a possible 30-day termination notice and
assignments to work in specific schools. And whereas teachers had always pledged their
allegiance to the Federal Constitution, they now also had to pledge their allegiance to the
Virginia State Constitution.63
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Roy Wilkins may have represented African American teachers as having more
confidence than they really did. According to him, black teachers had “a measure of
assurance stemming from” a shortage in black teachers and that, furthermore, black
teachers had a certain amount of job security based on the fact that they often had more
experience and training than white teachers.64 Perhaps most incongruous with teachers’
fears, Wilkins asserted that they knew that because white women had once left their
infants in the care of black women, white mothers would eventually be willing to allow
black women to teach their now older children.65 A section in the 1955 SC NAACP
Conference program seemed to echo this assertion:
Throughout the South there has been widespread
bemoaning of the fate of the Negro teacher who is expected
to pass out with the end of the segregated Negro school.
The colored teacher’s new “friends” are now extending
profuse and premature condolences, unmindful of the
traditional practice of southern whites of entrusting their
children to the care and training of Negro women.66
As evidence that these fears were unrealistic, the author noted that black teachers in
Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and West Virginia were instructing
white pupils.

Moreover, the author used New Jersey—where the number of black

teachers rose from 479 before desegregation to 645 after desegregation—as evidence that
not only would desegregation not bring about the black teacher’s demise, it would bring
increased employment opportunities. There was a general shortage of teachers, after all,
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and not enough white teachers to fill all the positions. In such circumstances, black
teachers were to become a necessity, not disposable.67
But despite Wilkins’ seeming nonchalance, there is evidence that the NAACP
took these concerns seriously.

Gloster B. Current, the Director of Branches, sent

NAACP officers questionnaires asking if any teachers in the local school districts had
lost their positions, or if any had been reassigned. Current announced that the NAACP
had hired Dr. John W. Davis as Special Director of their Department of Teacher
Information.68 The new department was part of a longer, pre-Brown struggle to protect
black teachers from “discriminatory loss of employment.”69 The department’s explicit
purpose was to protect qualified African American teachers who lost their positions as a
result of southern school desegregation.70 In a 1955 memo, Davis aptly described why it
was so difficult to convince African American teachers to fight for desegregation:
Dispelling fear among Negro teachers is not an easy task.
Fear is an emotional and psychological factor yet a very
real one when food for the family, the loss of a job,
economic pressures and ugly threats constantly haunt the
teacher every minute in the “place called home” and when
away from home.71
Indeed, as the Elloree community and its teachers would soon find out, threats of
economic reprisals were not empty, and could have long term negative effects. Even as
Davis contended that there had not been widespread teacher dismissals, he admitted that
67
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those numbers would likely rise in the future.72 While the NAACP had tried to allay
black teachers’ fears, the formation of John W. Davis’ department suggested that those
concerns were, in fact, valid.
Despite teachers’ anxieties regarding how desegregation would affect their jobs,
they continued to join the NAACP in large numbers. Even as the fate of Brown hung in
the balance, thirty-two teachers joined the Richmond, Virginia branch. The 110 teachers
in Brunswick County, Virginia branch comprised over fifty percent of the membership.
The entire faculty at a Tallahassee high school joined.73 In South Carolina, where the
battle for southern school desegregation started, the NAACP had been receiving “a
steady flow” of teacher memberships. According to membership secretary Lucille Black,
This would seem to indicate that Negro teachers in the
South have not been taken in by the scare propaganda that
they will lose their jobs if the NAACP wins its fight to ban
segregation in education.74
In the small town of Elloree African Americans were, perhaps unknowingly, gearing up
so that they would be able to take a stand against the severe economic reprisals that came
after they pursued school desegregation.

Four new members—two adults and two

youth—joined and one person renewed their membership during its regular monthly
meeting in April 1954.75 Those numbers may seem small compared to the previously
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mentioned reports but under L.A. Blackman, who intended to increase the branch’s
membership to 200, the branch had been “very active.”76
Throughout South Carolina African Americans filed school desegregation
petitions, therefore contesting the segregationist notion that they were satisfied with the
racial status quo.

And although urban centers such as Columbia and Charleston

continued to play an important role in the Palmetto State’s black freedom struggle, the
Clarendon County example of a small rural area coming to the forefront of education
politics continued to be emblematic. The small town of Cheraw had plans to submit a
desegregation petition as of August 1954. The Florence branch submitted its
desegregation petition in June 1955. Black Carolinians in Georgetown drafted a petition
as of July 1955. African Americans in Orangeburg and Elloree also joined the school
desegregation effort. The Elloree NAACP sent their school petition to each member of
the school board of trustees on August 31, 1955. It was a petition to desegregate the
Elloree Training School, the same school which would later be at the center of the state’s
anti-NAACP efforts.77
In reaction to the slew of school desegregation petitions, Governor Timmerman
announced that the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) was investigating the
NAACP. 78 It was not entirely clear what SLED was allegedly investigating, but
Timmerman asserted that the investigation’s purpose was to establish “the manner” in
76
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which the names were secured.79

However state and local governments were not the

only, or even the most powerful, organized efforts to silence desegregation petitioners.
On July 11, 1954 the first chapter of the White Citizens Council (WCC) was founded in
Mississippi, and quickly spread across the South.80 In South Carolina county seats such
as Orangeburg, Charleston, and Sumter became “bastions of Council strength.”81 They
experienced significant growth during the summers of 1955 and 1956. These growth
spurts were triggered by school desegregation petitions, and at its height, there were as
many as 40,000 members in the South Carolina Councils. The WCC made no secret that
their main purpose was to protect segregation in schools and all matters of public life.82
Desegregation petitions triggered the establishment of local Council chapters.
The first two South Carolina chapters were founded in the summer of 1955 in Elloree and
Orangeburg after African Americans in Orangeburg County School Districts 5 and 7 filed
school desegregation petitions.83 Yet while the desegregation petitions were certainly
central to the WCC’s decision to begin their operations in Orangeburg County, the choice
could most likely also be attributed to the fact that the county was the home of a black
community so committed to racial uplift that Jet magazine once referred to it as “the
home of the militant Negro intelligentsia.”84
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The WCC did not officially employ physical racial violence.

Instead, they

recommended “the application of economic pressure to ‘trouble-makers.’” 85

A

Mississippi Council leader’s comments illustrated how these economic repercussions
could have long-term effects on black activists:
If I had a Negro working for me and he belonged to the
NAACP . . . I’d do the same thing I’d do to any Negro
working for me who wanted to cause trouble. . . I’d just let
him go. When the Negro tried to obtain work elsewhere in
the region, he would find no jobs available.86
Signing your name on a desegregation petition not only meant that you were risking
temporary financial hardships.

The decision to assert you child’s right to equal

educational opportunities could mean financial ruin, and little chance of fully recovering.
Still, to long time activist like J. A. DeLaine, the WCC was cut from the same
cloth as other white supremacist terrorist organizations:
There is little doubt but that the Ku Klux Klan has been
born again—the use of a new name and the dropping of the
hood is only a sham. The White Citizens Councils and the
K.K.K. have a common objective. . . Their methods are
different and have been modernized to the extent that
television, radio and daily newspapers are regularly used to
recruit members and to put white against Negroes.87
Thurgood Marshall expressed similar sentiments:
They intend to use every means, lawful and unlawful, to
prevent the inevitable. . . They will also give aid and
comfort, as well as support to the un-American
organizations dedicated to white supremacy who are no
more or no less than revised, revamped and renamed
groups of the old Ku Klux Klan. These groups with the
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support of state officials will use every economic pressure
possible against Negroes who insist on being full
Americans. They will use this pressure against laboring
men as well as the professional men such as doctors,
businessmen and lawyers.88
One southern newspaper referred to the Councils as “a ‘manicured’ Ku Klux Klan” and
another as “an ‘uptown’ KKK.”89 And although the Councils feigned non-violence, even
its own members admitted that violence was an essential to maintaining segregation. As
one Mississippi Council member said, they would make sure that “no Negro who
believes in equality has a job, gets credit, or is able to exist in our community. ‘Is able to
exist’—that means agree and knuckle under, or flee, or die.”90
South Carolina’s black intellectuals knew that the WCC coordinated its efforts
with state officials. One such intellectual was Walker E. Solomon, Executive Secretary
of the PEA. As an ally of both teachers and the NAACP, Solomon used national black
media outlets to bring attention to local blacks’ struggles for equal rights. He believed the
Councils were “[c]ooperating with the legislature for a last ditch stand against
desegregation.”91 For example, a principal founder of the WCC was S. Emory Rogers,
who served as the state’s lead attorney in the Briggs v. Elliot case.92 In yet another
example, in January 1956 the Gressette Committee held a conference with the executive
committee of the state association of WCC to discuss the their program. And it appeared
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that the idea to have SLED investigate the NAACP originated with the WCC.93 For their
part, the NAACP attempted to turn the SLED investigation on its head when they asked
that the Governor have the same agency “investigate the pressure that may have been
used on signers of petitions to withdraw their names or to make contrary statements.”94
It is important to note that, at least in the short term, the WCC’s efforts were often
successful. The number of NAACP branches fell from eighty-four to thirty-one between
1955 and 1957.95 It was the largest dip in branches “since the organization began its
rapid expansion in 1943.” The pressure on the NAACP was so concentrated that, most
likely out of fear that their mail was being tampered with, the Orangeburg and Bethesda
chapters asked that the national office refrain from sending communications to them.96
One person suggested that, if and when it was absolutely necessary to send
correspondence via mail, the national NAACP office should use plain rather than
letterhead envelopes.97
Orangeburg and the neighboring small town of Elloree serve as apt examples of
how white segregationists were able to leverage their political and economic power to
squelch the local school desegregation movement. Both political and business leaders in
the area did all within their power to target the desegregation petition signers and those
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who were identified as movement leaders. At the forefront of the white reactionary
movement were the Citizens Councils, who had “thrown a boycott so effectively that few
Negro businesses in the two progressive counties [Clarendon and Orangeburg] get as
much as a shoe lace.”98
Two people who epitomized the WCC’s ability to leverage economic and political
power were businessmen Robert Jennings and W.J. Deer. Jennings was the Orangeburg
mayor and was credited with organizing the boycott. He was also the president of the
local Coca-Cola Company and the owner of several businesses including Orangeburg Ice
and Fuel (Paradise Ice Cream) and Palmetto Bakery (Sunbeam). Mayor Jennings was at
the forefront of targeting black businesses.

He stopped Coca-Cola deliveries to

businesses if the owner or one of its personnel had signed a desegregation petition. For
example, deliveries had been discontinued to a barbershop, even though the owner
himself had not signed a petition.

One of the barbers who worked there had. He

circulated a list containing the names and addresses of African Americans who the
Council selected as its economic reprisal targets. All the Orangeburg branch officers
were on the list.99
H.O. Harvey, who owned a successful Shell station located on a busy highway,
found that his gasoline was not delivered in time for him to take advantage of Labor
Day’s busy traffic. Approximately 2,000 African Americans, some of whom were merely
suspected of being NAACP members, found their credit withdrawn at all the downtown
98
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stores. The Council provided a list of African Americans to white business leaders and
essentially forced them to fire or evict everyone on the list.100 As one newspaper
correspondent noted, the local Council practiced little restraint in “forc[ing] Negroes into
economic submission.”101

Instead, they sometimes became “suicidal maniacs in their

fanatic zeal to ‘squeeze’ Negroes.”102
W. J. Deer was the mayor of Elloree, and seemed to be largely responsible for
organizing the town’s boycott of black businesses. Mayor Deer openly declared that the
Council would “fight the leaders of the NAACP from ditches to fence posts to keep the
Negroes out of white schools.”103 Not only were black businesses targeted, but also
schoolteachers. Orangeburg NAACP branch president Rev. McCollum, whose activism
resulted in the revoke of his credit and threats against him, remembered that the
desegregation petitions put schoolteachers and their families in an awkward position:104
There were some members of the NAACP who could not
participate because their wives were school teachers [sic].
My wife, who was an assistant to the principal at Bowman
Elementary School, was fired in the spring of 1956 for no
stated reason. We remained in Orangeburg until the
summer of 1962, but no principal in the county called on
her for as much as a day’s substitute work during those six
years.105
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Job loss was a very real possibility for black teachers who openly supported
desegregation. As Mrs. McCollom’s experiences demonstrate, being dismissed from
your job because of your activism did not represent a temporary loss of income. That
loss could be long-term. Yet, income was only one part of their loss. For schoolteachers,
and black teachers especially, teaching offered accessible, professional, respectable work
that helped cement their status in the community.
Of course, teachers were not the only ones who faced repercussions for their
activism. A Charleston newspaper published the school petitioners’ names, and one
editorial told white citizens that they should study the list of names carefully.106 In one
instance, a segregationist used a certain amount of creativity in his/her efforts to extract
information from the NAACP.

S/he tried to impersonate an uneducated African

American, and wrote a letter to Walter White asking for a list of NAACP members so he
would know “who is my friens” and “who is i supposed to buy from.”107 John Morsell
informed him that poor, uneducated blacks did not, in fact, speak “in that bad imitation of
Uncle Remus.”108 The bad imitation, combined with their line of questioning only
proved that “no one knows less about southern Negroes than the southern whites who
claim they know most.”109
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A number of other Orangeburg County African Americans faced job
dismissals.110 In the small town of Elloree, the school desegregation effort brought about
such a coordinated and concerted effort on the part of local white supremacists that one
state NAACP leader, A.C. Redd, was prompted to announce, “Hell is popping here in
South Carolina.”111 In response to Ruby Hurley’s inquiries regarding the conditions of
Elloree’s black community, L.A. Blackman told her, “I don’t see how these poor people
are going to make it.” 112 At least fourteen people lost their jobs for signing the
desegregation petition, most of whom were domestics, laborers, and sharecroppers. Mrs.
Roselee Easterling wrote the NAACP desperate for help because, as a result of the
economic squeeze, she and her sons were finding it impossible to find employment. A
law firm sent John Hagler a letter demanding that he pay his mortgage in ten days or face
foreclosure.113 In fact, calling in someone’s mortgage became common practice, even
though as Blackman noted, “[i]t wasn’t like that before this thing (economic campaign)
started.”114

Mrs. Helen Thompson was dismissed from laundry job in Orangeburg,

leaving her unable to support her ill husband. Two municipal employees were dismissed:
a ten year employee named James Shivers, and a twelve year employee named Andrew
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Glover. Their dismissals likely felt like a slap in the face as Mayor Deer, who had
received the black community’s electoral support, not only fired Shivers and Glover, but
forced Shivers out the house he was renting from the mayor. For the previous eight
years, Shivers had been paying $8 month to live in the home. Suddenly, in addition to
losing his job, the mayor raised the rent to $10 a week. Bennie Brown was fired from his
city job with the public utilities department allegedly because fifty cents had gone
missing and a wall was not clean. He was the father of five small children.115
Deer did offer Shivers a way out of his predicament. All he had to do to get his
job back and have his rent reduced was take his name off the school desegregation
petition. But Shivers refused, “I want to stand up for my rights. I don’t want to take my
name off.”116 With limited educational and employment opportunities, activism may
have offered men like Shivers an opportunity to grasp what had been, for them, an
inaccessible form of manhood.

Someone like Shivers may have seen this as an

opportunity to lift his children out of the working-class. Perhaps more importantly to his
sense of manhood, this school desegregation campaign provided a way for him to grasp
the manhood that eluded him due to his economic dependence on whites.117
What local blacks likely found most horrific was Coble Dairy’s refusal to deliver
milk to the homes of people who signed the petitions.118 “[T]he vicious ‘squeeze’” was
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“denying milk and bread to countless children.”119 African Americans in the counties of
Orangeburg and Clarendon were forced to leave their area to purchase essentials like
milk and bread. For the Lewis family, whose son required regular blood supplements, this
act had the potential to be especially detrimental. Milk was an essential part of their
son’s high protein diet. Mr. Lewis confirmed that they were able to purchase the milk
elsewhere, but that his real concern was whether or not his son’s specialist would refuse
to continue treatments.120 Lewis’ physician assured him that "my first obligation is to my
God and my second is to my profession.”121 The Lewis’ were fortunate that their son’s
doctor had high ethical standards. For, as the continued economic squeeze would prove,
many segregationists did not.
The lack of a healthy, complete diet was clear to black teachers. As Elizabeth
Cleveland recalled:
In Elloree . . . we had to do so much for them. . . you know
a child cannot learn anything if they have not had
something to eat. And so oftentimes, we would take food. .
. You would ask them if they had anything to eat and they
would say they didn’t have anything . . .You wanted them
to be alert to be able to learn. . . I don’t think people realize
how much money teachers spent of their own, not making
anything, to help their children be able to succeed in class
because the parents didn’t really have anything . . . Years
ago, you did whatever you had to do to help your students
and to help the school.122
Cleveland would have found herself facing these challenges teaching a rural, workingclass group of students regardless of whether or not there was a boycott, but since some
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of the parents who signed the desegregation petition had children at ETS, it is certain that
their financial straits were exacerbated.

Cleveland’s comments reflect that she

understood the community in which she worked. Like many other African American
teachers Cleveland acquired middle-class status through her profession, yet empathized
with her constituency because of her own working-class background.123
Even Christmas was not off limits to the economic squeeze. Customarily during
the annual Christmas parade, Santa gave all the children little bags of candy, fruit, and
nuts. But during 1955’s Christmas parade, the Santa handed out gift bags to the white
children, but ignored the little black boys and girls.124 Blackman said, “they ran our
children off the street.”125 Yet even in this, Blackman and Simkins were able to work
together to soften the blow. Simkins used NAACP funds to buy oranges and tangerines;
and Blackman had two hundred pounds of candy that a northern church donated in
response to the economic squeeze. Blackman gathered a group of Elloree women to put
together the children’s Christmas bags.126 They turned out so well that when a little white
boy saw a little black boy’s bag, he ran up to his mother and told her, “the colored people
had a better Christmas than we had.”127
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Most local African Americans demonstrated a serious commitment to seeing the
school desegregation through to the end, but the Councils, who James Hinton pronounced
were “acting like jackasses,” were sometimes successful.128 For instance, one Elloree
man asked that his name be removed from the petition after his white employer
threatened him. In Orangeburg, twenty of the original fifty-eight desegregation
petitioners asked that their names be withdrawn. A Standard Oil Esso representative
instructed brothers James and Roy Sulton, who owned a gas station and mechanic shop,
to remove their names from the desegregation petition. The Standard Oil representative
told them to claim that they did not understand what they were signing. Mr. Sulton
asserted that to say he did not know what he was doing would amount to claiming to be
illiterate. He argued that not only did he know what he was doing, but every person who
signed the petition knew what they were signing.129
Roy Wilkins expressed similar sentiments, asserting that such ignorance was
impossible. According to him, any literate man had to know what was going on. Several
of these school petitions had been signed at public meetings wherein the petitions’
purpose had been adequately explained. Wilkins was confident that names were not being
removed due to a misunderstanding. African Americans removed their names because of
economic pressure.130 But, removing their names would not guarantee that they got their
jobs back. The Pittsburgh Courier reported that there was “no record of a Negro getting
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his job back after taking his name off a petition.”131 Even worse, taking such an action
would ruin a person’s standing in their community.

Not only did they remain

unemployed, but they were “looked upon with contempt by both whites and Negroes.”132
But the economic squeeze taught Orangeburg County’s African Americans some
valuable lessons that had been in practice since the early activism of the 1910s and would
become signature characteristics of the burgeoning 1960s movement:
(1) no one should be permitted to sign petitions who can be
pressurized; (2) quality, not quantity, of petitioners is most
valuable, and (3) you can’t do business with Citizens’
Councils.133
Indeed, the WCC’s victims were just as likely to be the petitioners’ family members as
they were to be the individuals who actually signed the petition. But it was the last
point—not supporting WCC owned businesses—that turned the Elloree and Orangeburg
struggle on its head.
African Americans began “planning boycotts of merchants known to be members
of the Citizens’ Councils.”134 As James Hinton argued, “‘economic reprisals’ can be
two-way streets as well as sharp two-edged swords.”135 He called for not only a local
boycott, but a national boycott against the companies local WCC members
represented.136 And at least some African Americans seemed to heed his advice. The
March 1956 issue of The Crisis magazine featured a full-page photo of a medical center
131
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in New York City having its Coca-Cola machine removed from the facilities after reports
surfaced that “a Coca Cola distributor in South Carolina is spearheading the White
Citizens Council boycotts of Negroes who signed desegregation public school
petitions.”137 “The white folks,” said long time activist and NAACP member John
Felder, “want to run us out but we’re trying to hold our land.”138 If such a boycott meant
that they had no local merchants to buy from, African Americans were willing to
purchase all their goods via mail order catalog. In Orangeburg, black college students at
Claflin and South Carolina State College were encouraged to ask their parents to send
clothing from home rather than shopping in the local stores. The students readily agreed
to boycott Mayor Jennings’ products (Coca Cola, Sunbeam Bread, and Paradise Ice
Cream) and to stop shopping at the WCC-owned downtown stores. Women teachers and
other prominent community women closed their accounts at Beckers Department Store,
and used their status to encourage other black women to do the same.139
The Beckers store example helps demonstrates that, in their quest to punish
African Americans, Council leaders also hurt white merchants. When one of the women
called the owner and told him why she and other women would not be doing business
with him anymore, he expressed remorse and said that he had been pressured into joining
the whites’ boycott.140 White businessmen who did not join the WCC’s boycott “face[d]
the threat of being called ‘scalawags’ as well as being cut from the list themselves.”141 It
mattered little if he wanted to join. Every white man in the Elloree/Orangeburg area
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“was pressured into joining the WCC or face a WCC led boycott of his business, as well
as social isolation.”142 One white farmer, who dismissed his black farm hands at the
Council’s behest, was left with only he and his wife to do the farm-work. When he went
to the bank for a loan to help remedy his problem, the loan officer denied his loan and
told him that he should present his problem to the Council.143
Indeed, although the economic squeeze was directed mostly against African
Americans, it is important to acknowledge that being white did not automatically protect
one from the Council’s wrath. White Carolinians who had the audacity to support
desegregation were also subjected to threats and economic reprisals. One Orangeburg
County Methodist minister, Rev. J.B. Murray, found himself transferred to a different
church after members of his flock found out that he co-authored a resolution denouncing
the use of economic reprisals to maintain segregation. A Camden man was attacked for
reasons that remained unclear.

A Mr. Guy Hutchins was beaten and accused of

advocating desegregation before a Lions Club group and a women’s group. Hutchins
denied these accusations, and said that the only thing he could think of that would incite
such violence towards him was that he helped some of the students at Mather Academy, a
black school, with their music lessons.144
The person often operating in a social space somewhere in between the black and
white southerner was the southern Jew who felt “their economic and social status
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threatened by the segregation controversy.” 145 Like the owner of Beckers, Jewish
merchants fell between a rock and a hard place as they were pressured by the Council and
would lose the business of the black patrons. One third of South Carolina’s Jewish
congregations were Council members, so there were certainly some who sincerely
believed in the stated goal of preserving racial segregation. But others were simply wary
of becoming the Council’s next victim.146
The boycott of WCC owned businesses proved to be effective.

In Elloree, the

absence of African American patronage left Main Street, normally bustling with business
on Saturdays, “ominously barren.”147 As one unnamed Elloree man said, “The NAACP’s
done put the white man out of business around here.”148 One company (most likely
Sunbeam) had been forced to return almost 800 bread loaves from a white store. Most
African Americans were buying their groceries from one of three black-owned stores in
the area, who were pooling their resources to stock their shelves with food purchased in
towns as far as fifty to seventy miles away. They traveled to the neighboring towns of
Holly Hill, Orangeburg, St. Matthews, and even as far as Columbia.149 After all, black
grocery store owners were also victims of the economic reprisals. They “found it
difficult, if not impossible, to get supplies from wholesalers.” 150 One of the most
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successful signs of the boycott was that it did cause some white merchants to close up
shop.151
A likely unforeseen consequence of the economic squeeze was that it positioned
the NAACP—the very organization Carolina’s segregationists endeavored to destroy—
“in the role of savior.”152 Indeed, it mobilized the black community to action. When
Rev. Hinton attended an Orangeburg NAACP meeting at a local church, he found a
packed house.153 Levi Byrd told Thurgood Marshall that the Council’s persecution of him
increased his status in the community and made “more Negros [sic] stick with The
N.A.A.C.P.”154 One Elloree man said, “T’hell with the white man now.”

Another

argued, “we are closer together here now then ever before. In one way I think the White
Citizens Council’s economic pressure campaign was the best thing for unifying us.”155
Epitomizing the long-held black tradition of self-help, the Palmetto State’s black
community and the NAACP took special measures to assist those in need. After the
Shivers and Butler families were kicked out of their homes, they were able to secure
housing in black-owned homes. When John Hagler’s mortgage was called in, the state’s
successful black-owned bank, Victory Savings Bank, took up his mortgage. In fact, the
Victory Savings Bank proved to be an essential part of the movement’s success. When
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the WCC targeted the Sulton brothers, the men transferred their bank account to Victory
Savings.156
The bank provided a safe space where local and national entities could provide funds
for local use. The national NAACP deposited $1,000 into the bank for the local relief
fund, and had $20,000 total on deposit there. But the needs of local blacks were so great,
and the economic reprisals they faced so harsh, that they soon had to deposit another
$10,000 to help farmers in Clarendon and Orangeburg counties. Two years later, the
NAACP was sending funds directly to Blackman to be dispersed to those in need.
Victory Savings Bank itself made loans to several reprisal victims, sometimes beyond
what was good collateral.157
Elloree’s seventy-four year old branch president, L.A. Blackman, used his skill as a
building contractor to build homes and provide work for those facing economic reprisals.
Snack bar owner George Mack kept “a stream of chickens headed for distressed
families.”158 Decisions on how to help reprisal victims were made on a case-by-case
basis. Some people received outright gifts, and others received loans. James Hinton later
boasted that through monetary donations and loans, the SC NAACP had been able to take
care of each individual who faced reprisals as a result of the desegregation petitions in

156

“Big Corporations Exerting Pressure.”
Roy Wilkins to A. W. Simkins, 26 January 1956; Roy Wilkins to Rev. James M.
Hinton, 10 February 1956; James M. Hinton to Roy Wilkins, 12 February 1956; H. D.
Monteith to Roy Wilkins, 18 February 1956; Roy Wilkins to L.A. Blackman, 28 May
1958; James Hinton to Roy Wilkins, 3 February 1956, Papers of the NAACP, Part 20,
Box A-289.
158
“South Carolina’s Plot to Starve Negroes.”
157

195

Clarendon and Orangeburg counties.159 He declared, “people are very happy and satisfied
over the entire matter.”160
According to one unnamed NAACP official, there were several black and white
national organizations “just waiting” for the signal to place funds in the Victory Savings
Bank.161 Such a willingness to help would prove to be fortuitous since, according to
NAACP assistant John A. Morsell, “[t]he greatest need for clothing, food, etc., appears to
be in South Carolina.”162 At least part of the reason the official’s statements turned out to
be true was because of the work of long-term SC NAACP secretary, Modjeska Simkins.
Simkins and well-known black journalist Simeon Booker came up with a genius idea.
They put a small add in Jet magazine encouraging people to send assistance to South
Carolina.163 In less than two weeks clothing, money, and canned goods began to arrive
“by the ton.”164 Fifteen churches in Wilmington, North Carolina pooled their resources
to make a contribution. William H. Boone of the Portland Urban League told Wilkins that
his colleague could secure at least $1,500. The Denver NAACP branch sent in $20 to be
applied to the South Carolina Fund, and expressed interest in sending food and
clothing.165 The Berkshire County, Massachusetts NAACP branch donated $10 and were
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“very anxious” to know if they could donate clothing.166 The Public School No. 2’s PTA
in the Bronx contributed shoes and clothing. Despite the outpouring of support from
people across the nation, the economic reprisals placed insurmountable hardships for
some local blacks. Some in Elloree’s black community were forced to leave the area to
find work.167
The events also emphasized a pre-existing sense of distrust between the national
NAACP office and the local branches. When Roy Wilkins found out how successful
Simkins had been in recruiting outside assistance for the squeeze victims, he informed
her that the NAACP was not a relief organization.168 He told her to return any funds she
received to the people and organizations who sent them. Simkins was incensed. She told
him that she would do no such thing:
Now Roy, I am not going to send back a damned cent to
anybody. These people are under pressure. You all asked
us to get these petitions signed, and that’s what we’re
doing. We have an obligation to these people. . . Now, you
all sit up there and drink all the Bloody Marys and eat all
your big sirloin steaks and drink your scotch and milk, but
we are down here under pressure. And we’ve got the load
on us, and we’re going to handle it.169
So largely under Simkins’ leadership, the SC Conference continued its assistance
campaign.
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Still, the Council’s economic squeeze may have helped build a sense of trust between
the NAACP and the local black community who learned to rely on the civil rights
organization for help rather than trying to find the assistance of sympathetic whites.
If we need money now, we go to the NAACP to help us
borrow it. If we need food and clothes, the NAACP gives
them to us, and we don’t have to say ‘yowsuh’ for it. I tell
you, that NAACP is the best thing that’s ever come to
colored folks. I ain’t never heard of no white man around
here treating us like the NAACP is doing. T’hell with the
white man now!170
The NAACP’s financial assistance helped blacks in Elloree/Orangeburg reclaim a sense
of ownership of their community. It prevented them from feeling as if they had to
disgrace themselves in order to provide for their families.

Therefore, the school

desegregation petitions, the WCC’s boycott, and the black community’s counter-boycott,
proved to be an empowering experience for a disfranchised community.
It is possible that no one in all of Orangeburg County received more severe
reprisals than L.A. Blackman who was targeted for his zealous, and often successful,
efforts to organize the black community against the segregationist’s status quo. He was
known as “the most hated man” in Elloree and “the most feared by whites and most loved
by his own people.”171 On Saturday, December 10, 1955, Blackman was in Orangeburg
visiting his bed-ridden wife in the hospital. Yet back home in Elloree, he became the
center of attention for the sixty people “in full regalia” attending a local Klan rally.172 It
was announced over the loudspeakers that Blackman’s fellow African Americans should
170
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see to it that he leave town.173 Blackman actually went to the rally and said he drove as
close to the speakers as possible to hear what was going on. It was almost over but he
remembers the speaker asking him if he would like to say anything. Blackman said that
he would, and announced, “I’m here in Elloree. I’ve been here for seventeen years. And
I have no idea of leaving here. I want to stay here.”174 Blackman joked that after that,
“then I had my own people to face.”175 Regardless of his positive attitude, he knew to
take the Klan’s threats against his life seriously. He was aware of the violence faced by
other South Carolina activists. When a reporter asked Elloree’s mayor, W.J. Deer about
the rally, he claimed to know nothing about it.

His ignorance, however, was quite

unlikely in light of the fact that the rally attendees staged a parade through town.176
Blackman was also a victim of the WCC’s malicious economic reprisals. The
Holly Hill Building Supply Company wrote the successful contractor—who had largely
come out of retirement for the express purpose of helping other people in his
community—to let him know that they would no longer sell him the goods he needed to
build homes:
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We do not want to carry on business transaction[s] with
people that support the advancement of colored people. So
do not ask for any more materials.177
Likewise Burgess Butler, the father of three children and an Elloree resident, was
instructed by his white landlord to leave the home he had been renting. In 1955 he was
also charged with assault to kill for an incident that happened a year prior. His friend,
Rev. McCollum, believed that he never would have been charged if he had not signed the
school desegregation petition. Butler did shoot a white man in the leg, but only after the
man knocked him down, and threatened him and his family.178
The events at South Carolina State College most directly foreshadowed the 1960s
student-let movement. The students had already been participating in the black boycott
of WCC owned businesses when the South Carolina legislature targeted them. In March
1956, a committee was established to investigate the NAACP’s activity at the university.
Governor Timmerman signed a joint resolution which asserted that: 1) the NAACP’s
main objective was to create “a bitter feeling of unrest, unhappiness and resentment”
among African Americans, 2) the NAACP ruined the “amicable and friendly relations”
between black and whites that had been “so common in the past,” and 3) the NAACP had
“mislead” the faculty and staff into becoming active members.179 The newly established
committee would investigate the NAACP’s on-campus activity, discover who was a
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member and/or sympathizer, and whether said activities were “detrimental” to the college
and its students.180
The university faculty and staff were among the first to react to the General
Assembly’s actions. They released a resolution of their own in order to “save the General
Assembly any undue expense or difficulty in securing” their viewpoints.

The

faculty/staff: 1) affirmed their belief in academic freedom, 2) proclaimed that education
was intended for the good of all, not to “further the interests of any individual or group,”
3) asserted that pressure and intimidation negatively effected their ability to teach, 4)
asked that the Assembly provide any information from the U.S. attorney’s office which
suggested that any organization subversive, and 5) suggested that if the legislature was so
convinced that South Carolina State faculty/staff were not working in their students’ best
interest, they should dismiss the entire faculty/staff and admit the entire student body into
the state’s other institutions of higher education.181
The students, however, engaged in direct-action protests. They went on strike
from their classes. Using skills he learned under Principal William H. Grayson’s tutelage
while a student a Burke Industrial High School in Charleston, Fred Moore, now the
student council president, helped organize the strike. Moore, reported that he suspected
most students would stay away from campus as long as the school was under
surveillance.182 One newspaper reported that in a “quiet, 20-minute demonstration”
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students hung the governor in effigy.183 And although the timing suggest that their
activism was in direct response to the legislature’s resolution, the college students linked
their activism to the economic squeeze which was having such a devastating effect on the
surrounding community. As one student, S. E. Gamarekian, noted in a letter to the New
York Times’ editor, the persecution of SC State was only one of several factors. They
were concerned about the plight of teachers at colleges, universities, and public schools.
They were also concerned about African Americans “at the lower economic levels, such
as laborers, and maintenance and service personnel” who had already been dismissed
from their jobs because of their relationship with the NAACP.184 In reaction to their
protest and strike, the college’s president, Dr. Benner C. Turner notified some of the
students by mail that they should not return to school for the next semester. Such an
action had the potential to cause irreversible damage to a group of students who did not
always have the financial opportunity to attend another school. Charleston’s most wellknown teacher-activist, Septima Clark, wrote Roy Wilkins regarding four Charleston
natives who Turner kicked out of school. The students, two boys and two girls, were
bright and had earned four-year scholarships from the County. They now needed the
NAACP’s legal and financial assistance.185
Orangeburg’s segregationists expressed confidence that the college students had
been “duped” into “supporting the Red-sponsored NAACP” and were now aware that
183
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“the organization was not benefiting the Negro race.”186 But South Carolina’s black
college students would continue to prove that they knew exactly what they were doing,
and that they were just as dedicated to desegregation as their adult counterparts. In
Columbia, Fred Moore, who South Carolina State College expelled for his activism, was
now attending Allen University where he and other students decided to test the city’s
segregated bus system.187
As African Americans engaged in protests, boycotts, and petitions, state authorities
and agencies renewed their effort to ensure state-sponsored segregation remained in tact.
The Crisis magazine reported, “State after state is using its legislature or its court, or
both, in efforts to bar the NAACP from operation.”188 Demonstrating that the fight to
preserve segregation was not only a multi-state fight, but that southern segregationists
leaders were willing to work together in this fight, four southern governors met in
Richmond, Virginia in January, 1956 to formulate a cooperative plan. Governors J. P.
Coleman (Mississippi), Marvin Griffin (Georgia), Thomas Stanley (Virginia), and
George Bell Timmerman (South Carolina) agreed to ask their legislatures to: 1) adopt a
resolution asserting that school desegregation was a violation of their states’ rights, 2) ask
U.S. Congress step in to protect the state’s from the federal government’s
“encroachment”, and 3) establish new laws to protect state sovereignty. The southern
governors were clearly employing the oft-used states’ rights argument. And the NAACP
did not hesitate in questioning the legitimacy of their claims. Roy Wilkins wrote the
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governors soon after their meeting and argued that the U.S. Constitution did not grant the
states any right to violate people’s civil rights. Moreover, while the segregationist
governors asserted that they were protecting their citizenry, they certainly did not
represent African Americans’ interest. Nonetheless, South Carolina’s legislators
proceeded to draft and pass a joint resolution the following month, and Timmerman
signed it. In addition to the demands the four governors originally made, Timmerman and
the South Carolina General Assembly also requested that the U.S. Attorney General place
the NAACP on the subversive list.189 Such an action would enable the state to essentially
outlaw the active civil rights organization and guarantee that it would be consumed with
defending itself before Senator Joseph McCarthy’s House Un-American Activities
Commission.
As black Carolinians increased their protest efforts, it was in this political
environment that anti-NAACP legislation gained increased support. Indeed, it was the
WCC’s inability to effectively and decidedly stymie the black community’s
desegregation efforts that led the state legislature to enact a law that would result in the
removal of professors, teachers, and students who had the audacity to support
desegregation and/or the NAACP.190 As the national NAACP office acknowledged,
there was “a mounting crescendo of legal efforts to stem NAACP activities.”191 In order
to deal with the integration issue, an act was approved on March 17, 1956, which
189
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extended both the Gressette Committee’s existence and its reach. Moving beyond the
public school system, the committee turned its attention to higher education and “all
phases of segregation affecting the state government and the citizens of South
Carolina.”192 That year the Gressette Committee had been especially busy, and persuaded
the General Assembly to pass fourteen new laws. These included permitting local school
boards to sell or lease school property, the repeal of the compulsory-education law, and—
most importantly to this study—a series of anti-NAACP statutes designed to stymie the
organization’s progress.193 The meaning of the legislation was not lost on attentive
educators like PEA leader Walker E. Solomon. He wrote that the Gressette committee’s
life had been extended in order to prove the state’s “determination to defy the court.”194
The new legislation that most directly affected black teachers was H-1998, which
became known as the anti-NAACP oath. Passed on March 17, 1956, this law made it
illegal for local, county, or state government employees to be NAACP members and
required them to disclose said membership, whether personal or through family ties.195
Employing the same rhetoric white segregationist leaders had been using for generations,
the new law accused the NAACP of disrupting “the peace and tranquility which has long
existed between the White and Negro races.”196 And in a line that would play a vital role
in the Elloree case, the legislators not only established that NAACP members would be
dismissed from their jobs, but also that anyone “refusing to submit a statement as
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provided herein, shall be summarily dismissed.”197 So even if someone was not a
NAACP member, if they refused to make a statement one way or the other, they would
lose their job. In the event local white officials felt inclined to be sympathetic,
repercussions could also fall on them. If they did not report these cases, they were subject
to pay a $100 fine for each violation.198
African American leaders were sure that black educators were the anti-NAACP
oath’s real targets. Georgia passed a similar law the previous year that explicitly named
teachers as its sole target. Any teacher there found to be a NAACP member would have
their teaching license revoked in perpetuity unless they renounced their membership and
pledged an oath to the same effect. 199 According to Solomon, the South Carolina
legislation was passed in order to “make sure no teachers join [the] NAACP.”200 He
observed that the oath stemmed largely from the legislature’s incorrect assumption that
“most, if not all, of the 7,500 teachers” in black schools were NAACP members.201 Soon
after the law’s passage, Roy Wilkins and Reverend Hinton denounced the new law as an
effort to “intimidate teachers as they are the only large group of public employees from
which the NAACP membership is recruited.”202 The anti-NAACP oath was not just a
vague swipe at the organization. It was meant to hit them hard. As one editorial noted,
the new law was “simply another in a series of moves by the White South to break up the
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NAACP.”203 Cheraw branch leader Levi G Byrd agreed when he said that the state was
doing all it could to “kill off” the NAACP.204 Black Carolinians would need to “stand
firm and fast.”205
Ten days after the new law was passed Byrd wrote Lucille Black in the national
office to update her of the situation in South Carolina. He told her he received word that
white officials in the area planned to ask him for the chapter’s membership roster in order
to find out how many teachers were in their NAACP branch. He was giving Black his
word that he would not give them the information. He wrote, “I Am telling you if thay
[sic] do I will not tell them, I will go to Jail before I tell them any thing [sic].”206
Likewise, when he heard a rumor that the Governor would force NAACP officials to
disclose their membership, he promised Simkins, “I will never do so.”207 Instead, he
planned on referring them to Black. Requests for membership were not only being made
of the NAACP, but also of the PEA. The PEA gave responses like Byrd’s and local
NAACP branches replied that they did not keep track of their members’ occupations.
Solomon attributed these requests to white officials’ and reporters’ desire to find out how
many teachers were NAACP members.208
While it would be easy to assume that all African American teachers would stand
in support of the NAACP, or at least oppose the anti-NAACP oath, P.B. Mdodana, an
203
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A.M.E. minister, principal of Chesterfield County’s Pine Forest High School, and former
teacher at Camden’s Jackson High School, demonstrates that black Carolinians were far
from being a monolithic group. Mdodana may initially appear to be a proponent of equal
rights. A short Jet Magazine article said that the South African born educator believed
black teachers should “appreciate equal facilities and oppose integration.”209 But a
deeper look into Mdodana’s past reveals a more nuanced understanding of race and the
meaning of equality. In April, 1956, the PEA refused to permit Mdodana to introduce a
resolution at a PEA conference in Columbia that strongly criticized the group’s support
of integration. While accused of racial disloyalty by some members for his purported
defense of segregation, the language of Mdodana’s resolution and its accompanying letter
reveal a different and largely understudied motivation for his support of separate black
institutions.210 Reminding readers that African Americans were “proud of our heritage
and God-given racial distinctions,” Mdodana wrote:
I, for one, am proud of my Negro heritage and wear my
God-given color with dignity and display my racial traits
without shame. I envy no man who has been endowed by
our Creator with characteristics differing from my own.211
With a direct nod to black nationalism, Mdodana encouraged the PEA to go on record as
“declaring our racial pride.”212 He resented the assertion that black education—and
educators—were inferior. 213

Mdodana did not dispute the fact that blacks had

substandard resources, but he did not see integration as the cure. His hesitancy mirrored
the uncertainties of other black Carolinians.
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desegregation battle in South Carolina, Briggs v. Elliott, began as a fight for improved
and equal educational resources. It was changed at the behest of the national NAACP
office.

As Mdodana asserted, maintaining “separate but fully equal public school

facilities” was the “well known desire” of most African Americans.214 For individuals
like Mdodana, civil liberties could be better acquired through equalization, than with
integration.
The new legislation was effective in persuading some teachers to distance themselves
from the NAACP. Levi Byrd and the Cheraw Branch, understanding that teachers who
did not quit the civil rights organizations would most likely be losing their livelihood,
responded to these resignations with official letters acknowledging teachers’ resignations.
Still, he hoped that the teachers would continue to offer financial support.215 Lucille
Black understood that the deadline for teachers in the NAACP to either leave the
organization or lose their jobs was fast approaching. But she was confident that “a
number of test cases” would arise, and the matter would eventually have to be settled in
the courts.216 Roy Wilkins must have been equally confident because he telegraphed the
South Carolina conference to offer the NAACP’s legal assistance should they wish to
challenge the new law.217
The opportunity to take advantage of this offer soon presented itself. On May 11,
1956, Elloree school district superintendent M. G. Austin, gave Principal Davis a set of
214
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applications to distribute to each teacher.218 Their employment contracts for the 19561957 school year were significantly different from their past contracts. This time school
superintendent M. G. Austin included the following questions:
Do you belong to the NAACP? Do you support the
NAACP in any way (money or attendance at meetings)?
Do you favor integration of races in schools? Are you
satisfied with your work and the schools as they are now
maintained? Do you feel that you would be happy in an
integrated school system, knowing that parents and students
do not favor this system? Do you feel that an integrated
school system would better fit the colored race for their
life’s work? Do you think that you are qualified to teach an
integrated class in a satisfactory manner? Do you feel that
parents of your school know that no public schools will be
operated if they are integrated? Do you believe in the aims
of the NAACP? If you should join the NAACP while
employed in this school, please notify the Superintendent
and Chairman of the Board of Trustees. Do you desire a
position in the Elloree Training School for the 1956-1957
session?219
The teachers were required to complete and submit the applications in order to have their
contracts renewed for the following school term. When the teachers met with
Superintendent Austin a few days later most of the dissenting teachers informed him that
they would not be completing the new application. Austin told them that they would
have to sign a resignation form. But three teachers—Bee A. Fogan, Essie M. David,
Rutha Ingram, and Frazier Kitt—also refused to sign the resignation forms Austin
supplied them with. Two of the dissenting teachers, Leila M. Summers and Robert D.
Carmichael filled out the application, but refused to answer the questions regarding
NAACP membership and school integration. In short, they completed the information
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regarding their qualifications, but only answered the questions regarding their desire to
teach at ETS. On May 17, 1956, the national office sent out a press release that was
intended to bring attention to the twenty-one Elloree teachers who effectively lost their
positions as a direct result of the anti-NAACP oath. Eighteen resigned and three refused
to sign. Ultimately, only seven of the Elloree Training School’s thirty-one teachers
submitted applications on May 11.220
The questionnaire set the small, rural town of Elloree apart from the rest of the
state. All South Carolina school districts required black teachers to reveal or terminate
their NAACP membership, but only superintendent Austin included what one African
American commentator described as “none-of-their-business” questions that “no selfrespecting, truthful, 100% American Negro” could answer.221 With Elloree as a model
for other South Carolina school districts, similar questionnaires were executed in
Charleston and Jasper counties where active WCC chapters operated.222
The ETS teachers’ stance may have looked like a staged protest, but there was no
planned collective action in place. Before superintendent Austin arrived at the school on
May 11 to have the new contracts signed, Charles Davis met with each teacher to review
the stipulations of the new questions.223 With as much objectivity as he could muster, he
told each teacher to “only do what you think you have to do. . . You do what you feel that
220
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you want to do in your heart.”224 That advice meant something different to each teacher.
For some teachers, it meant not answering the questions at all, for others it meant
resigning from their positions, and for certain teachers it meant answering the questions
honestly and openly. To someone like Elizabeth Cleveland, it was simply a matter of
standing up for herself. She said, “I felt like I had gone to school and felt I could teach
any child.”225 Some of the ETS teachers answered the questionnaire in a satisfactory
manner and their contracts were renewed for the next school year. Cleveland remembers
being surprised that her roommate signed the contract. But she also understood the
reasons why others went ahead with signing it: “The others, I knew—it was a mother and
daughter—but they lived there and so I could understand why they weren’t gonna leave,
you know.226
Despite expected repercussions, some black teachers continued their affiliation
with the NAACP.

Orangeburg County’s Dantzler School principal Reverend E.E.

Richburg, who played a vital role in the Clarendon movement, seemed ready for the
inevitable battle when he told a reporter with the New York Post, “I hope they fire me
then. I’d like to meet them in court.”227 Out of fourteen teachers at his school, he was the
only one who admitted to being in the NAACP. But this current battle was nothing new
to him.228 He was already firmly entrenched in the movement. In 1955 the KKK
kidnapped him and threatened to “horse-whip” him and was dismissed from a teaching
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job because of his role in the Briggs case in Clarendon County. 229 Richburg serves as an
excellent example of the far-reaching implications of one individual’s activism. Not only
was he dismissed from his teaching position, but so were his daughter, his son, and their
spouses.230
Other teachers around the state also lost their positions. At least five teachers in
Charleston did not have their contracts renewed because of their NAACP affiliation.
Among them were Henry Hutchinson and Septima Clark who were dismissed after
helping to shore-up support for a desegregation petition. Hutchinson taught at Burke
Industrial School, and Clark taught at Henry Archer School. Both refused to renounce
their NAACP membership.231 Clark remembered, “I refused to overlook my membership
in the NAACP, as some of the teachers had done, and listed it.”232 Teachers like Clark
were well aware of the fact that their activism would have repercussions and
consequently many did not feel comfortable following her example. As Cecil Williams
recalled regarding black teachers, “It was rare for teachers to really take any antiestablishment kind of attitude or any activity.”233 For her part, Clark tried to mobilize
black teachers in Charleston to fight the anti-NAACP oath, which she saw as a blatantly
unjust law.234 She was largely unsuccessful in this endeavor and regarded it as one of her
greatest failures. She remembered:
[T]here were such a few jobs that they didn’t see how they
could work against the law. . . I signed my name to 726
229
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letters to black teachers asking them to tell the state of
South Carolina that it [the anti-NAACP oath] was unjust . .
. I don’t know why I felt that black teachers would stand up
for their rights. But they wouldn’t. Most of them were
afraid and became hostile.235
Clark did get a response from twenty-six teachers. Eleven of them agreed to go with her
to talk to the superintendent, but only six of them showed up for the meeting. The
superintendent did not say much to them, only that they were living far ahead of their
time.236
The wholesale dismissal of black teachers and hyper-focused negativity towards
the NAACP was by no means exclusive to South Carolina. In 1956 North Carolina threw
out its state tenure law and requested that all teachers reapply to their positions. Teachers
who were known to support integration were unlikely to be rehired.237 A few years later,
1959, Little Rock, Arkansas not only threatened to close its public schools but also to fire
forty-four teachers, most of whom were black, for their “mild support of school
integration.”238 And in one of the most troubling incidents of massive white resistance,
every teacher in Prince Edward County, Virginia lost their job when the county closed it
public schools rather than comply with the law.239 Clearly, the ETS teachers, and anyone
else who was unwilling to bow to the demands of powerful white segregationists could
find themselves unemployed.
All of these dismissals for breach of contract had the potential to culminate into a
court case. The NAACP and the PEA stood by various teachers around the state, but they
235
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homed in on the Elloree case because their lawyers thought the circumstances presented a
better opportunity to challenge the anti-NAACP legislation.240 Correspondence from the
national office shows that it had a deep interest in the Elloree case. Indeed, it was their
“moral obligation” to offer whatever help they could.241 Roy Wilkins and Thurgood
Marshall exchanged memos about the case between each other.242 The NAACP made
strategic efforts to ensure that the teachers would stay the course by offering legal and
financial assistance. Roy Wilkins wrote to Reverend Hinton that the national office was
“very anxious” to offer the Elloree teachers as much support as it could muster.243 Even
as Wilkins acknowledged that his organization’s “financial resources are not
inexhaustible,” he pledged to help the teachers find other jobs and “to give assistance in
these outstanding cases.”244 The NAACP also endeavored to help the teachers in their
path towards financial recovery by helping them go to graduate school, find immediate
employment, or in taking the New York City teachers exam. They sent $2400 to the
South Carolina conference to assist the interested Elloree teachers with their graduate
studies.245
As the NAACP and black newspapers publicized the plight of Orangeburg
County’s black teachers other organizations lent financial and logistical support. Charles
Davis was invited to attend a citizen’s organization in Minneapolis called the Campaign
240
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for Courage where he received a five hundred dollar award on behalf of the Elloree
teachers. They agreed to turn the sum over to the NAACP.246 Similarly when Thurgood
Marshall contacted Fred Fuges, the Director of the Rights of Conscience Program of the
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), he said they had some money set aside to
provide “relief of conscience victims” and that the teachers could qualify for aid.247 The
aid was intended to help its recipients pay court costs and legal fees, demonstrating that
Marshall and the NAACP were laying the groundwork for its next legal battle. The AFSC
also helped pay for Ms. Floyd’s graduate work as well as Robert Carmichael’s. The
NAACP also offered to help people relocate. Such assistance was not their usual method
of assistance, but they were willing to do so in this case.248
With growing funding, NAACP leaders believed that the Elloree case presented
great possibilities for their legal efforts to undermine segregation and racial inequity. The
release of twenty-one teachers by the same school board and the unique questionnaire
made it blatantly clear that the teachers’ dismissals and forced resignations had nothing to
do with their performance and everything to do with their affiliation with the NAACP.
By July 1956, the national NAACP office communicated with the local chapter and
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Columbia attorney Lincoln Jenkins regarding the most effective legal strategy on behalf
of the Elloree defendants.249
The Elloree teachers’ legal case began in the Federal District Court in August of
1956. In a bit of irony, John J. Parker and George Bell Timmerman, who ruled on the
Briggs case alongside J. Waites Waring would hear the case: Ola L. Bryan et al. v. M. G.
Austin, Jr., as Superintendent of School District No. 7. The plaintiffs, all ETS teachers,
were: Ola L. Bryan, Robert D. Carmichael, Essie M. David, Charles E. Davis, Rosa D.
Davis, Vivian V. Floyd, Bee A. Fogan, Hattie M. Fulton, Rutha M. Ingran, Mary E.
Jackson, Frazier H. Keitt, Luther Lucas, James B. Mays, Laura Pickett, Howard W.
Shefton, Betty Smith, Leila M. Summers, and Clarence V. Tobin. In their initial
complaint, the plaintiffs repeatedly pointed out that they had refused to answer the
questions that appeared on the new application because the questions were
unconstitutional and violated their rights as American citizens. The NAACP attorneys
took on the anti-NAACP oath directly, asserting that it not only violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also their constitutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom of
association, and the right to petition. Jenkins and Marshall asked the Court to instruct the
defense that it could not use personal beliefs or associations as a condition of
employment, and likewise to instruct the defense that it could not refuse to hire/rehire
someone because they refused to answer these intrusive questions.250
The defense asked for more time to review and prepare for the case, so it was
postponed until mid-October. When the defense submitted its answer to the plaintiffs’
249
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complaint their attorney argued that the federal court had no jurisdiction in the case, an
argument segregationist attorneys had been making since the teacher salary equalization
cases. The defendants also tried to argue that the plaintiffs had not completed their duties
in a satisfactory manner, but this was easily disproved by the fact that the school district
had re-hired some of these teachers over and over again. They also noted that the
teachers who refused to sign the new applications did not give a reason for their refusal.
Moreover, they argued that none of the teachers, save Luther Lucas, expressed an interest
in being rehired. But since Lucas did not fill out the application, they alleged that they
could not hire him.

And while the NAACP’s attorneys attacked the anti-NAACP

legislation, the defense used it as evidence that they were within their rights to require the
teachers to complete the new application. The defense’ sixth defense—that the Briggs
case did not outlaw racially segregated schools—revealed South Carolina segregationists
true fears. After all, the plaintiffs were not making a desegregation argument. They had
not even brought the issue up.251
During the trial, the Attorney General’s office submitted a brief for the defense. The
attorney general used arguments that mimicked those used during the teacher salary
equalization cases to prevent the defense from being held responsible for their actions.
For example, the attorneys stated that the case was not really the court’s prerogative
because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies that the General
Assembly laid out. Ignoring precisely why the ETS teachers’ lost their positions, the
attorney general also argued that the case was null and void because the plaintiffs were
251
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no longer employed, had been replaced, and waited months to file the case.

And

although they claimed that the teachers had not been dismissed because they were
NAACP members—after all, none of the teachers volunteered whether or not they were
members—they positioned the NAACP as the source of the state’s racial woes and
defended the legislature’s attack on the organization.252
In its decision, the court largely chose to avoid the issues most central to the
NAACP’s case. The judges chose not to rule on whether or not the anti-NAACP statute
was unconstitutional. Instead, they posited that a state court had to make a ruling before
the U.S. district court could render a decision. The case was not dismissed outright, but
remained pending until and if the plaintiffs had “a reasonable time for the exhaustion of
state administrative and judicial remedies.” On the surface (and perhaps in the judges’
perspective) this was a non-ruling. But their assertion that the teachers should exhaust
the administrative options was, in fact, a ruling in the defendants’ favor.253
It was Judge Parker, whose opinion in the Briggs case had been decidedly against the
NAACP, who issued an opinion dissenting parts of the court’s order. He disagreed that
the three-judge panel needed a lower court’s ruling in order to make an appropriate
decision. He also disagreed that the teachers needed to exhaust their administrative
remedies because such remedies did not address the issue of unconstitutionality. Most
important to the NAACP’s case, Judge Parker asserted that the association was not a
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subversive organization engaged with overthrowing the government.254 The NAACP was
unpopular, but that was not a justifiable reason to deny its members their constitutional
rights:
The right to join organizations which seek by lawful means
to support and further what their members regard as in the
public interest or in the interest of a particular part of the
public, is protected by the constitutional guarantees of the
free speech and freedom of assembly; and such right is one
of the bulwarks of liberty and of social progress. The fact
that organizations may render themselves unpopular with
the majority in a community is no reason why the majority
may use its power to enact legislation denying to their
members the fundamental rights of constitutional liberty.255
Judge Parker believed that court should declare the anti-NAACP oath unconstitutional
and enjoin the defense from enforcing it as it was “unambiguous and clearly
unconstitutional.”256 The National Education Association agreed with Judge Parker.
They released a joint resolution with the Palmetto Education Association which stated
that although applications were an appropriate prerequisite to hiring teachers, if those
applications asked questions that “can be answered only in a manner that prejudices the
teacher’s professional integrity and unjustly eliminated the teacher from further
consideration for employment,” it was imperative for “professional organizations and
individual citizens alike” to “oppose the use of the forms.”257 Unfortunately, the state’s
white teachers’ association, the South Carolina Education Association, refused to stand

254

Parker, Circuit Judge, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part, Ola L. Bryan et al. v.
M. G. Austin, Jr., as Superintendent of School District No. 7.
255
Ibid.
256
Ibid.
257
Report, “White Teachers Association Refused to Endorse Resolution (SCEA),” 11
January 1957, Gressette Papers, Box 5.
220

with the NEA and PEA.258 The Palmetto State’s black teachers found that, once again,
they could only depend on their own professional association and the NAACP.
The NAACP did not go to a lower court as the three-judge panel recommended
and instead filed an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.259 But they would not get their
day in court. South Carolina, realizing that it was unlikely to win the case if it went
before the U.S. Supreme Court, repealed the statute.260 The case was remanded back to
the U.S. District Court where it was dismissed.
But the anti-NAACP oath’s repeal did not mean that the South Carolina General
Assembly was abandoning its effort to dismantle the organization, or that it would stand
idly by while schools were desegregated. In its stead were two new anti-NAACP laws.
Governor Bell Timmerman signed what was known as the barratry law. The law, which
was intended to prevent the NAACP from starting and filing school desegregation
petitions, was quickly condemned by James Hinton who argued that it would “have little
or no effect” on black Carolinians’ effort to acquire full citizenship. Furthermore, even if
the law managed to hurt the organization, the NAACP would “move right on.”261 The
second law required teachers to list all of their organizational associations. Having
learned a valuable lesson from the Elloree case, state segregationist lawmakers did not
make it illegal to employ a NAACP member, but gave state agencies the option to not
hire someone on the basis of their organizational affiliations. The new law bore the
258
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appearance of being less overtly unconstitutional, but its supporters were not secretive
about its intent to stymie the NAACP’s progress. These new laws were in some ways
worse than the anti-NAACP oath. Not only did they accomplish the same goal, but
amidst the Red Scare’s oppressive atmosphere they bore the appearance of being legally
defensible.262
The fact that the NAACP had become a target for the state legislature and other
elected officials was quite blatant. Additionally, black Carolinians’ heightened activism
reinvigorated the reactionary white resistance movement. The Citizens Councils, which
had already grown to nearly sixty local councils, launched a new membership drive at the
start of 1957.263 They had been so effective in their methods, that Senator Englehardt of
Birmingham, Alabama made a pilgrimage to the state so that he could “swap ideas” with
the state’s council leaders. He heard how well-organized the South Carolina councils
were and believed that his campaign, which he asserted was “based on white supremacy,”
could learn from South Carolina’s well-organized Councils.264
Under these circumstances, it is less surprising that Clark had such a difficult time
rallying Charleston’s black teachers. The Elloree situation was a bit of an aberration.
Perhaps in that moment, they did not truly realize what they were risking. Elizabeth
Cleveland recalled that she was not worried about the risk of not being able to find
another job.
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I guess some people were afraid that they weren’t ever
going to work again or something like that, but I didn’t. . .
that didn’t dawn on me. That didn’t bother me. I felt like
all of us would be able to work wherever we applied, even
if they found out that we did do that.265
But unfortunately, while Cleveland’s confidence in her and her colleagues’ abilities was
more than justifiable, her confidence in their capacity to find work in a post-Brown
political environment proved to be misplaced. Cleveland was able to find work. But that
was largely due to the fact that her husband was in the military, and they moved away
soon after this incident. For the majority of the ETS teachers, their audacity to pose a
direct challenge to the anti-NAACP oath earned them a place on the state’s black list.266
And as Cecil Williams recalled, the ETS teachers simultaneously risked their livelihoods
and their community status:
The bravery these people had to give up their livelihood.
And jobs are hard to come by during those days. So, this
meant everything. This meant that if they owned a house
and had a bank loan, they had no income coming. . . Many
of them, when they did that, they were ostracized by the
rest of the educational community. Not many of them were
able to find jobs in the state. Many of them traveled out of
state. . . There was an effort by the NAACP to get
employment and also to have fund drives to give them
money to pay them and that went on for a while. But,
many of them never regained gainful employment and lived
a life of poverty for the rest of their lives.267
Black teachers received widespread support among local community members in their
goals of educating black youth.268 This strong backing was readily apparent among the
ETS parents. After word of the teachers’ dismissals got around town, some of the parents
265
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released a statement that characterized the teachers as “sympathetic, admirable, and
respected” community members.269 In local black citizens’ eyes, the teachers’ activism
only heightened their professionalism.270 Segregationists were correct to fear the possible
implications of black teacher activism. If they became activists in large numbers, their
efforts, in concert with the unceasing work of the NAACP, could bring about their worst
fears. It could completely break down the architecture of Jim Crow segregation.
And the Elloree teachers did not necessarily receive an unqualified support. After
the ETS teachers’ contracts were revoked, the school trustees received fifty-four
applications, including some from out of state. Blackman said community members
would refuse the new teachers because they did not feel the new teachers “should have
taken the jobs of other teachers who had taken a noble stand.”271 He quoted one trustee
as saying that “anything can teach a nigger.”272
The reprisals local NAACP members faced were so pronounced that tensions
between local and national leadership rose, as local residents did not feel the national
office did enough to support them and compensate them for their struggles. Blackman
most likely felt forgotten by the very organization he risked so much for and which he
worked so hard to mobilize the community’s support. When Blackman wrote the state
NAACP leader James Hinton in February of 1957, asking for additional support for
Elloree’s black farmers, Hinton told him that they did not have any funds available that
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year and that the NAACP “cannot become a relief agency.”273 Likewise when Rev. H.C.
Demore who noted that he had been unable to borrow money because he was the
president of his NAACP branch, and an “ardent worker” for the organization, John
Morsell advised him that they had no funds to help him, and told him to go to Victory
Savings Bank for a loan.274 But Demore had gone to the bank the previous year. And
while they furnished him with a $200 loan, the amount was insufficient to run his farm.
Wilkins assured Blackman and Simkins that the NAACP would try to help with
specific cases immediately connected to NAACP activism, and noted that he recognized
that Elloree had become a “punishment area.”275 But he also repeated the assertion that
they were not a “general relief agency.”276 Simkins remained one of Blackman’s most
ardent supporters. In February 1958, she wrote him, seemingly heartbroken about the
continued hardships he and the people of Elloree were facing. She wanted him to stay in
the small, rural town and maintain his leadership role.
Now, I do not want you to leave Elloree. You have been
the patriarch there, the leaven that has held the lump
together. I know that more attention could have been given
to you in your struggle there, and God knows I have tried to
walk with you every step of the way—as well as it was
possible without being there constantly as you are. Now, I
want you to stick a little longer. Where would the people
be without you. What semblance of branch activity would
there be without you. You have gone on a thankless job,
apparently. But your influence is there—your immortality
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is there. You will never die as long as there are Negros
who have lived in Elloree and in South Carolina.277
Enclosed in the letter was “a little cash for you to use personally and to show you that I
care and to inspire and hearten you.”278 She advised him to get a truck and come to
Columbia. There were still some food and clothing donations remaining that he could
take back to Elloree. Simkins later sent his letters to Roy Wilkins in the hopes that he
could help her find children’s clothing to send to Elloree. The NAACP did continue to
offer some aid, but Elloree’s black citizens remained financially devastated.279
In truth, the state’s and White Citizens Council’s laser-focused efforts to diminish
the NAACP may not have been completely successful, but they certainly made an
impact.

The NAACP did experience a decline. The number of branches dropped

drastically between 1954 and 1957 from eighty-five to thirty-seven. The membership
dropped from 7,889 to 2,202.280 Yet while the state legislature and the Council were
certainly to blame for much of this decline, people on the local level and in the national
office believed that it was also “indicative of the weak organization which has resulted
from absentee leadership and incidentally about program and activities to be effected.”281
After all, the Elloree NAACP branch—which suffered a loss of membership but
continued to have active participants—proved that repercussions alone were not enough
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to completely destroy a local movement. Internal discord among its leaders worked to
worsen the leadership problem.282 It was “imperative that something be done.”283
The person at the center of this dissatisfaction with “the South Carolina situation”
was James Hinton.284 During the last years of his leadership, the state organization
remained in a state of disarray as, by all accounts, he all but abandoned his duties as
president.285 One NAACP member, clearly irate regarding his most recent interaction
with Hinton, wrote Ruby Hurley in February of 1958. Hinton, who the author referred to
as “His Highness,” had already been spending most of his time out of the state when he
arrived a half hour late to their meeting.286 The group was meeting with Hinton to speak
about recent activism among students at Allen University. The author and his delegation
believed that the NAACP should offer the students legal assistance. Hinton provided
what most likely seemed like a series of excuses about why he and the NAACP could not
offer their support: 1) the students’ academic standing was unknown, 2) their moral
character was unknown, 3) none of the students had attempted to meet with him
beforehand. But the author and his delegation felt that if the NAACP did not offer the
students legal assistance, they would lose their standing throughout the state’s black
282
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community. Hinton did finally support the students, but his hesitancy revealed a man that
may have grown out of touch with his community and the ever changing black civil
rights movement.287
It was growing more and more apparent that Hinton’s time as leader of the SC
NAACP was coming to a close. Hurley said that she received complaints regarding his
lack of leadership during her visits to Greer, Oconee County, Rock Hill, Spartanburg,
Sumter, and Union. She admitted that the situation caused her to avoid visiting the state
more than absolutely necessary.288 Things got so bad that people began to wonder why he
would not simply “retire gracefully.”289 On the one hand Hinton was not doing the
NAACP’s work, but on the other hand it was difficult for other leaders within the state
organization to move the NAACP’s agenda forward without Hinton because he had a
close relationship with the national office. On March 28, 1958, a meeting was called in
Columbia wherein some thirty-five to forty branch leaders met to discuss the issue.
Hinton, in a move that seemed to demonstrate growing disinterest in the NAACP, did not
attend.290
As the South Carolina NAACP approached its annual Conference of Branches,
Hinton expressed that he was ready to formally retire from the position he had held since
1940.291 The NAACP gave the outgoing president a proper banquet in his honor where
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Current praised him as a “tough, courageous, resourceful and brilliant” state president.292
During his farewell speech, Hinton reviewed the SC NAACP’s major accomplishments
of the previous nineteen years.

He acknowledged that reprisals/repercussions had

impacted membership numbers, but encouraged members to actively campaign for
increased membership and to purchase life memberships. He dismissed the organization’s
internal problems and instead argued that “the fight and the organization are greater than
any of us.”293 The state NAACP “must not become divided, but must move ahead in
unison.”294 They had accomplished much, but those accomplishments were not enough.
He, like so many others, maintained the belief that in the end, they would win. They
were “ON GOD’S SIDE, and HE cannot fail, so we cannot fail.”295
The ouster of one of its most stalwart and dedicated leaders perhaps best
exemplified the NAACP’s decline. Simkins, whose lifelong activism reflected a
commitment to her community rather than to any particular organization, ruffled feathers
when she served as the South Carolina delegate at the Conference on Voting Restrictions
in Southern States and several newspapers identified her as being a NAACP
representative. The NAACP had not sent her. And the assertion that it had upset both
Hinton and Wilkins.296 Wilkins was further upset that an Amsterdam News article on
black leadership criticized him and the NAACP Board for its “alleged failure to carry on
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a vigorous fight for students” who wanted to desegregate the University of South
Carolina. He was convinced the information came from Simkins.297
By the time Edwin G. Washington wrote the South Carolina NAACP in July,
1958—asking Simkins if she supported the NAACP, how the community felt about her
leadership, and if they would endorse something she co-sponsored—she was no longer
serving as the SC NAACP secretary.298 Hinton informed Williams that Simkins was
“very efficient and militant.” 299 He noted that although he did not know of her
participation in any subversive organizations, she was currently under investigation by
the House UnAmerican Activities committee. Regarding her leadership Hinton said, “I
do not care to state any portion.”300
NAACP leadership tried to make Simkins’ ouster appear to be her idea. She
found out that she had allegedly declined reelection as secretary in a newspaper article.
Simkins wrote a letter to all the officers and local branch members assuring them that she
had not “turned my back on my people and our cause in this needy time.”301 She
expressed confidence that her fellow South Carolinians knew her well enough to know
that she would never “be bought and that I WILL NOT be sold.”302 Her willingness to
take the state NAACP to task proved her assertion. She argued that the NAACP still had
much work to do; and that it was important for the organization to not look backwards
297
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and “bask in reflected glory.”303 Adding to her inability to serve as a leader in the
organization was a recent bout with influenza that had left her debilitated, and the death
of her mother. Longtime NAACP member and dedicated civil rights activist Rev. I.
DeQuincy Newman replaced Simkins.304
The NAACP continued to actively engage teachers. In March of 1959, the South
Carolina NAACP received a $400.00 loan to help fund their “Teacher Mailing campaign”
which they hoped would help with membership and funding.305 They mailed 8,000 letter
to South Carolina’s black teachers ahead of the Palmetto Education Association’s annual
convention, asking teachers to support the NAACP. The Field Secretary followed up
these letters during the convention with an art exhibit, a booth where they handed out free
literature, and welcome signs at nine public locations where teachers were known to
visit.306
As the nation entered into a new decade that brought about some of the most
striking moments of social unrest, the SC NAACP Conference of Branch’s new
president, I. DeQuincy Newman, wrote John Morsell in the national office regarding the
continued hardships Elloree’s black citizens faced due to a “systematic program of
economic pressure foisted against Negroes who have been a part of school desegregation
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and NAACP activity” in the area.307 To make matters worse, a recent hurricane had
devastated the largely agricultural economy. The combination of no crops because of the
hurricane, and the inability to receive credit due to economic reprisals meant that “hunger
and general want” was a more than likely outcome.308 In this case, the national NAACP
responded by calling an emergency conference in their office and sending $1,000 to
South Carolina. Morsell told Newman that the NAACP had a similar fund in Mississippi,
and advised Newman to model this South Carolina fund the same way their Mississippi
administrator, Medgar Evers, did.309
Ultimately, the plight of Elloree and its teachers proved that the subjects of Doddy
& Edwards study were right to fear that integration could negatively impact black
teachers. The mere threat of integration turned out to be enough to displace them.
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CHAPTER 5: “WE FIGURED YOU’D CAUSE TROUBLE:” GLORIA RACKLEY
AND THE 1960S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
On August 5, 1956, almost three months after the Elloree Training School’s
teachers were effectively dismissed from their positions, educator Gloria Rackley
received her Master of Science degree during South Carolina State University’s summer
convocation. Speaking on the subject of “The Responsibility of the Individual in a
Democracy,” Dr. R. B. Atwood, Kentucky State University at Frankfort’s president and
the day’s commencement speaker, congratulated the 101 degree candidates, and told
them that their contemporaries were in great need of responsible leadership.1 Rackley,
already a young wife and mother, seemed to take Dr. Atwood’s words to heart. Over the
next decade she emerged as one of the most committed and prominent members of the
Orangeburg civil rights movement. Her roles as mother, teacher, and NAACP member
converged to make her a charismatic leader and sympathetic activist. Drawing upon the
NAACP papers, court documents, oral histories, and newspaper and magazine articles,
this chapter uses Rackley’s life as a lens to examine the 1960s black civil rights
movement on the local and national level.
Born in the “comfortable town” of Little Rock, South Carolina, on March 11,
1927, Gloria Blackwell Rackley became one of Orangeburg’s most prominent civil rights
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activists during the early 1960s.2 That activism was largely framed by her family’s
background. She inherited a deep relationship to the church from her grandfather, a
Methodist minister. Rackley took on leadership roles within the church from an early age;
she attended national and international Methodist youth meetings, and she served as
president of the Methodist Youth Fellowship for South Carolina. That spirituality carried
into her adulthood when she obtained her bachelor’s degree in 1953 from Claflin, a
Methodist college, and joined Trinity United Methodist Church—which served as the
local movement’s unofficial headquarters—in Orangeburg.3
Rackley’s mother, Lurline Olivia Thomas Blackwell, and father, Benjamin
Harrison Blackwell, played pivotal roles in their small town community.4 Benjamin
Blackwell was the only barber in the area, and Mrs. Blackwell was “the teacher, with a
capital T-H-E.”5 Rackley’s father, an active NAACP member, began taking her to
meetings in Columbia where she became familiar with the state’s most well-known civil
rights leaders—people such as Modjeska Simkins, James Hinton, Levi Byrd, and S. J.
McDonald. She even began collecting NAACP memberships as a child. But she based
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her transition from teacher, mother, and wife to full-fledged activist on her mother’s
example.6 She remembered,
You know, there was really no big transition. My mother
was always a community serving person. She was a
teacher. And she was the teacher in the community. People
came to her for all kinds of things.7
Although Mrs. Blackwell did not engage in the same type of activism as she did,
Rackley’s words demonstrated that for her, the connection between teaching and activism
was not particularly exceptional. For Rackley and other teacher-activists activism served
as another type of community work—an extension of their daily work in the classroom.
This perspective would become pivotal as Gloria Rackley became increasingly active in
Orangeburg’s 1960s civil rights movement.
The 1960s civil rights movement’s birth is typically tied to February 1, 1960,
when four Greensboro, North Carolina, college students sat down at an all-white
Woolworth’s lunch counter, asked for service, and were denied. This moment of directaction protest then sparked a youth-led movement that spread across the South. But in
South Carolina, this youth-led movement began in 1950s Orangeburg, and was marked
by a protest on New Year’s Day in 1960. The incidents surrounding that January 1st
protest began in October 1959, in Greeneville, South Carolina, where baseball legend
Jackie Robinson was a speaker at the annual NAACP State Conference. Gloster B.
Current, who also attended the conference, and a few other locals, arrived at the
Greeneville airport on Sunday morning, October 18 and sat down in the whites-only
waiting room while they waited for Robinson’s plane to arrive. They were told to leave.
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They refused and were threatened with arrest. Current and the others insisted that they
had every right to be there. Robinson’s flight arrived, and they left without further
incident. When Robinson came back to that same airport for his departure the following
Sunday, October 25, they received the same treatment. Current and a few others sat
down in the whites only waiting room. The manager arrived and told all of them,
Robinson included, that they could not sit in that area. He told an officer to arrest the
group if they refused to move. Current and Robinson reminded the manager that they
were interstate travellers, and therefore under the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Current also told them that he had no problem going to jail. But he later
noted that they “made no attempt to prolong the discussion,” and “remained standing in
that area which was forbidden to colored passengers.” Current and Robinson were able
to board the plane and leave.8
As of November, neither the airport nor the airline had made any effort to rectify
the situation. Responding to comments from Herbert Harris, Eastern Air Line’s public
relations manager, that he had not heard of the incident, Robinson wrote that he was
“amazed.” It was “inconceivable” that the company’s public relations department had no
information. Robinson was further unsatisfied with Harris’ assertion that he was merely
the airport’s “tenant.” To Robinson, it was Harris’ job to ensure all the airline’s
passengers received fair treatment.9
By the end of the year, local black residents wanted full desegregation of the
airport’s waiting rooms. On January 1, 1960, African Americans gathered at Springfield
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Baptist in Greeneville where they prayed, and listed to over a dozen speakers. Three
hundred African Americans proceeded to the Greenville airport through the “chilling
rain, snow and sleet.”10 Traditionally observed as Emancipation Day, it was the ideal day
to stage their “protest pilgrimage.” Once there, 265 people entered the facilities, but the
manager cited fire safety regulations and prevented any more protestors entrance. The
protestors proceeded to gather in front of the building and sing hymns, while a fifteen
person delegation went inside and presented a resolution calling for the end of racial
discrimination and segregation in South Carolina. 11 Rev. M. D. McCollum—the
Orangeburg NAACP branch president whose 1950s activism resulted in severe reprisals,
including his wife’s dismissal as an elementary school principal—was the one who read
the resolution.12 McCollum’s presence demonstrates that Orangeburg activists were
leaders both on the local and state level, and that they believed their well-being was
interconnected with all black Carolinians’ plight.
The following two years placed Orangeburg’s college and high school students at
the forefront of the youth-led 1960s movement. Gloria Rackley, a schoolteacher, mother
to two teenage daughters, and NAACP Youth chapter organizer, would find that the
many hats she wore often placed her at the center of these struggles.
The early 1960s witnessed a seemingly unstoppable student movement. The
home of two black colleges, several black public schools, and a historically politically
engaged black population, Orangeburg turned into a hotbed of activism. Students from
South Carolina State and Claflin colleges began consistently staging direct-action protests
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in March 1960. On March 2, approximately 400 students marched through downtown
Orangeburg.13 Their walk was slow and silent, but their signs with slogans such as
“Segregation is Dead,” and “We Want Liberty,” voiced their discontent.14
Of course, South Carolina’s student movement was not an exclusively
Orangeburg phenomenon. In Columbia, Benedict College and Allen University students
were planning a march to the State House when Governor Hollings went out of his way
to thwart their plans. He announced that their protest, which would include saying a
prayer and singing freedom songs, would not be tolerated. The attorney general’s office
backed up Hollings’ threat when it confirmed that law enforcement had the authority to
arrest demonstrators.15 Although these threats were directed towards the Benedict and
Allen students, it set the tone for how state and law enforcement officials would react to
the direct-action protests of the coming years.

Mass demonstrations were now

guaranteed to result in mass arrests.
On March 15, 1960, between 350 and 450 students were arrested in Orangeburg.
The arrest came after 1,000 college students from nearby South Carolina State and
Claflin colleges marched to downtown. Local authorities were somehow alerted to the
students’ plans because state police, sheriff’s deputies, and the fire department were there
to boost the local police force. They used fire hoses and tear gas to break up the
demonstration. The sheer number of young men and women meant that Orangeburg’s
jail, with a capacity of fifty-eight, was insufficient. So the students were herded, like
animals, into a nearby stockade where they waited in forty degree weather and sang
13
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songs—like “God Bless America” and “The Star Spangled Banner”—that simultaneously
demonstrated a love for their country and asserted their right to full citizenship. After
waiting in the stockade for hours, the students were released on $10 surety bonds posted
by local black businessmen and NAACP members.16
March 15 witnessed protests activities across the state. In Rock Hill seventy
black college students from nearby Friendship Junior College were arrested after
picketing at City Hall against segregated lunch counters. Five to nine students from
Benedict and Allen colleges were arrested in Columbia. In Sumter, Morris College
students were able to avoid arrest after singing on the steps of the Sumter County
Courthouse.17
The March 15 protests and subsequent arrest were part of a much larger
collaborative effort across the South to confront racial segregation. March also witnessed
seventy-seven African Americans arrested in Atlanta, seventy FAMU students arrested in
Tallahassee, three out of seventy protesting Savannah State College students were
arrested in Savannah, and one hundred twenty Wake Forrest College faculty members
signed a petition asking the local Woolworth’s to serve all customers regardless of race
after the manager signed trespass warrants against twenty-two in-store demonstrators.18
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But, the largest number of arrests took place in Orangeburg, demonstrating the important
role local activists played in the national movement.
Orangeburg’s African American college students continued to engage in directaction protests that coincided with protests across the state and the South. On July 21,
1960 sit-ins were staged in Columbia, Greenville, and Orangeburg. On February 11,
1961 ten people in Orangeburg were arrested and jailed during a lunch counter sit-in
while African Americans in Sumter passed out handbills encouraging people to boycott
city buses.19
The youth-centered movement of the 1960s was mostly comprised of black
students, but there were a few white students who also got involved. Orangeburg police
detained two young men from Wofford College’s (located in Spartanburg, South
Carolina) all white student body in May of 1961. The two students, Daniel Reed Lewis
and Scott Barnes Goeway travelled to Orangeburg and participated in anti-segregation
protests alongside local blacks. Their plight demonstrated that the audacity to so blatantly
disregard the South’s long-held social mores came with consequences and that whiteness
could not protect you. For after their detainment they returned to college to find a student
body enraged by their actions. Clearly inspired by the Ku Klux Klan, a group of 200
Wofford students dressed themselves in white bed sheets, burned Lewis and Goeway in
effigy, and then set fire to a wooden cross.20 Despite their obvious visual references to
the KKK, one student insisted that they were not “protesting against their beliefs.”
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Instead they “just don’t like the way they’re dragging down the name of Wofford College
with them.”21 And while the college’s administration declined to say exactly what
happened, it was pretty clear that they did not support the students. Within days, Lewis
and Goeway were no longer enrolled in school.22
The seemingly non-stop student activism of the early 1960s positioned South
Carolina’s black civil rights attorneys to contest the arrests and imprisonment on a large
scale. On August 5, 1961, the Pittsburgh Courier reported that a group of thirteen
African American lawyers, with Matthew J. Perry at their helm, were preparing 900 civil
rights cases to go before the State Supreme Court. The cases included people involved in
protests throughout the state including Charleston (24 people), Columbia (209),
Darlington (4), Greenville (52), Florence (59), Spartanburg (2), Rock Hill (105), and
Sumter (26). But by far the largest number of cases came from Orangeburg, which
boasted five hundred individual protestors. Indeed, by May the following year, nine of
these cases were slated to go before the South Carolina Supreme Court. Considering the
sheer number of Orangeburg activist, it was unsurprising that eight of the cases originated
in the small urban town. The other case involved high school students from Florence.
Perry and his committee of civil rights attorneys planned to argue that: the arrest warrants
were vague, they did not have the opportunity to question jury members before they were
chosen, prosecutors did not prove that the students broke any laws or intended to incite a
riot, and police powers were used to deprive the students of their constitutional rights of
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freedom of speech and to petition government officials.23

In one of the Orangeburg

cases, the state Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, and remanded it back
to the lower court for re-trial. Unfortunately for the young activists, the State Supreme
Court upheld the lower court’s decision in the seven other Orangeburg cases, arguing that
because the previous demonstrations had resulted in “very high tension” the subsequent
protests amounted to disturbing the peace and inciting violence.24
As Perry’s role in these court cases demonstrates, despite the fact that the 1960s
boasted a decidedly youth-led social movement, the young activists were able to garner
some of the old guard’s support. In fact, many adults made unequivocally positive public
statements regarding student activism.

For instance, in response to the Rock Hill

students’ activism, local minister Rev. C. A. Ivory was quoted as saying, “We are 100 per
cent in favor of the movement.” He believed the students needed “adult assistance,
morally, spiritually and perhaps financially.”25 Additionally, when over 400 Orangeburg
student activists were arrested in March 1960, the NAACP quickly denounced the state’s
“storm trooper” actions. The NAACP asserted that instead of using state power to
compromise students’ freedoms of speech, peaceful assembly, and right to petition the
government, Gov. Hollings and other leaders should be using the state’s police power to
persuade more businesses to serve all patrons regardless of race. In some ways, the state
NAACP began to emulate the students’ efforts. In December, 1960, Rev. I. DeQuincey
Newman, NAACP field secretary, announced the NAACP’s Christmas shopping
campaign to boycott stores that did not serve African American patrons at their lunch
23
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counters. Indeed, Roy Wilkins said that the NAACP was proud of the students, and
credited the 1960 Orangeburg mass arrests for sparking the association’s boycott of stores
that practiced racial discrimination. Perhaps hoping that the students’ energetic activism
would energize its own base, the NAACP even hired a Claflin student who had served as
a leader in the well-known Orangeburg demonstrations.26
But not all of South Carolina’s old guard welcomed the students’ tactics. As one
North Carolina student, Laureiette Williams recalled, “Our adults are too worried about
security to do anything. They are too afraid of their jobs. We’ve got to do it. And we’re
not afraid.”27 Rev. David H. Sims, a former Allen University president, seemed to agree
with Williams when he praised student efforts to end segregation and criticized black
adults for “selling out” and focusing too heavily on social life rather than political
issues.28 Yet, while Williams was correct in her assertion that many African Americans
feared activism’s economic repercussions, a closer look at what these adults said
demonstrates that their disapproval was nuanced and grounded in their lived experiences.
John McCray—African American intellectual, and the well-known editor of South
Carolina’s black newspaper, the Lighthouse & Informer—seemed to believe that while
the students’ protests were orderly and well-orchestrated, they were trampling on whites’
rights when they “grab all available seats at a store counter for his race while decrying the
same thing when it is reversed.” McCray believed the students were “mostly sincere,” but
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that they were being exploited by groups who claimed to raise money to assist the
students in “a heartless and cold scheme,” to defraud African American adults of their
money. McCray, who had been a voice for racial advancement since the 1940s, believed
that the methods, which brought equal pay for teachers, and desegregation in the
Democratic primary, had been “serviceable in the earlier years” and were still serviceable
in the 1960s.

According to McCray, the students “made their point and collected

answers.”29 It was time to let the “city officials, the store operators and the real and
responsible community leaders within the two races” finish this conversation so that they
could come to some sort of resolution.30 Still, when news came that over twenty South
Carolina State students would be expelled for their role in protests, McCray wrote Gov.
Hollings and Bruce W. White, chairman of the college’s board of trustees, urging them
not to punish the students for using their “constitutionally guaranteed rights of protest
against customs and policies they believe illegal and inhumane.”31 Any punitive efforts
taken against the students would be viewed as “vengeful and partisan and depriving one
body of students . . . of the right to express themselves on the issue.” Furthermore,
although McCray and other African Americans may not have agreed with the students’
tactics, they stood together in their opinion that racial segregation was wrong and had to
end.32
Particularly important for the purposes of this study were black teachers’
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reactions to student activism in the 1960s. The job loss teacher-activists had experienced
over the previous decades prevented many black teachers from openly assuming the
activist role of someone like Gloria Rackley. But that did not mean they saw themselves
as having no role to play in the desegregation movement. As Dr. Stephen J. Wright, Fisk
University president stated during a Palmetto Education Association (PEA) conference, it
was the black teacher’s job to “cleanse the mind of the Negro child of any vestige of
inferiority.”33 Orangeburg’s African American teachers seemed to agree with Wright’s
sentiments. In December of 1960, the Orangeburg County Teachers’ Association drew
up a resolution affirming their belief “in the fundamental rights of all men, in Christian
brotherhood, and in the inalienable rights of all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution
of the United States of America.”34 The resolution went on to say:
…we as teachers, citizens of the United States of America,
law-abiding citizens of the State of South Carolina,
members of a learned profession, hold that our
responsibility of guiding the learning processes of our
youth toward optimum citizenship in a democratic society
is inseparable to our responsibility as citizens in our
community . . . We believe that the students of South
Carolina State and Claflin Colleges are to be commended
for their passive, orderly demonstrations for first class
citizenship. We believe that the brutal attacks and
incarcerations which have accompanied these peaceful
demonstrations in Orangeburg are to be deplored.35
The statement—both in open support of the college students and in defiance of state and
city leaders who saw fit to arrest and jail them—was sent to local and national news
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outlets, the PEA, and the National Education Association. 36 Local segregationists
challenged the resolution’s authenticity. Richard Rhame, a local broadcaster, announced
that the Orangeburg Teacher Association president, Lee M. Tyler, denied that the
resolution had the teachers’ unanimous approval. As evidence, he pointed to the fact that
the resolution bore no signatures. It was only signed, “Members of the Orangeburg
County Teachers’ Association.”37 But Rhame’s assertions may not have been entirely
true. After all, it was quite likely that teachers chose not to sign their names out of a very
realistic fear that they would be dismissed from their jobs. Nonetheless, two teachers
requested and were given the opportunity to reply, on-air, to the Rhame-Tyler accusation.
One person was Wilkinson High School teacher Napoleon Ford. The other person was
Whittaker Elementary School teacher Gloria Rackley.38 She recalled that being on the
radio gave her “some kind of notoriety.”39 It contributed to her reputation as a vocal
activist and made her a target.40
But Rackley’s vibrant activist career was only getting started.

The events that

occurred on, and followed, October 12, 1962, demonstrated how Rackley’s activism
intersected with motherhood and her teaching career. On that day Jamelle, her fourteenyear-old daughter, dislocated her finger during a playground accident and was taken to
the Orangeburg Regional Hospital. Gloria Rackley was teaching her elementary school
class when she was advised that her daughter was at the hospital and was hysterical. She
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arrived at the emergency room right as hospital staff was finishing an X-ray. 41 Told that
Jamelle would receive anesthesia and go in for surgery, she was directed to a waiting
room that was, at best, sub-par. Mrs. Rackley, concerned for her daughter’s physical and
emotional well being was distracted. She remembered:
When they took her away, a nice woman said, “Oh, she
really was hurt” and said nice things. . . and this woman
was white and she said, “now, you can wait over there.”
…And over there was really some Coca Cola crates up
against the wall. . . And so, you know how people get left
and right mixed up? So I just assumed she had got, you
know, her directions mixed up. So I just went on to the
waiting room. And when I got there I was really still
thinking about my daughter, who is so tender. And I was
wondering if I had made a mistake in rearing her because
she’s so fragile and tender. And she was carrying on so
about this finger . . . And I did take the moment, very
seriously, to think about what I might need to do to prepare
Jamelle for life. And I looked up and a man was there at
the door. Well, I really thought it was still about Jamelle.
So I jumped up and rushed to the door. He turned around
and went ahead of me. So, I’m thinking it’s very bad. So I
almost run to keep up with him. And when we get to the
end, to a turn in the corridor, he stops and says, “There’s a
waiting room for you down there.” And that’s the first time
that I’m realizing that I’m being called out of the waiting
room.42
There were African Americans sitting on the crates, but Rackley chose to wait for her
daughter in the main area. One nurse told her that there was a difference between the
waiting rooms for blacks and whites, and was quoted as saying, “we figured you’d cause
trouble.”43 Rackley was threatened with arrest when two policemen were called to the
scene.44 But Jamelle was soon discharged and the two were able to leave without
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incident.45 Once they returned home and “had time to breath” she and the NAACP knew
that they could finally build a viable desegregation case against Orangeburg Regional
Hospital.46 Of course, the NAACP had been committed to desegregation for a long time,
but for Rackley and other local African Americans hospital desegregation was an
essential part of gaining equal access to healthcare. For instance, Rackley recalled that
when Orangeburg African Americans “needed an appendectomy or something, they got it
out of town.” African Americans only went to Orangeburg Regional “if you got sick in
the night.”47 The NAACP had been interested in challenging the hospital’s segregation
policy for some time, but Rackley also recalled that they were met with many problems:
. . . you know, it’s very difficult to get a sick person who’s
still going under the knife, or going back for further
treatment to bring a suit against the hospitals and the
doctors serving them. So, we [the NAACP] couldn’t get
any further than just kind of talking about it.48
So, when the daughter of a staunch activist was taken to the hospital, the Orangeburg
NAACP did, indeed, have a unique opportunity. When the mother and daughter duo
returned two weeks later to have Jamelle’s finger cast removed, Gloria Rackley again
chose to sit in the whites’ waiting room. A doctor told her that they were finished with
Jamelle and she could go see her, but Mrs. Rackley replied that her daughter would be
able to find her in the waiting room. Later, when Jamelle did join her, the Hospital
Director asked why she had not left. Rackley replied that she was waiting for her car.
Upon further refusal to go wait out on the street, a plain-clothes officer came to arrest her
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for “disturbing the business of the hospital.”49 She was taken to jail in the fashion of a
violent criminal. There was a police car escort both in front and behind the plain car she
rode in. She was charged with trespassing.50
The trial that followed gained national media attention and resulted in the first and
only time esteemed civil rights attorney, Matthew Perry, was arrested. On November 11,
1961, Perry was cross-examining Richard Roach, the Orangeburg Regional Hospital
administrator.

The presiding judge, Fred R. Fanning, believed that Perry’s line of

questioning—an attempt to get the administrator to plainly state the hospital’s
segregation policies—was too repetitive and told him to stop.51 Perry, who was trying to
get the administrator to admit that Rackley’s race was the only reason she was accused of
trespassing, insisted that he had a right to build his case around discrimination. Judge
Fanning ordered him to jail for being “disrespectful to the court.”52 Fifteen minutes later,
Perry apologized to Fanning, and in a surprising turn of events Fanning in-turn
apologized for losing his temper and said he understood Perry’s position. He dropped the
charges against Perry, and Rackley’s trespassing case was continued indefinitely. But, of
course, the NAACP was not done with the case. On March 24, 1962, attorneys Matthew
Perry and Lincoln Jenkins filed a suit on behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund against Orangeburg Regional Hospital in Federal District Court. They
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asked the court to enjoin the hospital from practicing racial segregation in waiting rooms
and wards.53
The NAACP envisioned the Rackley v. Board of Trustees case as having a locallevel impact, but also being part of a broader “all-out legal attack against segregated
health facilities.”54 The previous month, the organization filed a suit in Greensboro,
North Carolina’s federal court that challenged racial segregation in hospitals that received
federal funds. They would build the Orangeburg suit on similar grounds and argue that
racial segregation in the hospital violated African Americans’ equal protection of the law
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the hospital received both
federal assistance and funds from local taxes.55 The hospital’s counsel fired back by
asking the court to remove this part of the plaintiffs’ complaint. The defense also wanted
the plaintiffs to formally acknowledge that either the NAACP, or its legal defense wing
was paying Perry and Jenkins’ fees. They further claimed that Gloria Rackley went to
the hospital explicitly so she could be arrested and file a suit. They believed that they had
been gracious by allowing Rackley to wait in the white-only waiting room while the
doctor was seeing Jamelle. Therefore having her arrested was justified because she
continued to sit in the waiting room after her daughter was discharged.56 U.S. District
Judge George Bell Timmerman seemed to agree. He said: “The complaint indicates that
the adult plaintiff had in mind something other than concern of hospital care or treatment
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for her daughter.”57 He threw out the class action part of the case. Perry and Jenkins had
asked that the case be made a class action suit so that the hospital would be prevented
from practicing racial segregation in the future. But according to Timmerman, Gloria
and Jamelle Rackley did not represent other African Americans, only themselves. He
also refused the NAACP’s request for a temporary injunction. Finally, Timmerman
threw out the section of the NAACP’s complaint that noted how much the hospital
received in federal funds.58 Without being able to argue that this was a class action suit
and present evidence that the hospital received federal funds the NAACP would not be
able to effectively argue that segregation violated African Americans’ civil liberties.
Their case was decimated.
Those familiar with Timmerman’s judicial history did not find this decision
surprising. In fact, John McCray positioned Timmerman’s decision within a broader
recent history of South Carolina officials’ efforts to block integration. In an article titled,
“Does Secret Deal Block Integration?” McCray presented evidence that other South
Carolina U.S. District Court judges—Ashton H. Williams and C.C. Wyche—routinely
circumvented rulings that were in favor of black civil rights. For instance, when Bobby
Brunson filed a desegregation suit against Clarendon County District No. 2 in 1960,
Judge Wyche ruled that it was not a class action suit. This was despite the fact that
Brunson’s case was based on the 1954 Brown decision.59 Judge Timmerman’s decision
was only the most recent case. And he, too, had “consistently issued rulings exactly
opposite to civil rights verdicts where Negroes have been concerned the last 10 years, and
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more.”60 Indeed, the language Timmerman used echoed his dismissal of the 1954 Sarah
Mae Flemming city bus desegregation case. 61 Therefore, while the NAACP was
disappointed in Timmerman’s decision, they were also prepared.
Perry had anticipated an unfavorable ruling and already laid the groundwork for
their next step. He quickly appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Perry and
Jenkins were prepared to take their case to the Supreme Court if necessary.
Unsurprisingly, the hospital’s counsel asked the Circuit Court to dismiss the case. The
U.S. Court of Appeals’ opinion was a bit inconclusive. They decided that the appellants’
case was too narrow. They were making an argument for desegregation of the whole
hospital, but only presented evidence on the waiting room. The hospital never admitted
that they practiced segregation, and the NAACP attorneys did not prove it. On the other
hand, the court disagreed with the lower court’s decision to throw out the sections of the
complaint regarding the contribution of federal funds and separate ward/room facilities
for patients. The Circuit Court remanded the case back to the District Court, but ruled
that the class action issue should be reopened during the permanent injunction trial.62
The hospital case was not over, but the lower court’s final decision was still some years
away.
In the mean time, Rackley’s activism did not subside. Soon after the she and the
NAACP filed suit against the hospital, Rackley was jailed by the same judge, Fred. R.
Fanning, who had jailed attorney Matthew Perry. Rackley arrived at the Orangeburg
60
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court to serve as a witness in a traffic case when she was directed to sit “in what can be
called the colored side” of the courtroom. When she asked why she had to sit in the
section she was told that it was the judge’s orders. She refused and two officers came
and put her in what she described as “an indescribably dirty cell.”63 She was not charged
with anything, but was forced to remain in the cell for thirty minutes until it was time for
her to take the stand.64 Yet, these types of courthouse incidents were not new for Rackley
or her daughters.

Her third grade students told her that when their mothers went

shopping downtown, there was no restroom for them to use. They had to use a toilet
located under the courthouse. But, as Rackley recalled, “I never saw that.” Her younger
daughter, Lurma Rackley, agreed. She said, “We went to the white bathroom at the
courthouse, and got arrested for it.”65 Still, she filed a complaint with the South Carolina
Committee on Civil Rights.66
It is worth nothing that Rackley was not only upset that her civil rights were
violated and she had to spend time in a jail cell. Indeed, by this time locals were well
aware that this was a likely result to challenging segregation. Rackley was incensed that
any human being would be expected to stay in such a dirty cell.67 Rev. I. DeQuincey
Newman read her complaint to the biracial committee who agreed to send it on to the
Federal Civil Rights Commission in Washington, D.C.

One of the committee members,

Rev. Herbert Nelson of Sumter, said that the teacher’s civil rights were “definitely
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abridged.”68 He further said that submitting her complaint to the committee rather than
filing a lawsuit removed her of “the burden of the prosecution,” and was “an alternative
to having the expense of hiring private counsel.”69
Rackley’s brief stint in jail, combined with her and Jamelle’s case against
Orangeburg Regional Hospital, elicited sympathy. One person’s letter to Congressman
H. Allen Smith helps elucidate why Rackley’s story was able to elicit so much public
sympathy, “Mrs. Rackley is a lovely young mother of two daughters; she is quiet and
well-mannered, but not one to be pushed around.”70 Many people in the community
quickly came to her aid and defense. A mass meeting was scheduled at her church,
Trinity United Methodist, to address the incident.71 So many people wrote letters to their
elected officials that Robert Kenney’s office asked her to visit their Washington, D.C.
office. Furthermore, Rackley’s teaching contract, which her activism compromised, was
renewed for the following year.72 For some this signaled definite, if too limited progress.
Mrs. Rackley has been awarded her teaching contract for
next year. It was long past due and there was talk of
carrying an organized protest through channels. Her finally
receiving this contract is a long cry from the many
dismissals of a few years ago merely for belonging to the
NAACP for signing a petition. So—even South Carolina is
moving ahead.73
The fact that this writer connected Rackley’s job security, or lack thereof, to the events
surrounding the anti-NAACP oath demonstrates that the black civil rights movement may
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have been undergoing changes, but local people still saw it as the same movement, with
many of the same risks and objectives.
1960-1962 witnessed vibrant moments of civil rights activism in Orangeburg, and
throughout South Carolina and the entire South. But 1963 was easily one of the most
active and significant years of the Orangeburg movement. That year, Mrs. Rackley read
the Emancipation Proclamation during a January 2 NAACP sponsored meeting of about
600 African Americans at Allen University.74 Rackley was the perfect choice to read the
Emancipation Proclamation that day. The wife and mother of two was not only an
emboldened activists and sympathetic victim of segregation, but one paper later referred
to her as the “coordinator of the Orangeburg 1963 Freedom Movement.”75 1963 was a
pivotal year for the civil rights movement in Orangeburg and throughout the state. Even
Governor Ernest Hollings—the very governor who paved the path for peaceful
demonstrators to be arrested—admitted during his farewell address to the legislature in
1963 that if the state did not proceed with desegregation it would cause “irreparable
harm.” South Carolina and Mississippi were the only two remaining southern states to
have no school integration for, as Hollings noted, “We have all argued that the supreme
court decision of May 1954 is not the law of the land, but everyone must agree it is the
fact of the land.”76 With even conservative white politicians acknowledging that the
state’s education landscape must change 1963 would prove to be a year of dynamic,
stalwart, non-stop activism.
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Gloria Rackley often found herself in the eye of that storm.

Towards the

beginning of the year, Orangeburg student activists received some positive news. The
Supreme Court ordered the lower court to reconsider the breach of the peace convictions
of 373 student protestors. Perhaps this emboldened the student activists, because they
only ratcheted up their protests. On Saturday, August 24 fourteen African Americans
were arrested during two lunch counter sit-ins in downtown Orangeburg. Six of the
fourteen were turned over to the juvenile authorities, but the other eight were charged
with trespassing and placed in the city jail. Fred Fanning convicted the eight jailed
protestors of trespassing, and sentenced them to $100 fines or thirty days in jail. None of
the students posted bond, so all eight were transferred to a county chain gang. In
reaction, sixty-five African Americans, mostly teenagers, marched to the Orangeburg
mayor’s office in protest. A four-person delegation went inside to speak with the mayor.
But he was allegedly out of town, and the city administrator later pretended ignorance
when asked about the meeting. One of the eight was later released after friends and
family posted his bond, but the other seven remained on the Orangeburg County Chain
Gang.77
But the chain gang sentence did not effectively dampen the Orangeburg
movement. Hundreds of arrests were made in the following month of September. On
Saturday, September 28, 175 people were arrested as 250-300 protestors marched around
downtown Orangeburg. The group—singing, chanting, and clapping—marched singlefile in in the pouring rain. City and state officials behaved as if they were in a state of
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emergency. State Highway Patrol, Orangeburg County deputies, SLED agents, and fire
personnel (along with their fire hoses), were all on hand to assist the Orangeburg police.
When the protestors were instructed to disperse, some began to leave. Those that did not,
between 162 and 174 people, were arrested. The NAACP filed a report with the FBI for
police brutality during the arrest.78
The Orangeburg demonstrations, and the arrests, continued.

On Monday,

September 30, 333 people were arrested during a protest for equal job opportunities.
Some of the older men were placed in the county jail, and 120 women and youth were
transported to the State Penitentiary in Columbia. However, as with earlier mass arrests,
the majority of the group was placed in a stockade style area while awaiting processing.
The next day, October 1, 189 more arrests were made in Orangeburg. Most of those
arrested were South Carolina State and Claflin College students, but there were also some
high school students. The majority of the protestors were headed to downtown, but about
twelve were arrested while actively trying to desegregate all-white restaurants.79 Police
Captain M.W. Whetstone alleged that the march “could have very easily become a fullscale riot.” He remarked, “It looks like these people are determined.”80 And, indeed,
they were. With the October 1st arrests, more than 1,000 local blacks had been arrested
over the past four days.81
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Even with the massive number of arrests, the local movement continued to
escalate. Clearly concerned, local white officials attempted to halt the protests. City
officials met with movement leaders in a purported attempt to ease tensions. However,
their efforts probably seemed insincere since the same officials also threatened to
immediately arrest any protestors. Surely local whites felt support from Governor Donald
Russell who warned “disorder would not be tolerated.”82

In reaction to the growing

movement, the City Council met and passed two resolutions. The first resolution said
that they were willing to meet with “responsible leadership.” The second resolution said
that the city would maintain order “under any and all circumstances.” 83

In what

movement leaders described as “exploratory talks,” the city offered to drop its charges
against protestors if the black community agreed to halt all protests for ninety days.84 But
the movement’s leaders were unwilling to halt their work and were “ready to fill the
jails.”85
The city’s protests ban had no effect on the movement. On the next day, October
4, three hundred and eighteen more arrests were made while protestors marched towards
Orangeburg’s business district. 86

On Saturday, October 5, eighty-five African

Americans, in what was considered “the smallest protest march of the current wave of
racial demonstrations,” started a march to downtown Orangeburg while a smaller group
took a different route. 87

Twenty-eight people, including ministers and college

professors, were arrested. That Monday, October 7, the city council took further action
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and approved a bill that required picketers to register with the police department. Yet the
protests continued. That same evening one hundred college students were arrested during
an anti-segregation demonstration and were placed in the stockade.88
Throughout the public protests, the Orangeburg Movement continued to boycott
white businesses with segregated lunch counters and those that refused to hire African
Americans in their stores. They presented a ten-point list of demands for desegregation
of public facilities and for equal job opportunities. But the Orangeburg Merchant’s
Association publically dismissed all ten of the demands. This was despite the fact that
white business leaders acknowledged that the boycott had negatively affected their
profits.89 As the state’s foremost newspaper noted:
Business is disrupted. The schools are disrupted. The city
administration is disrupted. The Negro community is
disrupted. And the state’s law enforcement officers are
disrupted.90
Orangeburg’s black and white communities were, essentially, at a stalemate. And, for
their part, black activists showed no interest in conceding. In fact, they had a bit of a
victory when, on October 21 the Supreme Court overturned the 1960 convictions of 373
Orangeburg student protestors.

After the State Supreme Court twice affirmed the

students’ convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions and ruled that
they violated the students’ right to peacefully protest. 91 The state NAACP heralded the
Supreme Court decision as proof that the students had a right to protest racial segregation
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and discrimination.92 The Chicago Defender, a black newspaper that reported on the
Orangeburg events, eloquently vocalized how people involved in movement felt:
The action of the Supreme Court . . . should clear the air
once and for all of the mist that had settled over the right to
peaceful demonstrations. . . The Southern segregationist
have been engaged long ago in the despicable act of trying
to preserve their mores under the protective mantle of their
own unjust laws. . . Let the segregationists everywhere,
including Chicago, beware!93
The Orangeburg movement had not shown any sign of slowing down. Validation from
the highest court in the land would only give them more incentive to continue their
efforts.
In the midst of so much student activism, it would be easy to lose sight of adult
participation and leadership in the movement. Certainly, the movement was changing
shape. But it is important to remember that Orangeburg’s black college students were
already a decade into their student movement. And in a city with two black universities,
a “highly influential Negro leadership,” and where African Americans made up sixty
percent of the population adult-youth cooperation may have been closer to the norm than
the exception.94 For her part, Rackley continued to be an activist throughout this year of
lively activism, and became only more well-known for it. In fact, her activism seemed to
crescendo at the same point as the college students’. It was that increased activism that
eventually led to Rackley’s dismissal from her teaching position. The first hint that her
activism could cause problems came in the 1962-3 school year when the school
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superintendent, H. A. Marshall, chose not to send her reappointment letter until he could
have a meeting with her. Marshall told her that the episode at Orangeburg Regional
Hospital was “embarrassing to the school system and particularly to our profession,” but
the next day she received her employment letter and was able to return to her job.95 But
the meeting likely did not have its intended effect. Rackley’s activism did not lessen. In
fact, she filed her case against the hospital only two weeks later. So the following year,
on October 7, 1963, Superintendent Marshall called her to his office for another meeting.
But this time it was to explain that she was being dismissed from her teaching duties
effective immediately, and he would recommend to the board that they take the same
actions. He then gave Rackley a letter he wrote that unequivocally placed her activism as
the foremost, indeed sole reason for her dismissal. 96 The letter concluded with:
It would appear that you have become so rabid in your
desire for social reform that you are advocating breaking
the law as a means of calling attention to what you consider
your grievances. A teacher in the public schools cannot
advocate lawlessness without destroying her usefulness in
teaching young people.97
The fact that the multiple arrests he outlined resulted from peaceful, lawful protests was,
to someone like Superintendent Marshall, not the point. Her leadership in and open
support of the NAACP and its goals made her an enemy to a state and city that was
stalwart in its efforts to protect racial segregation.
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demonstrated, Rackley was unwilling to simply accept Marshall’s decision without a
fight. She informed him that she would request a hearing before the Board of Trustees.98
In a testament to her role as a teacher and activist, Rackley quickly garnered
community support. The following day, October 8, teachers and students at all seven
black schools in the area formed picket lines that morning outside their schools. Jamelle
Rackley, Mrs. Rackley’s teenage daughter, was among them. She and the rest of the
students and teachers effectively shut the schools down for the day because
Superintendent Marshall ordered them closed. As a result of the pickets, thirty-seven
black youths were arrested and placed in jail overnight. But even that was not sufficient
to dampen their activism. That afternoon, a protest parade was organized as boycotting
students began marching to downtown. Youth activists carried signs that said “Save Mrs.
Rackley.” About fifty-seven juveniles were arrested and taken to jail. The first-time
offenders, about twenty children, were released. The other children had records due their
participation in previous protests, and were forced to stay in jail overnight.99 While
protests were often the purview of college students and adults, Rev. I. DeQuincey
Newman, NAACP field secretary, asserted that the school boycott was “the desire of the
students.”100 He and the NAACP supported the students, but hoped that the situation
would be resolved soon. Classes did resume the following day, but attendance was low
as approximately seventy-five percent of students continued to boycott classes because of
Rackley’s dismissal. For their part, African American teachers decided, in a 62-18 vote
to observe the picket lines, but when they returned to school on Wednesday there were no
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pickets outside the schools so they returned to work.

Robert E. Howard, the African

American school supervisor, said he expected most students to return to classes by the
end of the week. One African American woman, Lizzie Matthews, was arrested for her
alleged role in organizing the pickets, and charged with the delinquency of a minor.101
Mrs. Rackley said that she would “do everything possible” to keep her teaching
position. On Monday, October 14, the board permitted her to make a statement, but they
demonstrated no interest in her case. They neither asked nor allowed her to ask any
questions regarding her dismissal. Superintendent Marshall was also allowed to testify,
and gave previously unmentioned reasons for his decision to fire her. Marshall testified
that she had left three teacher workshops, without previously obtaining permission, in
order to attend civil rights meetings. The insinuation was that she neglected her duties as
a teacher, and that her activism was directly responsible for that neglect.102
In direct contradiction to his words, that night Mrs. Rackley encouraged students
to return to their classes. The following day, October 15, attendance doubled. A few
days later, she received special recognition during the state NAACP’s annual conference,
and Rev. Newman confirmed that the NAACP intended to bring a suit against the school
board to have Rackley’s teaching position reinstated. In the meantime, Rackley became a
professional activist. The SC NAACP created a third vice president position, which she
filled. In this role she continued to be a leader in the Orangeburg movement, but also
travelled the state to assist NAACP chapters, and travelled to New York to speak to the
High School of Fashion Industries and the United Federation of Teachers where she sat
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on a panel with noted author James Baldwin, who she remained friends with throughout
the duration of her life.103
The children’s arrest during the school boycott emblemized their past activism
and served as a precursor to what was to come. Rackley, in her new role in the NAACP,
as a mother, and as a member of Orangeburg’s black community was, once again, in the
thick of things. On Wednesday, October 23, police arrested fifty-eight youth who were
marching toward City Hall. Most of them were jailed overnight and then turned over to
their parents. However, those over sixteen were also charged with breach of the peace.
They were arrested for staging a protest, but Rackley insisted that they were actually
walking to City Hall in order to register for permission to picket. The children’s parents
had a meeting the next day. They and the NAACP asserted that the children’s arrest was
illegal and that the children behaved in an orderly manner. They asked Governor Donald
Russell to meet with them and to investigate the case.104 Their accusations against the
police were not simply that their children had been unlawfully arrested, but that they had
been manhandled during their arrest, denied food and water for thirteen hours, and placed
in cells with individuals who were not only “common criminals,” but also adults.105 As a
Rev. J. Herbert Nelson wrote:
We are Tired and Sick [sic] of the intimidation of the
threats of fire hoses, jailing of children under age, locked
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up several to a cell without privilege of seeing their parents
or adults advisors, without food or personal needs.106
It is unclear to this writer whether or not one of Rackley’s daughters was involved in this
particular protest. But it is certain that she would have understood the parents’ anguish.
Her eldest daughter, Jamelle, was still one of the plaintiffs in the ongoing case against
Orangeburg Regional Hospital. Her younger daughter, Lurma, was all too eager to be a
full-fledged activist. Yet as Lurma recalled, black parents had historically limited how
active their children could be in the movement. The children’s increased role was at their
own behest.
We [the teenagers] were all charged, and pumped and ready
to do our part. And, walking around on the campus
[carrying picket signs for the boycott of downtown
Orangeburg] didn’t seem to be significant enough. . . The
parents were involved, and the college students were
involved, and the little children were restricted. . . we were
either restricted to marching on the campus or making a
picket sign in the basement of the church, you know, not to
actually wear the picket sign . . . So finally the movement
broadened to include the younger people in a more
significant role.107
Governor Russell met with the parents that Saturday. According to their spokesperson,
Professor H.D. Smith of Claflin College, the meeting gave the parents received “some
measure of satisfaction.”108 Attorney Matthew Perry was also in attendance. He told the
governor, “your good offices might be used in bringing about the furtherance of the aims
and aspirations of these citizens.”109 Yet, while the meeting with the governor permitted
black parents to be somewhat mollified on this occasion, the fact remained that their
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children’s unlawful arrest and unfair treatment while in police custody was all too
representative of generations of black folk’s experiences in the Palmetto State.

If

continued school segregation was not enough to prove to black Carolinians that their state
did not care about their children, the arrest and abuse of their children certainly did.
Orangeburg’s 1963 civil rights movement garnered the “overwhelming support”
of schoolteachers and college professors.

Their boycott was effective.

During

Christmas, when the downtown area would normally be buzzing with both black and
white shoppers, stores were “piled high with Christmas sales.”110 African Americans
refused to shop there, and a few of the smaller stores had gone out of business. In the
coming years, the Orangeburg Movement (the formal organization founded to manage
the local movement) planned to: continue pickets and other demonstrations, continue
their selective buying campaign, increase voter registration, fight for school
desegregation, and open a black-owned shopping center.111
As black youth’s activism and arrests in 1963—and Lurma Rackley’s words—
demonstrated, young people were eager to be more involved in Orangeburg’s movement.
In 1964, Whitaker and Wilkinson high school students became fully immersed. On
Saturday, February 1, 1964, twenty-six people were arrested while picketing in the city
for the dubious crime of violating a city ordinance of not picketing in a single file line.
The following day, forty-two people staged a march to the county jail where they hoped
to visit their jailed comrades. On the way there, twenty-three additional people were
arrested. The marchers were not able to get inside the jail, so they remained on the front
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lawn where they sang freedom songs. In reaction to yet another spate of arrests, students
at Whitaker Junior High and Wilkinson High boycotted their classes the following day.
But the school boycott quickly quieted. By Wednesday, February 5, attendance started to
go back up.112
On the other hand, Rackley’s hospital case was still ongoing, and was gaining
momentum. Both sides first began making their cases before the U.S. District Court in
1964. The Rackleys and the NAACP were asking the court to rule that the hospital’s
policy of racial segregation was a violation of their Constitutional rights. In their answer,
the hospital’s attorneys essentially alleged that Gloria and Jamelle Rackley were the
NAACP’s puppets. The NAACP was paying their legal fees and was the real party of
interest. But the court saw differently. In his opinion Judge Simons found that Mrs.
Rackley and her daughter were, in fact, the real party of interest, and that whether or not
the NAACP was paying their fees was irrelevant. The plaintiffs were not required to
answer any inquiries regarding counsel fees or NAACP membership. Moreover, the
plaintiffs would be allowed to provoke the defense to answer questions regarding whether
or not they maintained a policy of racial segregation.113
So with the judge’s permission, the NAACP attorneys sought to prove that the
hospital was practicing racial segregation, not only in the waiting room in which Gloria
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and Lurma Rackley staged their two-person sit-in, but throughout the hospital, including
in room assignments. The defense and its witnesses tried to couch their segregation
policy in professional language. Drs. William Whetsell and Vance Brabham, Jr. testified
that room assignments were made according to “professional advice” and what was in the
patient’s best interest.114 But the hospital administrator, Henry Mabry, admitted that
African American patients were only assigned to the hospital’s south wing. Dr. Whetsell
attempted to defend the hospital’s room policy by arguing that patients were “better
treated, better satisfied, and the nurses could do a better job” in segregated
accommodations.115 Dr. Brabham echoed this statement when he testified that segregated
rooms were important to patients’ recovery process. He said, “It’s best for the hospital,
and best for the patient, white or Negro, to get them in this environment.”116
When the case finally concluded in February 1965, Gloria Rackley and her
daughters were residing in Virginia where she had acquired another teaching position.
The defense argued that because neither Rackley nor her husband, L. G. Rackley, still
lived in South Carolina, the plaintiffs had no right to sue them because the hospital’s
mission was to serve Orangeburg County residents. But as Chief Judge Robert Hemphill
acknowledged in his opinion, Rackley was an Orangeburg resident when the issues
surrounding the case took place, and she still maintained a home on Whittaker Parkway
in Orangeburg. As to whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to permanent injunction,
Judge Hemphill decided that there was “an overabundance of evidence” that they were.117
The defense’s own witnesses proved that the hospital practiced segregation. He also
114

“Staff Physicians Defend Hospital’s Room Policies,” The State, 1 December 1964.
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Rackley and Rackley v. Board of Trustees (1965).
115

268

agreed with the plaintiffs regarding the importance of how the hospital was funded.
Hemphill did not dismiss the doctors’ claims that there were “sound medical reasons” to
practice segregation in a hospital since “psychological factors are important to all
citizens.” 118 But that did not change the fact that the hospital was operating as a
governmental office or agency. It was, by this point, a well-established fact that it was
illegal for such entities to practice racial segregation.119 The court ruled in the plaintiffs’
favor, but gave the defense time to adjust to the “drastic change.”120 The hospital was
ordered to file a plan with the court within sixty days and to have it fully implemented
forty-five days after that. If the hospital did not file a plan with the court within that sixty
day time period, Judge Hemphill said that he would have no choice but to implement an
integration plan without the hospital’s input.121
The Orangeburg hospital case was significant because it was the first one filed
against a South Carolina hospital. One month after Judge Hemphill handed down his
decision, the hospital filed notice that they were appealing to the U.S. Court of
Appeals.122 In April, they proceeded to submit a desegregation plan. The plan outlined a
six-point checklist for deciding patients’ bed assignments:
1. Availability of beds and rooms
2. Consideration of effect on other patients (contagious
disease cases, mentally disturbed cases, burns, critically
ill, etc.)
3. Economic condition of the patient.
4. Type of treatment to be rendered.
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5. Availability of a trained nursing staff for the particular
type of illness.
6. Availability of special equipment…123
But the plan still left room for the hospital to make prejudiced choices. Staff members
would still be able to assign beds based on what they thought was in the best interest of
all the patients. It also allowed patients to be moved if they or their doctors had a
problem with them being in a room or ward with someone else.124 In short, the hospital’s
plan would allow the hospital to continue racial segregation without openly admitting that
that is what they were doing. Hemphill’s court approved the plan, but the hospital found
themselves in hot water a couple years later. In September 1967 the U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) cut off funding to the hospital for non-compliance
with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The hospital asserted that they were in compliance with
the court-approved desegregation plan originating from the Rackley suit. But Robert M.
Ball, the Social Security commissioner, upheld the decision. The hospital filed suit with
the U.S. District Court where it alleged that the department’s decision was “unlawful,
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the Constitution.”125 The hospital was asking the
court to decide that they were not in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and to require
HEW to reinstate their federal funding.126 The Justice Department also became involved
when in February 1968 they filed suit in a federal court to compel the hospital to finally
desegregate its facilities.127 The Justice Department further asserted that Orangeburg
Regional Hospital practiced racial discrimination in its “medical care, treatment, services
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and training programs.”128 They asked that the court affirm HEW’s decision to cut off
the hospital’s federal funding.129
Similar to black college and high schools students, there were a few black
teachers who also found themselves more deeply involved in the movement.

Two

African American teachers filed suit against their school boards in the U.S. District Court
to be reinstated to their teaching positions. One of those teachers was Gloria Rackley
who, as a NAACP leader and litigant in another case, had already demonstrated a deep
commitment to the movement.

The other teacher was Sampson Williams.

While

Williams was located outside of Orangeburg (in Sumter) her case demonstrates that while
other teachers found themselves dismissed from their teaching jobs, the nature and tactics
of both the black civil rights movement and the white massive resistance movement were
changing. Like Rackley, Williams had performed her work in a satisfactory manner for
the past ten years at Sumter’s Manchester High School, but did not have her contract
renewed. The Rackley and Williams suits alleged that when school officials dismissed
them because of their activism, they were practicing discrimination.

Additionally,

Williams alleged that her dismissal was connected to her efforts to enter her students into
a contest sponsored by a national organization. White students were allowed to enter the
competition, but blacks students were not. The school board denied William’s claim.
Superintendent Dr. Hugh T. Stoddard claimed that Williams was not rehired because she
was absent without official permission. She had acquired permission from her school
principal, but Stoddard asserted that he did not have the authority to grant her an excused
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absence.130 Williams’ activism demonstrated that, as a black teacher, she was unable to
separate her activism for social change from her activism for black educational
advancement. She was just as interested in ensuring her students had the same
opportunities as white children as she was in desegregating a lunch counter. However,
both Rackley and Williams would have to wait another two years for their day in court.
In the mean time, Orangeburg activists remained vigilant.
In 1965 the Orangeburg Movement followed the program it laid out at the close of
1963 and pushed for increased voter registration efforts. 1965 proved to be an ideal time
to pursue black voter registration. On August 6 of that year President Lyndon Johnson
signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Act was one of the most far-reaching pieces
of civil rights legislation for the time period, and perhaps the most significant piece since
the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation decision. Southern
segregationist lawmakers predictably objected to the legislation.

South Carolina’s

governor, Robert E. McNair announced that he intended to challenge the law’s
constitutionality, and asked the state attorney general to “proceed immediately with all
proper legal steps.”131 The Orangeburg Movement’s efforts were met with both victories
and defeats. For instance, 849 African Americans were registered to vote within the span
of three days, but fifty people were arrested during a voter registration protest at the
county courthouse. The sit-in demonstration was in response to what civil rights workers
believed as an intentional delaying tactic on the part of registration officials. The county
had not hired enough registrars to handle the large number of people who wanted to
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practice their right to vote. The allegation was supported by the fact that there were still
seventy African Americans standing in line when the registration books were closed. The
insult was worsened when several white registrants were moved to the front of the line,
while black registrants remained un-served.132 The civil rights workers made police
brutality charges. Indeed, police were photographed carrying at least one demonstrator
out the Orangeburg County Courthouse by his arms and legs.133

Thirty-four of the

protestors were sentenced to thirty days in jail or $50 fines.134
Nonetheless, Rev. H. O. Harvey, leader of the voter registration campaign, was
more than happy with their progress.

“I have no complaints,” he said.135 It was,

according to him, the most people Orangeburg County’s Voter Education Project had
registered in a three-day period since 1960.136 Harvey vocalized disapproval of the sit-in.
He said:
My main object is to have people come to work and get
people registered. We welcome people to come in and
help, as long as they don’t break the law. I don’t go for
that.137
Instead, he advised those that were unable to register to go home and return on the first
Monday in October.138 But perhaps part of Harvey’s unease came from the fact that these
civil rights workers were not all Orangeburg County natives. Those arrested included
twenty-one whites and thirty African Americans, and out of all of those arrested only one
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was eligible to vote.139 Local African Americans like Harvery were certainly eager to
gain full and equal access to the franchise, but they were not necessarily willing to do so
at the risk of losing autonomy of their local movement. Moreover, Harvey’s was from
Elloree. He doubtless had very real memories of the 1950s and how economic reprisals
directed towards a whole community could have disastrous effects.
The Orangeburg Movement also used 1965 as a time to prep for increased school
desegregation efforts. That summer, it found allies in white schoolteachers who were
working with the American Friends Service Committee. Four such teachers worked on a
tutoring project that was preparing 105 African American schoolchildren to apply for
transfer to white schools.140
Perhaps at this point Orangeburg’s citizens found it predictable that Gloria
Rackley was a named litigant in a 1965 civil liberties case. The suit, which sought to
desegregate two local theatres, was filed in August of 1964, but did not go to court until
May of 1965. Rackley was one of four other plaintiffs: C. H. Thomas, Jr., Julie Wright,
Elease Thomas, and Theodore Adams.141 On July 21, 1964 the plaintiffs attempted to
buy theatre tickets for the ground floor section—customarily reserved for whites—of
both the Edisto and Carolina Theatres. They were denied admission at both locations and
were asking the court to enjoin the defendants from practicing segregated admission
policies. The theatre company, Orangeburg Theatres, Inc. asserted that they did not
practice segregation, but they also did not deny the plaintiff’s claims. Instead the current
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owner alleged that the segregation policy existed before they acquired the theatre, and
that they had now discontinued that policy. In fact, on August 31, 1964, the company
adopted a resolution during one of its meetings informing all its employees that all
people, regardless of race, were to be admitted to the theatre without restrictions. Based
on this, they asked the court to dismiss the case. Rackley and the other defendants
expressed that while they were happy with the theatre’s change in policy, they did not
wish for the case to be dismissed. Yet Judge Simons went ahead and dismissed the case,
citing that it was a well-established rule “that an injunction will not issue for the purpose
of punishing past offenses.”142 Rackley and her colleagues had successfully desegregated
the movie theatres, but not in a court of law. There were undoubtedly happy with the
victory, but disappointed that future desegregation petitioners would not have one more
legal case to prove their arguments.
Rackley still needed to settle her suit against her former employer. Likewise,
Irene Williams’ case also needed to be settled. Williams and Rackley’s cases would
prove to be very similar. Williams’ suit against her Sumter school district was decided in
a U.S. District Court in June 1966—a few months before Rackley’s. Williams’ attorneys
wanted a permanent injunction against the school district that would require them to
reinstate Williams’ teaching contract and to continue reissuing it without regard to her
civil rights activities.143 Williams had been teaching at Manchester School for ten years
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when she was dismissed explicitly for her leadership role in the Sumter civil rights
movement.

That she was a dedicated activist was not a point of dispute.

It was

“admitted by all parties that she was vigorous in the promotion of civil rights in and about
Sumter.”144 But also not up for dispute were her abilities as a teacher. Aside from
having a decade of experience at that school, her principal’s description of her as “the
best teacher we had—understanding, sympathetic, very diligent, very cooperative,” made
it very clear that her work in the classroom was above par.145 The defense argued that
Williams’ activism was a sufficient reason to fire her by noting that some of the people
involved in the protest were children between ten and sixteen years old, and that some of
these children went before the Domestic Relations Judge. In short, they were arguing
that she posed a danger to young children.

Echoing Rackley’s school officials, the

Sumter school district also said that Williams was absent from the first teachers’ meeting
during the 1964-65 school year without first obtaining permission. This, unlike the
former topics, was a point of contention because both Williams and her school principal
testified that she obtained permission from him. But school district officials said that his
permission was not sufficient. She needed to gain permission from the Superintendent or
a Supervising Principal. Either way, these issues must not have negatively affected her
performance at work because her principal, Benjamin F. Robinson, recommended she be
rehired for the 1964-65 school year. However, instead of sending her a reappointment
letter, Superintendent Stoddard wrote her a letter advising her that he would like to meet
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with her. During their meeting, he informed her that he would not be recommending her
for reemployment and advised her of her right to appeal. She did so immediately, and
appeared before the Board of Trustees on June 16, 1964 to plead her case. 146
Superintendent Stoddard wrote her the next day and explained that the Board had
considered her case “at considerable length” but had not come to a final decision.147 She
would receive an answer in two weeks.

On June 24, Stoddard informed her that the

Board decided not to intervene in her case. Her dismissal stood.148 When her counsel,
NAACP attorney Ernest Finney, plainly asked the defendants’ counsel, Shepard K. Nash,
why Williams was dismissed he was told “the board doesn’t care to state” the reason.149
And, as Judge Hemphill noted in his opinion, “At no time during the entire proceedings
was (or has she yet been) advised of the reason for refusal of reemployment.”150 Still,
Stoddard’s testimony made the reason for his and the board’s decision clear:
At some time during the fall, on Saturday morning, when I
had gone by the post office to pick up the school mail, I
observed Mrs. Williams picketing some business
establishments on the streets of Sumter, which in my
personal opinion reflect poor professional judgment and did
not dignify the position which she held in the schools in the
eyes of the community.151
Judge Hemphill must not have found this testimony compelling enough, for he noted that
one’s right to freely practice their constitutional rights without fear of reprisal was a
guarantee already decided by the Supreme Court:
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The Constitution for the United States is the written
guarantee of freedom and justice to Americans everywhere.
The United States Supreme Court, in its interpretation of
the Constitution’s application to human rights, or civil
rights, as exposed by trial under common law or effect of
statute, decided and that decision is the Law of the Land
unless changed by proper authority.152
While Judge Hemphill agreed with the defense’s assertion that the court could not create
a contract between Williams and the school district, he was equally emphatic that the
court was “prepared to protect, interpret, insist upon the securing to plaintiff of all of her
constitutional rights.”153 He appreciated the fact that the school board had a right to hire
and not hire at its own discretion, but asserted that this discretion did not cover violating
one’s constitutional rights. Of course, the 1964-65 school year was over, and the judge
had already mentioned that it was not within his power to draft a contract between the
plaintiff and defendant. With that in mind, the judge told the parties to come to an
agreement for monetary relief.154
A few months later, on September 16, 1966, Rackley’s case against her school
district was also decided. The issues in this case echoed, almost verbatim, the issues
covered in Williams’ case. The “sole issue” before the court was whether or not the
school board was justified in using its discretionary power to dismiss Gloria Rackley
from her position.155 There was never any question regarding Rackley’s abilities as a
teacher. In fact the Whittaker Elementary School principal, John H. Pearson, described

152

Irene Williams v. Sumter School District Number 2.
Ibid.
154
Ibid.
155
Gloria B. Rackley, Plaintiff, v. School District No. 5, Orangeburg County, et al.,
Defendants. 258 F. Supp. 676 (U.S. Dist. 1966).
153

278

her job performance as “excellent.”156 She was one of his “better classroom teachers,”
had a good relationship with the rest of the faculty, and had no parent complaints.157
Unlike Williams’ employers, Rackley’s school district did not wait until the end
of the school year and then simply choose not to rehire her. Rackley was dismissed, upon
Superintendent Marshall’s recommendation, only halfway into the school term on
October 15, 1963. And, of course, she had not been offered reemployment for the
following school year. What was truly at issue was her very visible leadership role in the
Orangeburg NAACP. She had participated in many peaceful demonstrations and, as a
result, had been arrested numerous times. As Judge Charles E. Simons noted in his
opinion, the decision to dismiss Rackley had to be “viewed by the court in light of the
matters before the board as recommended to it by Superintendent Marshall . . . There is
no evidence of record to indicate that any other considerations were before the Board in
this connection.”158 Judge Simons acknowledged that it was within a school board’s
power to hire and fire at their own discretion, but that discretion had to be exercised
carefully in order to ensure that no schoolteacher’s constitutionally guaranteed personal
liberties were compromised. His decision had to come down to whether or not the
board’s decision to dismiss Rackley was justifiable based on the reasons Superintendent
Marshall outlined in his letter. Therefore, Judge Simons ruled that the school district had
to pay Rackley the remainder of her salary from the 1963-64 school year. But, perhaps
because Rackley’s dismissal was so much more flagrantly unconstitutional, Simons also
ordered that the defense to “immediately reemploy, or offer to employ” Rackley in the
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same position she had before.159 If the position was no longer available, they were
ordered to offer her a position of equal status and salary as soon as it became available.
If she accepted the position, they were ordered to continue her employment without
regard to her civil rights activities.160
Losing her teaching position was obviously an enormous sacrifice, but despite the
fact that the judge ruled in her favor Gloria Rackley and her family did not return to
Orangeburg. By the time the case finally ended, she was already living in Virginia where
she had a more lucrative position teaching at Norfolk State University. And despite the
fact that her husband was a college professor, he no longer had a viable career in
Orangeburg. Because of his wife’s activities, Professor Rackley found himself a target of
economic reprisals. He had been given leave, with pay, to finish his doctorate. So the
college administration must have at least found his work satisfactory. Despite that, South
Carolina State chose not to renew the professor’s contract.161 So Professor and Mrs.
Rackley moved to Virginia, but Mrs. Rackley admitted that by this time their relationship
was already ending:
And by that time, our marriage was ended. So, if we talk
about losses that can be another thing we count as a loss.
Though no one thing ends a marriage . . . we never
recovered, our family never recovered from that.162
Indeed, the personal costs of Rackley’s activism not only included a professional setback,
and the dissolution of her marriage, but also compromised her relationships with her
daughters. For instance, she came very close to losing custody of her younger daughter,
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Lurma Rackley, who was eager to be more directly involved in the movement. A judge
ruled that she was a juvenile delinquent because of the long arrest record she accrued
during civil rights protests. The day they went to court regarding this issue was the same
day she and her mother were arrested for using the white restroom.163 There were
actually in jail when their case went before the judge. Lurma remembered:
And he was mad, mad. He was livid. He was beet red with
anger that we had not only come down to the court and
used the ladies room, but then had been continuously
protesting. . . He said to me, “I love all children, black and
white. Treat ‘em just the same. Feed ‘em out the same
spoon. But if you come before my court one more time
you’re going to reform school for seven years, until you’re
twenty-one.164
Lurma was arrested again and, as the judge warned, sentenced to seven years in reform
school. Fortunately, their ever-vigilant civil rights attorney, Matthew Perry, was able to
have Lurma returned to her mother, but he advised them both that Lurma should not
participate in any more demonstrations. He could not guarantee that she would not be
required to go to reform school. After all, Mrs. Rackley had been accused of being an
unfit mother due to her daughter’s many arrests.165 One newspaper even referred to her
as “wildly dangerous.”166 Initially, Rackley disagreed with Perry’s advice. She said a
judge could not just take a child away from their mother. Perry told her that she must not
know anything about the juvenile court system. The possibility that her daughter could
be taken away scared her. She spoke with Lurma and asked her to stop picketing for a

163

Blackwell and Rackley interview.
Ibid.
165
Ibid.
166
Woods, “Working in the Shadows,” 105.
164

281

while. But Lurma wanted to continue, unless her mother was in jail. So, she continued
to participate, but fortunately was not arrested again.167
Gloria Rackley also seemed to feel some guilt about having to move her
daughters to another state. They had to leave their friends. Lurma, who was looking
forward to being part of the class to integrate Orangeburg High, ended up in a city that
had already desegregated its schools. She understood that her mother needed to move on,
but regretted not being able to see the fruits of their labor. For her part, Jamelle Rackley,
who was named alongside her mother as a plaintiff in the suit against Orangeburg
Regional Hospital, excelled. In many ways, she did exactly what middle-class African
Americans like the Rackley’s expected their children to do and embodied what
generations of African Americans had hoped for. She did well in high school, winning a
New American Library of World Literature Award during the PEA’s annual meeting. She
started Bennett College in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1963—the same tumultuous
year in which her mother lost her teaching position. She graduated in 1967 and received a
scholarship to go to graduate school at Wesleyan-Middlebury University to study modern
language. Her engagement in 1968 was announced in three different black newspapers.
Jamelle had become quite the socialite. Her fiancé, John Tollie Patterson, Jr. of New
York City, was a well-know businessman, and a founder and the National Director of the
Interracial Council for Business. But these same announcements, which help underscore
her status as a respectable member of the black middle-class, also hint at the possibility of
a strained relationship with her mother. Jamelle Gloria Rackley, who was so clearly
named after her mother, was repeatedly referred to as Mr. and Mrs. Louis Cargile
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Frayser’s daughter.

And although one paper mentioned her father, Dr. Larney G.

Rackley, and both her maternal and paternal grandparents, Gloria Rackley was never
mentioned.168
And Gloria experienced all of these repercussions without the unequivocal
support of her parents. Her father, who essentially introduced her to the NAACP and the
civil rights movement, was largely acceptant of her activism. But her mother, like many
other civil rights activists’ parents, worried about her and thought she and her daughters
might be safer if they were not always on the front lines of the battle for civil rights.169
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EPILOGUE: “NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH:” TEACHERS IN A
DESEGREGATING SOUTH CAROLINA
At its 1964 national convention in Seattle, Washington, the National Education
Association (NEA) requested that teachers associations in eleven southern states adopt a
merger plan: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Teacher associations in other
states that practiced racial segregation had voluntarily joined together after the 1954
Brown decision. The Palmetto Education Association immediately began working on a
merger plan. They put together an Executive Committee to draft guidelines for the
merger, and submitted their plans to the PEA House of Delegates. The guidelines were
then sent to every county association and printed in the PEA journal to ensure the
information was shared with as many members as possible.1
The PEA Unification Committee chairman, Hudson L. Barksdale, said in a report
to the House of Delegates that he wanted the PEA to formulate a plan that would
guarantee the PEA met the SCEA “as equals,” and “negotiate from strength.”2 The
merger discussion interrupted the PEA’s previously steady growth.

Membership

declined during the 1966-7 school year. Yet there were also more PEA members joining
the NEA. Potts believed that this was because many members believed the merger was
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inevitable and that, under these circumstances, the NEA was best equipped to meet their
needs.3
He specifically referenced the Rackley and Clarendon County cases.4 One issue that
Barksdale pointed out was that unlike the SCEA, the PEA had a history of meeting black
teachers’ needs. Walker E. Solomon, the longtime PEA executive secretary, also had
concerns, including: the new constitution, if the new association would continue
employing PEA staff, and “the protection of PEA members.”5 Solomon wanted the new
teachers’ association to maintain the Defense Welfare Fund, and to continue making
contributions to the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.6 Behind Barksdale
and Solomon’s concern was the knowledge that black teachers faced specific issues
completely unknown to white teachers. The PEA leaders wanted some assurances that
black teachers would continue to have a supportive organization behind them. Their
concerns help demonstrate that in addition to professional concerns the PEA served as a
black teachers’ civil rights organization.
PEA representatives had four meeting with SCEA representatives. The PEA
House of Delegates met and accepted a merger plan on April 1, 1967.

The new

organization would be called the South Carolina Education Association. Most of the
merger plant set in motion committees and leadership positions that would contain
current leaders from both organizations for a one year period. Both organizations’ full
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staff were to remain employed for a full year. The new merged teachers’ association
would officially begin April 1, 1968.7
Despite the PEA’s desire to come to the merger discussions as equals, the agreements
laid out in the Memorandum of Agreement illustrate that they were not truly regarded as
equals. The PEA leaders maintained leadership positions, but they were normally lower
positions—directly under the current SCEA leaders. For example, Walker E. Solomon,
the well-respected PEA Executive Secretary, was employed as the SCEA Associate
Secretary. Likewise, the current SCEA president

kept his position while the PEA

president became the vice-president.8 Furthermore, the merger plan also specified that
after the initial one-year period “no individual or group be given any special
consideration because of race,” leaving former PEA members with no guarantee that they
could continue to have any significant influence.9
Overall, the SCEA membership rose after the merger, but that was solely due to
its new African American members.

White membership fell after the merger was

announced.10 This turned out to be indicative of the organization’s continued to be racial
divisions. For example, the Human Relations Committee, tasked with the role creating
racial understanding worked “largely in isolation from other activities of the
association.”11 Additionally, its workshop attendees were predominantly black. This,
combined with the lesser positions former PEA leaders held in the new organization, lead
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some black teachers to believe that there was no real merger at all. Instead, the PEA had
simply been absorbed into the SCEA.12
Things were further complicated when it was revealed that some of the black
leadership questioned the SCEA’s financial standing. When the PEA was essentially
dissolved, their total worth in cash and property was estimated to be $250,000. There
were some questions regarding what exactly happened with those funds. PEA members
were especially concerned with the portion designated for the teacher defense fund as, per
the merger agreement, the teacher defense fund would continue to exist and be used in
the same way.13
It is perhaps what happened with the former PEA Executive Secretary Dr. Walker
E. Solomon that best illustrates the rift between the SCEA and PEA leadership. The
merger agreement’s language implied that Solomon would work directly under the
Executive Secretary, Dr. Carlos Gibbons. Solomon’s rank would be reflected in his
salary and responsibilities. Instead, in 1967, the SCEA hired an assistant executive
secretary, Dr. Henry Wiesman, whose position apparently pushed out Solomon.
Wiesman received a higher a salary than Solomon, had a prominent office location next
to Gibbons—while Solomon’s was small and in a non-descript area—and had a higher
status with more responsibilities. This was despite that fact that Solomon, with his
seventeen years of experience as an executive secretary of a statewide teachers’
association, clearly had more experience that Gibbons. When a group of black teachers
lodged a formal complaint, Gibbons and Solomon’s salaries were equalized.

Yet,

Weisman maintained the better office and Solomon’s skills continued to be completely
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overlooked. The NEA noted that Solomon’s treatment was “a clear violation of the intent
of the merger agreement” as the title Associate Executive Secretary clearly indicated he
would work directly under the Executive Secretary.14 Instead, not only were his skills
not used to their best advantage, but there was no evidence that Solomon was included in
the decision-making process. He was isolated—both physically and symbolically—from
the organization’s leadership.
The SCEA’s misuse of Dr. Solomon deepened the divide between the two
groups—one that had not been fully overcome before the merger.

There was an

opportunity to right this wrong when Dr. Gibbons resigned in April 1973. The Board of
Directors named Dr. Solomon the Acting Executive Secretary, and the SCEA’s black
leadership must have hoped that he would be chosen as the new Executive Secretary.
Instead, when the screening committee interviewed twenty-five candidates, Solomon was
not one of them. They initially chose a former SCEA president, Dr. Claude Kitchens,
who declined the appointment. Thirty-three SCEA members took this opportunity to
petition asking that Dr. Solomon be named the new Executive Secretary.15 The petition
stated:
Whereas the Screening Committee and the Board of
Directors will select a person who meets the qualifications
that have been set fort in the established guidelines; be it
also resolved that Whereas the present Acting Executive
Secretary, Walker E. Solomon, having met all the
qualifications that were included in these guidelines, be
given primary consideration for the position of Executive
Secretary of the South Carolina Education Association.16
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They noted that Solomon served as the PEA’s executive secretary for “17 successful
years” and implored the committee to place Solomon in the position.17 The committee
interviewed five applicants for the job, including Dr. Solomon, and elected Michael
Fleming by secret ballot.18
In his account of the PEA’s merger with the SCEA, Potts says that although the
merger agreement only ensured collaboration between the two organizations for one year,
the organization’s constitution was revised in 1971, 197, and 1975 to to guarantee
“ethnic-minority representation.” 19 This was likely done at the NEA’s recommendation.
For after reviewing the PEA-SCEA merger process the national organization noted that
although “the concept racial quotas and minority guarantees is repugnant to many
citizens,” there were few other options “until we are able to eradicate, finally, the blight
of racial bigotry.”20 The NEA further recommended that the black teachers organize a
caucus in order to ensure that their voting power was used as effectively as possible.
They also recommended that the SCEA begin collecting racial designations during
enrollment to guarantee accurate information when determining the racial composition
for their various committees.21 Another recommendation the NEA believed would help
make the merger more meaningful was for the SCEA to “delay no longer” in having the
PEA’s history written before some of that history was permanently lost when the
organization’s oldest members passed away.22

17

Petition, July 6, 1973.
SCEA Merger Evaluation.
19
A History of the Palmetto Education Association, 205.
20
SCEA Merger Evaluation.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
18

289

One issue the SCEA was clearly unprepared to address was African American
teachers’ plight during desegregation. Desegregation almost always resulted in closing
black schools, located in black neighborhoods. As a result, the number of African
Americans in supervisory positions such as principal and coach fell.23

The demotion of

African American school faculty was the focal point of a American Friends Service
Committee sponsored 1970 meeting in New Orleans where conference participants
agreed that it was “very important for black children to see black persons in positions of
authority.”24 African American demotion became so routine that civil rights attorneys
began asking judges to include guarantees in school integration orders that the newly
desegregated schools retain African Americans in supervisory positions.25
The Training Coordination Center for Displaced Teachers (TCCDT) was created
to help teachers who had been displaced due to desegregation in North and South
Carolina. They cited a figure of over 2,000 black teachers who were displaced due to
southern desegregation in the 1968-1971 school years.26 Their focus was not only on
teachers who had been outright dismissed, but also those who were “demoted,
unsatisfactorily transferred, or reassigned to lower paying, less satisfying positions,” and
people placed in positions “outside their area of certification or experience.”27 The
organization intended to identify these educators, gather helpful data on them, and
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provide counseling and placement services for teachers to either find new teaching
positions or receive additional training/education.28
The Center reached out to other organizations such as the NAACP, teachers
associations, and school districts to locate displaced teachers, but ultimately decided that
best way to locate affected teachers was on a county-by-county basis. For this reason
they turned to some of South Carolina’s most well-respected black educators to identify
affected teachers including former PEA leaders Walker E. Solomon, and H. L.
Barksdale. 29 Individuals such as Solomon and Barksdale would likely have direct
knowledge of which teachers in their communities were having a hard time transitioning
to desegregated schools, and how to best meet teachers’ needs.
As of September 1971, the Center had made contact with 259 individuals, twenty-one
of which were displaced personnel. Out of that, the center helped fourteen teachers get
accepted to universities where they could pursue graduate degrees. All fourteen were
accepted to out-of-state schools.30 The Center was poised to help even more teachers in
the 1972-1973 school year since one hundred nine people applied to their Teacher
Development for Desegregating Schools Programs.
Yet, all of this may have seemed like a moot point in light of how much public
schools were changing in the post-Brown era, particularly as judges handed down more
and more desegregation orders. For although dual public school systems were being
abolished, segregation was not. Desegregation suits prevented public schools from
racially segregating students, but they simultaneously sparked the creation of a plethora
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white private schools. 31 One paper estimated that at least 100,000 students were
attending these new schools, “five to 10 times as many as there were before passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”32 According to a Southern Regional Council study, southern
students were riding up to seventy percent further to attend private schools; more students
were riding to private schools than public schools; and the average private school student
was traveling further (17.7 mi. one-way) than the average public school student (10 mi.
one-way). In fact, white segregated private schools were growing by leaps and bounds
along the South Carolina coast where there were large concentrations of black
Carolinians. For instance, white parents in Hilton Head, South Carolina were sending
their children on a 120 mile round-trip everyday so they could attend a school in
Beaufort. The result was that public schools were becoming, by default, predominantly
African American.33
In addition to maintaining a segregated school system, school privatization also
negatively affected public schools because it lowered school attendance, therefore
threatening public school funding from the local, state, and federal governments.34 After
all if “segregationist-inclined” state legislators did not care about black children, then
they would have no qualms about lowering education appropriations.35 Public pressure
to decrease tax support for public schools was already mounting. And while school
privatization may have had the most negative effects on black students, it did not always
bode well for the white students attending private schools. Many of the schools were
31
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located in old, inadequate buildings, and staffed by unqualified faculty. The Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools accredited only a few of them. Other than Florida,
no southern state had any strict set of standards that private schools had to meet. State
officials in Alabma, Georgia, Mississippi, and North and South Carolina were not even
sure how many private schools were located in their states. Some of the new private
schools were attempting to start their own crediting institutions, such as the South
Carolina Independent School Association. But older, more established private schools
were also critical of the new schools that they believed challenged private schools’
reputation for providing a superior education.36
Yet, a few of these new private schools were well-funded. A prominent example was
South Carolina’s own Wade-Hampton School, which boasted a $350,000 plant and tenacre campus. Located in Orangeburg, South Carolina, the out-of-way school attracted
students from all over. At least forty percent of its students were bused in. Like the other
white, private schools founded in the post-Brown era, Wade-Hampton was created out of
a fear of integrated schools, and a belief that black children were incapable of attaining
high intellectual standards.37 As the school president Dr. T. E. Wannamker one stated, “I
believe it is heredity first and environment second. Many (black students) are little more
than field hands.”38
Considering the Wade-Hampton’s history, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
appointment of the school’s former Head Master, Mr. Tiederman, as the new
Salkhehatchi Community Action Council Headstart director was met with negative
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reactions from the black community.

South Carolina NAACP leaders argued that the

Salkhehatchi Community Action Council violated the Office for Economic Opportunity’s
hiring practices in hiring Tiederman. As SC NAACP leader, I. DeQuincey Newman
argued in a telegram:
Such an appointment undermines confidence in a
supposedly racially integrated program and can hardly be
accepted with dignity by those who are sensitive to claims
of American democracy. I urge that the appointment be
withdrawn.39
The teacher associations’ merger, black teacher demotion and displacement, and the
growth of white private schools demonstrate that school desegregation did not solve the
issues that either black educators or their students faced. Instead, without legislated
racial segregation, continued education inequalities became more nuanced and therefore
more difficult to alleviate. As African Americans moved further into the twentieth
century, education attainment remained a central part of their struggle for equal rights.
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